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Summary 
 
Over the last decades, European countries have increasingly relied on Active Labor 
Market Policies (ALMPs) as a mechanism to increase the employability of the 
unemployed.  Following the 2008 economic crisis, ALMPs were increasingly relied on 
by Ireland and Spain as a strategy to assist and improve unemployed young workers’ 
integration into the labor market.   One notable aspect was the Irish and Spanish 
government’s development of new ALMP internship programs, ones that relied more 
extensively on demand led activation through firm work experience or ALMP 
internships.  While the development of these ALMP internship programs was in line 
with the existing ALMP evaluation literature which asserted higher levels of 
employer integration yielded higher probabilities for employment (Kluve 2006; Card 
et al. 2009), none of the evaluation literature considered the role of the employer in 
shaping ALMP outcomes, nor did it consider other aspects of job quality outcomes 
beyond earnings.  
While adopting a comparative case study design at the sectoral level within five Irish 
and Spanish ICT firms, this thesis aims to understand how Irish and Spanish ALMP 
internships facilitate particular job quality outcomes within the Spanish and Irish ICT 
sectors.  Through an examination of the key macro and meso institutions within 
which these ICT firms are embedded, the research identifies and examines how 
particular mechanisms may enable or constrain the ICT firms’ behavior surrounding 
job quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  It provides a conceptualization of 
job quality through the adoption of a flexicurity framework which enables the 
examination of four job quality dimensions: earnings, working time quality, skills and 
discretion and prospects and internal progression.   
The analysis reveals that in a context of weak macro and meso level institutions, firm 
features play an increasingly important role in explaining how employers facilitate 
particular job quality outcomes through ALMP internships within the Spanish and 
Irish ICT sectors.  Within this weak institutional environment, similar patterns were 
found among the Irish and Spanish MNC subsidiary firms and the Irish and Spanish 
 
 
xii 
 
domestic firms in relation to how these two groups of firms used ALMP internships.  
The MNC subsidiary firms were found to primarily use ALMP internships as a flexible 
supply of labor, one with limited scope for upskilling.  In comparison, among the 
domestic ICT firms, the ALMP internships were more effective, given the reduced 
hiring risks provided and the access ALMP interns had to a wider range of skill 
development and work experience, thus providing for upskilling.  This thesis 
highlights how sectoral and firm specific dynamics may influence employer behavior 
related to job quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  In doing so, it also 
emphasizes the need for further institutional constraints that encourage ‘good’ job 
quality outcomes among Irish and Spanish firms that recruit through ALMP 
internships.  
1 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
From 1994-2007, Ireland and Spain were coined the ‘Celtic Tiger’ and the ‘Spanish 
miracle’ for their large GDP increases and sharp decreases in unemployment.  The 
economic success of Ireland and Spain translated into sharp declines in (youth) 
unemployment, as well as huge socio-demographic shifts in education levels, female 
labor market participation and, for the first time, mass immigration.  Both economies 
were also heavily reliant on the construction industry, largely fueled by a property 
bubble.  Thus, the decades prior to the economic crisis, were characterized by stark 
changes in Ireland and Spain, not only economically, but also in regard to the socio-
demographic profiles of the Irish and Spanish population.  However, by 2008 the global 
economic crisis meant the burst of the property bubble, the decline of the construction 
sector, and a banking crisis that led to Ireland’s subsequent Troika (IMF/ECB/EU) and 
Spain’s ECB bailout.  Thus, this signified a complete reversal of unemployment trends, as 
well as the mass emigration of many workers.   
Large increases in youth unemployment during the 2008 economic crisis in Ireland and 
Spain were particularly acute.  Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs), or government 
sponsored policies and programs to activate the unemployed, were one such tool both 
the Irish and Spanish governments relied on to assist and improve unemployed young 
workers’ integration into the labor market.   During the economic crisis, the Irish and 
Spanish governments developed new ALMP programs, ones that relied more 
extensively on demand led activation through firm work experience or ALMP 
internships.  Given that Irish and Spanish policy makers have historically focused on the 
‘supply side’ of ALMPs to improve employment prospects and skill acquisition of the 
unemployed, the introduction of demand led ALMP internship programs represented a 
departure from the past focus of Spanish and Irish ALMPs.   
While the new Irish and Spanish ALMP internship programs were in line with existing 
ALMP evaluation studies that suggested ALMP programs with higher levels of employer 
integration yielded higher probabilities for employment (Kluve 2006; Card et. al 2009), 
these studies still have little understanding of how employers or firms facilitate 
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employment outcomes.  Furthermore, existing ALMP evaluations studies also neglect 
the actual quality of the jobs attained and what role, if any, ALMPs play in shaping 
employer decisions surrounding job quality.   
While one of the consequences of the Irish and Spanish economic crisis was the sharp 
increases in unemployment, it also resulted in an overall deterioration of working 
conditions, particularly among new labor market entrants who faced lower earnings and 
less job security attached to new contracts. Therefore, measuring ALMP success or 
effectiveness in terms of employment outcomes risks obscuring the quality of the jobs 
attained and exactly what factors influence employer recruitment behavior in terms of 
job quality.  Indeed, as Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2011a: 45) poignantly stated, ‘…it 
should not be forgotten that even in the context of the current crisis the great majority 
of workers are employed and the quality of their jobs will be an obvious concern for 
them.’   
Therefore, this thesis is unique in that it aims to link three key concepts that were 
previously not linked in the literature and by policy makers:  ALMPs, employers, and job 
quality.  The research seeks to understand how Irish and Spanish ALMP internships 
facilitate particular job quality outcomes within the Spanish and Irish ICT sectors.  The 
study is located in the Spanish and Irish ICT sector, a sector known for its dynamic 
changes which lead to new forms of work organization, including outsourcing and inter-
firm collaboration, thus providing for an interesting case study of post-industrial society 
and service economy.   
To address the central research question, the study necessitates not just the 
identification of the Irish and Spanish ICT firms that hired individuals through the ALMP 
internship programs, but also a clear understanding of the key macro and meso 
institutions within which these ICT firms are embedded.  Indeed, adopting this approach 
enables the identification of particular mechanisms that may enable or constrain firm 
behavior surrounding job quality outcomes through ALMPs.   Another key aspect of 
answering the central research question is the conceptualization of job quality, 
something that has been chosen to be done through the adoption of a flexicurity 
analytical framework.  This enabled the examination of flexicurity balances for ‘good’ 
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job quality outcomes on four job quality dimensions: earnings, working time quality, 
skills and discretion and prospects and internal progression.  Importantly these job 
quality outcomes were considered in the context of the relationship between the 
Spanish and Irish ICT firms and the wider meso and macro institutional features of each 
country, thus enabling a holistic understanding of the central research question.  
 
Thesis Summary 
As already mentioned, this thesis aims to understand how Irish and Spanish ALMP 
internships facilitate particular job quality outcomes within the Spanish and Irish ICT 
sectors.  The following chapters aim to answer this question through a comparative 
empirical analysis of job quality outcomes within five Irish and Spanish ICT firms.   
Chapter 2 addresses the key literature linked to the central research question.  The 
chapter begins by reviewing the flexicurity literature and the various conceptualizations 
and analytical frameworks adopted thus far by researchers. It establishes the 
conceptualization of flexicurity that is used to operationalize job quality, as well as 
examines the key gaps in the literature that this research aims to address.  Following a 
review of the flexicurity literature, the literature on job quality is examined.  The 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature is argued to provide an important guide for the 
identification of key macro and meso institutions within which the Spanish and Irish ICT 
firms are embedded and that may impact job quality outcomes through ALMP 
internships.   Lastly, the small, but growing literature on ALMPs and employers is 
examined and some of the key firm level features that may impact employer 
engagement with ALMPs and job quality outcomes through ALMPs are explored.  
Chapter 3 explains the research methodology adopted and the strengths and challenges 
during the research process. First, it establishes the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological foundations and explains the adoption of a comparative case study 
approach using qualitative semi-structured interview methods. Then it makes an 
argument for the selection of the Irish and Spanish cases, as well as the selection of the 
ICT sector.  The process of sampling and data collection among firms and interviewees is 
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also described with diversity among firms and interviewees accounted for by providing 
for variation in size, diversity in MNC/domestic firms, and a range of interviews across 
gender within firms.  Lastly, the process of data analysis and research ethics are also 
delineated so as to further affirm the trustworthiness, quality and rigor in the research 
findings.   
Chapter 4 addresses the ALMP dimension of the thesis through an examination of the 
existing literature.  Specifically, it contextualizes the thesis in terms of the ALMP types 
or ‘menu’ most dominant in each country.  It also describes the Education and 
Continuous (Vocational) Training systems within Ireland and Spain.  While Spain is 
concluded to have a less fragmented system of education and (initial) continuous 
vocational training providing for high degrees of social partner participation, the lack of 
coordination among social partners and heavy dependence on state intervention results 
in an underdeveloped and uncoordinated system with limited opportunities for training 
participation and innovation within firms.  The bureaucracy to access Spanish ALMPs 
and the continuous vocational training system also deters the participation of smaller 
firms.  Lastly, Spain is concluded to suffer from a weak Initial Vocational Education and 
Training (IVET) system with low graduation rates, in addition to large segments of the 
population with below secondary education levels. Thus, this creates a lack of trust in 
the ability of the Spanish state to deliver quality education at non-tertiary levels.  In 
comparison, Ireland appears to have a low degree of social partner participation to 
negotiate training with institutionalized spaces for social partners to negotiate and 
coordinate training largely absent, thus opportunities to innovate training are largely 
fragmented.   A lack of a strong initial and continuing vocational training system 
combined with weak Irish Public Employment Service (PES) institutions also further 
discourages Irish firms from consistently participating in ALMPs and developing strong 
links with training institutions outside the university and technical education system.  
Chapter 5 is the first of the three analyses chapters and aims to address the question of 
how the Irish and Spanish ICT firms engage with ALMPs.  Specifically, it analyses three 
factors:  1) the level of institutionalization of social dialogue, 2) the capacity of the PES, 
and 3) the level of trust in state institutions to deliver high quality training outcomes.  
These factors are derived from the Chapter 4 review of the literature on Spanish and 
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Irish ALMPs, and education and training institutions as potential factors that may 
influence how ALMP training and hiring strategies are used within the Irish and Spanish 
ICT firms.  Despite varying levels of institutionalization to encourage social partners to 
negotiate and coordinate training, both the Irish and Spanish ICT firms are found to 
have high probabilities for a greater tendency towards diverse firm training practices. 
The weak capacity of the PES on the other hand, influences the systematic participation 
of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, thus answering the question of why some of the ICT 
firms may consistently engage, but playing less of a role in how firms incorporate ALMPs 
into firm training strategies. The last factor, the level of trust in state institutions to 
deliver high quality training outcomes, begins to unravel the important role that Irish 
and Spanish ICT firm level features, such as the organization of labor and the supply of 
specific skills, play in how ALMP training programs are integrated into the ICT firms. 
Chapter 6 addresses one of the central aspects of this research: job quality outcomes.  
While using a flexicurity analytical framework, balances for ‘good’ job quality outcomes 
on four job quality dimensions, earnings, working time quality, skills and discretion, and 
prospects and internal progression are examined within the Irish and Spanish ICT firms.  
To account for any variations in the job quality trajectory, the thesis analyses two points 
in time of the job quality dimension: the current job of former ALMP interns and the 
initial job following the ALMP internship.  Where relevant, collective agreements are 
also considered, given the potential for them to constrain or improve the job quality 
outcomes attained through ALMPs. However, similar to the previous analytical section 
the chapter concludes that job quality outcomes, particularly initial job quality 
outcomes, through ALMPs are more dependent on the interplay between national 
institutions and firm level production strategies.   Indeed, particular patterns in terms of 
how initial recruitment pathways manifested in practice among two groups of firms: the 
Irish Medium (IRM) firm and Spanish Large (SPL) firm and the Spanish Small (SPS) firm, 
Irish Small (IRS) firm and Spanish Medium (SPM) firm inform the basis for the following 
chapter on extended internal entry tournaments through ALMPs.   
Chapter 7 extends the research findings of Chapter 6 which identify divergent internal 
entry tournaments among two groups of Spanish and Irish ICT firms.  It examines the 
dynamics of the IRM and SPL firms’ ‘slow’ and unstructured internal entry tournaments 
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through ALMP internships and the IRS, SPS, and SPM firms’ ‘fast’ and structured internal 
entry tournaments through ALMP internships, as well as considers three firm level 
features which are argued to enable or constrain how the Irish and Spanish ICT firms 
construct particular entry tournaments through ALMP internships.  Specifically, the 
degree of internationalization, the degree of value firm’s attach to human capital (both 
general and specific), and the scarceness of this human capital are argued to provide 
particular conditions which may be conducive to more or less segmented and extended 
entry tournaments among the two groups of Irish and Spanish ICT firms.  
Chapter 8 revisits the central research question and summarizes the main findings of 
the thesis. It also presents the main contributions to knowledge, including the research 
gaps it fills within the literature and its contributions to methodology.  Lastly, it provides 
policy recommendations for ALMP internships and future areas of research. 
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Chapter 2:  Flexicurity, Job Quality, and 
ALMPs 
 
According to the European Commission (2007), flexicurity is an effort to balance social 
cohesion and security, as well as continue to harmonize and promote the integration of 
EU employment policy.  It aims to promote more and better jobs, while also fostering 
increased labor market flexibility (external and internal within firms) and security 
(employment and income) for workers.  In addition, flexicurity aims to decrease labor 
market segmentation and improve labor market access for weaker groups in and 
outside the labor market (Council of the European Union 2007).  Instead of focusing on 
job security, flexicurity focuses on employment throughout the entire working career 
and transitions between jobs, as well as places a strong emphasis on the involvement of 
social partners to develop balanced flexicurity models (European Commission 2007).  
ALMPs are considered a key aspect of flexicurity and are considered a strategy to 
improve workers ability to make labor market transitions.  In sum, flexicurity is 
concerned with combining high levels of flexibility with high levels of security to 
mutually benefit employees and the firm alike.  Because empirical evidence has shown 
that increases in flexible employment often result in poorer working conditions 
(Standing 1999; Keller and Seifert 2005; Barbieri and Scherer 2009; Kalleberg 2011; 
Samek Lodovici and Semenza 2012; Vallas and Prener 2012), varying flexicurity 
combinations have significant implications for job quality. 
However, despite the popularity of flexicurity among policy makers and academics, the 
conceptualization of flexicurity and its varied labor market outcomes have been heavily 
critiqued by scholars (Keune and Jepsen 2007;  Lewis and Plomien 2009; Schmid 2009; 
Burroni and Keune 2011; Heyes 2011), mainly due to the ambiguity surrounding its 
theoretical and analytical foundations.  Indeed, one of the key theoretical and analytical 
questions is exactly how to achieve combinations of flexibility and security to enhance 
job quality.  The role that ALMPs may play in facilitating transitions towards flexible and 
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secure jobs is also unclear, particularly in countries such as Ireland and Spain where 
ALMPs are less developed and occupy a less coordinated policy strategy. 
Therefore, this review of the literature aims to examine existing research and 
conceptualizations of flexicurity.  The existing literature on job quality is also examined 
and argued to provide a strong foundation for expected flexible and secure jobs at the 
firm level.  Last, the smaller body of research examining ALMPs and employers is 
examined, which provides further guidance as to how employers may utilize ALMPs and 
implicitly or explicitly contribute to job quality.  
 
Flexicurity as a Policy Concept 
While the flexicurity concept was officially adopted and integrated into the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) in 2007, the concept originated in the mid-1990s in the 
Netherlands through the preparation of the Dutch Flexibility and Security Act and the 
Allocation of Workers via Intermediaries Act.  These Acts aimed to increase flexibility, 
improve (social) security and legally ensure atypical, flexible workers were granted 
similar working conditions and social security as workers employed on standard 
contracts (Wilthagen and Tros 2004).  Shortly after, the Danish flexicurity model 
emerged. However, this model placed less emphasis on atypical versus standard 
contracts and legal rights and instead emphasized low employment protection 
legislation, extensive unemployment benefits, and active labor market policies. Both of 
these models recognized the importance of social partnerships, collective agreements 
and resulted in significant decreases in unemployment levels in Denmark and the 
Netherlands (Keune 2008).  
The success of the Danish and Dutch flexicurity models, presented a viable alternative 
for the EES and the dominant OECD neo-liberal discourse at the time which advocated 
for complete deregulation and flexibilization of the labor market to solve Europe’s labor 
market problems.  Furthermore, the flexicurity approach fit key elements of the 
European social model:  social dialogue, decent working conditions and social 
protection (Vaughan-Whitehead 2011).  By 2005, flexicurity was recognized by the 
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European Commission as an effective employment strategy to improve 
competitiveness, increase quality and productivity at work and mitigate labor market 
segmentation through decreased labor market protection legislation and increased 
social security benefits (Keune 2008).  Following extensive dialogue with European 
social partners and civil society, the flexicurity concept was officially adopted and 
integrated into the EES in 2007 (Bekker 2012).     
Flexicurity is loosely defined by the European Commission as, ‘a strategy to enhance, at 
the same time, flexibility and security in the labor market’ (European Commission 2007: 
4) and the concept is founded on four underlying employment strategies: 
1) Flexible and reliable work contracts, in accordance with labour laws, collective 
agreements and modern work organization principles 
2) The introduction of lifelong learning strategies; to support the continual 
adaptability of employees, particularly the most vulnerable in the labor market 
3) Effective active labor market policies (ALMP); to help employees find 
employment again after a period out of work 
4) The modernization of social security systems; to provide financial support which 
encourages employment and facilitates labor market mobility 
 
European Commission 2007: 5 
 
In addition to the flexicurity strategies, the European Commission also has proposed 
four pathways towards implementing flexicurity:  tackling contractual segmentation, 
developing flexicurity within the enterprise and offering transition security, tackling skill 
and opportunity gaps among the workforce and improving opportunities for benefit 
recipient and informally employed workers (European Commission 2007).  Last, they 
suggest eight common principles that member states must adhere to regardless of their 
specific labor market regimes.  These include supporting gender equality, establishing 
mutual participation with social partners and trust, encouraging both external and 
internal labor market flexibility, and creating better jobs. 
As evident in the flexicurity strategies and common principles, flexicurity is presented as 
requiring the active involvement of social partners and is advocated as a labor market 
strategy that can be adapted to member state’s institutional contexts. Because 
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employers benefit from high levels of flexibility and employees are granted high levels 
of security, flexicurity is argued to be a ‘win-win situation’ (Keune and Jepsen 2007), 
which attempts to balance the trade-off between labor market flexibility (capacity of 
firms and workers to adapt to change) and (income) security (Auer 2010). Because the 
balance between flexibility and security can determine labor market conditions, 
improving quality of work remains an important aspect of flexicurity, as is enhancing 
labor market access for the most vulnerable labor market participants (European 
Commission 2007). Instead of focusing on job security, flexicurity focuses on 
employment throughout the entire working career and transitions between jobs, rather 
than maintaining the same job for life.  This objective is complemented by the 
promotion of lifelong learning (LLL) policies (ALMPs and other training programs) that 
assist in assuring progressive labor market transitions and diminishing unemployment 
spells.   
Despite the existence of flexicurity strategies and principles and given that the 
European Employment Strategy largely relies on the soft regulation of flexicurity 
through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), this term remains relatively open 
and subject to member countries adapting flexicurity to their employment regimes and 
socio-economic interests.  Therefore, as a policy strategy (Jorgensen and Madsen 2007; 
Rogowski 2008) flexicurity is argued to provide both inspiration and guidance for 
policymakers in the adoption of a ‘holistic approach’ to employment and social policy, 
while also argued to be under-defined, ambiguous and subject to ‘political capture’ 
(Muffels and Luijkx 2004, Bertozzi and Bonoli 2009; Ibsen and Mailand 2010; Burroni 
and Keune 2011: 76).   
For instance, Keune and Jepsen (2007) argue that at the EU level the flexicurity concept 
enabled consensus to be established among almost all political actors (the Commission, 
the Council, Parliament, European Trade Union Confederation and Business Europe), 
when in reality actors were able to interpret flexicurity without making any real changes 
in their traditional labor market perspectives.  Consequentially, the academic debates 
have tended to center on conceptualizing flexicurity, the extent of its adaptation in EU 
member states, and its propensity or lack thereof to address EU labor market problems.  
The high levels of unemployment and the deterioration of working conditions following 
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the 2008 economic crisis also led to discussions regarding the robustness of flexicurity 
as an employment strategy during periods of economic decline (Auer 2010).  
Nonetheless, despite the ambiguity and debates of flexicurity as a policy concept, the 
popularity of it at the EU level also sparked many comparative empirical studies to 
analyse and capture flexicurity at the macro, meso and micro level. These studies thus 
provided for the further conceptualization of flexicurity, as well as enable the 
exploration of proposed empirical determinants of flexicurity.   
 
Conceptualization and Empirical Determinants of Flexicurity 
As noted in the previous section, flexicurity is multidimensional and difficult to define. 
Because an agreed upon definition of flexicurity still eludes academics (Viebrok and 
Clasen 2009), flexicurity analyses tend to be centered on elements of the EU flexicurity 
strategies and based on the Danish and Dutch flexicurity models and operationalize 
flexicurity accordingly.  One of the most well-known proponents of flexicurity, 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004), derive their definition from the Dutch flexicurity model.  
According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004:  169), flexicurity can be defined as, ‘a policy 
strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility 
of labour markets, work organization and labour relations on the one hand, and to 
enhance security – employment and social security – notably for weaker groups in and 
outside the labour market, on the other hand.’  While this definition draws attention to 
establishing a balance between flexicurity and security, particularly for vulnerable labor 
market groups, it has been criticized because it does not clarify who exactly are the 
‘weaker groups’ and demands that academics only consider employment policies that 
are explicitly termed ‘flexicurity’ (Tangien 2005).   
Another definition is suggested by Tangien (2005) in which he uses a combination of 
existing flexicurity definitions to propose a ‘trade unionist’ definition. Tangien defines 
flexicurity as, ‘[a] social protection for flexible work forces, understood as ‘an 
alternative to pure flexibilization’ (Keller and Seifert 2004:  22) and ‘to a deregulation 
only policy’ (Klammer 2004:  283).  He asserts that this definition of flexicurity further 
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represents and protects the interests of flexible workers, instead of only the employer.  
Indeed, others have critiqued the flexicurity employment strategy for its assumption 
that an equal power relationship exists between employees and employers to negotiate 
employment conditions (Ibsen and Mailand 2010).   
A third definition, presented by Ferrera et al. (2001:  21) defines flexicurity as ‘secured 
flexible employment’ and an employment strategy which aims to ‘reconcile labor 
market flexibility with measures to counter the growing social exclusion and the 
emergence of a class of working poor.’   This definition slightly reflects Wilthagen and 
Tros (2004), in that it emphasizes the exclusion of certain groups of workers from the 
labor force, though it adds an additional element by drawing attention to the working 
conditions for certain groups of people.  Unfortunately, it still does not specify what 
groups of people should be targeted as the working poor or the excluded labor force.   
Despite these and other more general definitions proposed by academics, Wilthagen 
and Tros’ (2004) flexicurity matrix is still considered one of the most common heuristic 
tools to analyse combinations of flexicurity.  Using four forms of flexibility taken from 
Atkinson’s ‘flexible firm’ (1985) and four forms of security, the matrix presents sixteen 
possible combinations or balances of flexicurity.   
Table 1:  The Flexicurity Matrix 
 
Flexibility/Security Job Security Employment 
Security 
Income 
Security 
Combination 
Security 
External-
numerical 
    
Internal-numerical     
Functional     
Variable pay     
 
Source: Wilthagen and Tros (2004:  171) 
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External numerical flexibility refers to the employer’s ability to hire and fire. This may be 
limited by employment protection legislation (EPL) which stipulates variable 
redundancy costs according to certain labor market groups.  Alternatively, lower levels 
of EPL may result in the firm easily shedding workers during economic downturns.  In 
addition, taking on fixed or temporary workers is also a way of increasing external 
numerical flexibility (Atkinson 1985). 
Working time flexibility refers to the ability of the firm to adjust working hours of the 
workforce, including the distribution, variation and length of those hours, including 
part-time work (Ibsen and Mailand 2009). 
Functional flexibility refers to the ability of the employer to move employees from one 
task to another and change the work content which should require high levels of 
multiple skills. This includes internal mobility, job rotation, increased autonomy in 
decision making and flatter organizational structures (Ibsen and Mailand 2009; Keller 
and Seifert 2004). 
Variable pay, also referred to as wage flexibility is the ability of the employer to alter 
wages according to changing labor market or competitive conditions.  This includes 
variable pay schemes linked to individual performance, skill attainment or task 
responsibility (Ibsen and Mailand 2009). 
Job security refers to the certainty of retaining a specific job with the same employer as 
expressed by job tenure and protections against dismissals and changes in working 
conditions. This is inversely related to external numerical flexibility (Standing 1999; 
Ibsen and Mailand 2009). 
Employment security refers to the level of employability or ability to find employment. 
This is linked to policies that enhance employability such as through training programs 
through ALMPs, on-the-job training and skill development (Ibsen and Mailand 2009; 
Keller and Seifert 2004). 
Income security refers to stable income levels during periods of transitions between 
employment and unemployment or during new job situations. This may include national 
 
 
14 
 
minimum wages, social security, progressive taxation, and wage indexations (Standing 
1999). 
Last, combination security refers to the certainty workers have to combine work with 
other social responsibilities and obligations, commonly known as work-life-balance 
(Ibsen and Mailand 2009). This can include flexible working hours, leave facilities and 
flexible part-time retirement. 
Thus, through these possible flexible and secure combinations particular balances are 
argued to be attained. However, as argued by Ibsen and Mailand (2009), the flexicurity 
matrix lacks theoretical underpinnings to define exactly what constitutes a balance. 
From the literature three types of flexibility and security balances are proposed.  The 
first, trade-offs, relates to the idea that an increase in flexibility automatically results in 
a decrease in security and vice versa.  Hence, here flexicurity balances are a zero sum 
game.  The second two types of balances rely on the presence or absence of 
complementary institutions that either reinforce or counteract each other, so as to 
produce virtuous circles (flexibility and security positively reinforce each other) or 
vicious circles (where flexibility and security counteract each other in a negative 
direction) (Schmid 2009).  The most classic example of virtuous cycles is the classic 
Danish golden triangle of flexicurity where high risk of job insecurity is compensated by 
income security and active labor market policies contribute to employment security 
(ibid).   
Schmid (ibid) links these three types of flexicurity balances to transitional labor market 
theory, while using it to illustrate examples of EU member states’ best practice for labor 
market transitions during the life course.  However, the examples are merely used to 
illustrate the possible contributions the analytical framework may present in the future, 
rather than a robust analysis of a particular set of EU countries.  Ibsen and Mailand 
(2009) further argue that one of the issues with the conceptualization of flexicurity 
balances as vicious and/or virtuous cycles is that it is often difficult to detect 
complementarity between institutions. Indeed, despite Wilthagen and Tros’ (2011) 
assertion that a positive sum game is possible in the flexicurity matrix through the 
development of institutional complementaries and a coordinated employment 
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approach, Burroni and Keune (2011) argue that in reality institutional complementaries 
are extremely rare and employment and social reform strategies generally are not 
coordinated.   
Ibsen and Mailand (2009) propose a modified version of the three conceptualizations of 
flexicurity balances proposed above.  While accepting that it is difficult to detect 
institutional complementarity, Ibsen and Mailand (ibid) first suggest win-win pay-offs or 
regulation that results in the mutual benefit of employers and employees, such as 
increased working time flexibility and increased security.  The second flexicurity balance 
can be achieved through compensated trade-offs, where workers accept increased 
flexibility to preserve other aspects of security, such as increased wage flexibility and 
reduced income security in compensation for the preservation of jobs/employment 
security.  The last concept Ibsen and Mailand (2009) propose is for non-flexicurity or 
lose/lose pay-offs, where neither the employer nor the worker benefits, such as a 
failure to provide adequate skill provision systems.  Again, this last non-flexicurity 
concept also does not attempt to distinguish institutional complementarity.    
While these flexicurity concepts still require a high level of inductive analysis, Ibsen and 
Mailand (2009) provide a robust analysis utilizing these three concepts to identify 
flexicurity balances across countries and sectors.  Accordingly, their conceptualization of 
flexicurity balances is adopted for this study, albeit it expands it to identify actual 
balances of flexicurity outcomes in practice at the sectoral level within the Irish and 
Spanish firms.  Indeed, other flexicurity research also primarily focuses on national and 
sectoral level (Pulignano and Keune 2015; Paolucci 2017) regulatory features, thus 
neglecting firm level flexicurity outcomes.   
Tangien (2005) proposes to measure flexicurity by using only two indicators of 
measurement, strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and social 
(income) security and attempts to account for the direction countries move towards or 
away from flexicurity over time.1  He argues that the flexicurity matrix assumes that 
                                                          
1
 In Tangien’s (2005) operationalization of flexicurity he classifies countries as flexicure, high flexibility and 
high security, (Denmark and Finland); inflexicure, low flexibility and high security (Sweden and the 
Netherlands); flex-insecure, high flexibility and low social security (United Kingdom); and inflex-insecure, 
strict EPL and little advanced social security (Spain, Portugal and Czech Republic). 
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employment policies and laws must contribute to security and flexibility, when in reality 
employment policies and laws contribute to either security or flexibility.  However, 
Tangien’s (Ibid) method of measuring flexicurity is still limited because it only considers 
two objective flexicurity indicators.  In addition, the specific impact of EPL on 
unemployment levels is still not conclusive (Baker et al. 2005; Ibsen and Myland 2009).  
Furthermore, as argued above, the focus on national level regulation still does not 
illustrate the actual impact of flexicurity in practice, thus not adequately accounting for 
diverse labor market practices at subnational levels. 
In reality, labor market case studies have shown that the labor market continues to be 
extremely heterogeneous, not just at the national level or among country clusters, but 
also at the sub-national levels (Burroni and Keune 2011; ICF GHK 2012; Heyes 2013).   In 
Italy, for example, significant regional differences exist in relation to economic 
disparities, institutional frameworks, union membership and industrial relations 
practices, making it difficult to implement a coordinated and coherent flexicurity 
approach (Burroni and Keune 2011; ICF GHK 2012).  Regional differences can also be 
observed within the Spanish Autonomous Basque Country where unemployment 
continues to be consistently lower than the rest of the country and trade unions are 
stronger, thus meaning that the Basque country also boasts more provincial agreements 
(Fishman 2012; Ibsen and Mailand 2009).  In these cases, Burroni and Keune (2011) 
argue, the danger exists that negative complementaries may emerge which may 
strengthen existing differences at the micro level, between groups of employees and 
workers. Instead of analyzing flexicurity in terms of its benefits for employers and 
employees, they argue flexicurity should be examined for its impact on different groups 
of workers and sectors (Ibid). Indeed, a lack of understanding how flexicurity impacts 
certain groups of vulnerable workers can be observed in the EES flagship initiatives, 
Agenda for New Skills and Jobs and Youth on the Move,2 where a lack of EU regulation 
and monitoring combined with implementation deficits at the local and national level 
                                                          
2
 The European policy initiative Agenda for New Skills and Jobs aims to improve people’s labor market 
skills and provide further job search assistance. However, only a few measures explicitly address youth.  
The Youth on the Move initiative focuses on the acquisition of new skills and competencies and increasing 
the mobility of young people in the EU.  Unfortunately, only a few measures explicitly address youth in 
the first policy initiative and both tend to only address young workers under 25, thus neglecting those 
young workers over 25 in the labor market that are also increasingly experiencing poor quality of work 
(European Commission 2010a; 2010c) 
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continue to mean that youth targeted employment policy remains uncoordinated and 
incoherent (Lahusen et al. 2013).    
Keller and Seifert (2005) also argue that when analyzing the flexicurity concept one 
must also consider the type of flexibility (i.e. internal or external) and its relation to the 
security system. Through an empirical study of Germany, they argue that not all forms 
of flexibility result in low quality of work and that Germany presents an example where 
internal flexibility has actually led to increased security.  They conclude that flexicurity 
can be a positive policy development because it aims to decrease the low quality of 
work associated with flexibility.  Granted, it has also been argued that the role of social 
partners in collective agreements continues to drive the German labor market’s strong 
emphasis on internal flexibility (Keller and Seifert 2005; ICF GHK 2012).  Similarly, the 
development of the Danish flexicurity model has been largely attributed to collective 
bargaining and pressure from part-time workers to increase the security of their 
contracts (Klindt and Moberg 2006).   
However, a country such as Spain that has a less dominant role of social partners in 
establishing collective agreements and a historically low use of part-time worker 
contracts (Ibsen and Mailand 2009), would find the introduction of internal flexibility 
and increasing security for part-time workers more challenging.  Within Ireland, despite 
the prevalence of part-time work, collective bargaining is largely absent from the 
private sector, thus this would also make it difficult to establish such a flexicurity 
balance for part-time workers.  Thus, collective bargaining can be argued to be a key 
institutional feature necessary for flexicurity. More generally, Burroni and Keune (2011:  
88) argue that ‘flexicurity assumes certain pre-existing institutional conditions exist and 
that social partners equally represent and maintain similar power between and within 
countries.’   
While Wilthagen and Tros (2004) do recognize the necessity of certain existing 
conditions (collective bargaining, high levels of trust, decentralization of labor market 
policy) to establish balances between flexibility and security, they base their conclusions 
on in depth studies of Denmark and the Netherlands and largely neglect how member 
countries that lack these institutional mechanisms can build on their existing 
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employment regimes to improve their flexicurity pathways.  Furthermore, they assume 
that if collective bargaining exists it will automatically include actors representing 
different viewpoints (i.e. associations for the unemployed or precarious workers) and 
encompass a range of employment issues, not just wage issues or dismissal issues.  
However, Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009) found that in Spain collective agreements rarely 
represent the interests of temporary employers and rather act as a tool to legitimize 
and implement national employment and social policy legislation.  Therefore, this 
suggests that even in cases where certain flexicurity conditions exist, such as collective 
bargaining, this does not guarantee additional regulatory features that move in the 
direction of establishing balances between flexibility and security. 
Heyes (2011) and Ruud et al. (2004) attribute variation in flexicurity and more 
specifically working conditions, to different employment regimes and domestic labor 
market policy.  Specifically, they find that the three employment regime types: 
inclusivist, dualist and market regimes, significantly influences the role different actors 
play in employment policy reform negotiations and the type of flexicurity policies 
pursued. For example, in the inclusivist employment regimes of Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland, they argue that trade unions and employers organizations are institutionalized 
and employment rights are extended to many workers.  In contrast, in the Spanish 
dualist employment regime, trade union/employment regimes are much weaker and 
certain groups of workers are privileged over others. Whereas, in the United Kingdom 
(as well as Ireland) market employment regime, employer organizations and trade 
unions lack opportunities to influence employment relations.  
In summary, a plethora of empirical studies exist on flexicurity, all adopting different 
perspectives, analytical frameworks and levels of analyses.  National comparative level 
analyses appear to dominate the flexicurity literature with even fewer cases of 
comparative sectoral level studies.  While national level studies tend to focus on 
clustering countries according to different analytical frameworks, sectoral level studies 
tend to focus primarily on sectoral and firm level collective bargaining.  While the 
sectoral level analyses provide for similar firm level conditions to analyze flexicurity 
balances for job quality within firms, it is difficult to distinguish whether flexicurity 
balances actually occur in practice and how the intersection of collective agreements 
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with formal and informal firm level policies may inhibit or enable these balances.   
Therefore, these gaps in the flexicurity research provide the impetus for the analysis of 
flexicurity balances to assess job quality outcomes at the sectoral and firm level. 
In addition, while ALMPs are consistently mentioned in the flexicurity research as 
enhancing employment security, the evaluation literature on ALMPs suggests that some 
ALMPs are more effective in terms of employment outcomes than others, with 
programs closer to the labor market having higher potential for employment (Kluve 
2006; Card et al. 2009).   ALMPs are highly diverse, varying from training to employment 
incentives, and thus cannot be automatically assumed to result in increases in 
employment security.  Indeed, ALMPs are often argued to be associated with the classic 
Danish Golden Triangle of flexicurity, where a positive sum game is argued to be 
possible with institutional complementaries and a coordinated employment (Wilthagen 
and Tros 2011).  However, as the flexicurity literature suggests these institutional 
complementaries are difficult to detect.  Within countries such as Ireland and Spain, 
countries lacking high levels of coordinated employment, it seems even more unlikely 
these complementaries would be readily apparent.  Therefore, the question remains as 
to exactly how ALMPs facilitate not just employment security, but balanced flexicurity 
outcomes so as to enhance job quality for workers. 
Last, these studies clearly demonstrate the important role that the intersection of 
specific national level and sectoral level institutions, not necessarily through 
institutional complementarities, may play in facilitating flexicurity balances for good 
quality jobs.  Indeed, the flexicurity literature suggests that specific conditions such as 
collective bargaining, high levels of trust, and the decentralization of labor market policy 
may be necessary as well to facilitate balances.  However, it was argued that even when 
countries do possess some of these conditions (i.e. collective bargaining), it does not 
necessarily guarantee a movement in the direction of balanced flexible and secure jobs.  
Therefore, detecting flexicurity balances in countries with weak or absent institutions 
and/or flexicurity conditions may be more challenging.  Within these countries, more 
diversity would be expected for flexible and secure job quality outcomes across sectors 
and firms. The following section turns to the literature on job quality to further examine 
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some of the key macro and meso institutions that may contribute to better quality jobs 
within firms that hire through ALMPs. 
 
Approaches to Understanding Quality of Work 
Quality of work is often expressed as a dichotomy between those with ‘good/better’ 
jobs and those with ‘bad/worse’ jobs (Doeringer and Piore 1971). Because quality of 
work is a multi-dimensional concept, it has developed in an interdisciplinary fashion 
(Gallie 2007).  Quality of work is concerned with aspects of employment quality, the rate 
of transition between jobs, ease of reemployment and level of participation, as well as 
the quality of the current job.  Divisions are evident between and within disciplines and 
those with more theory based models versus more pragmatic ones (Green 2006; Kahn 
2008; Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011a).   
From an economic perspective, particularly the neoclassic approach, labor market 
rigidities such as unemployment benefits, employment protection, minimum wages, 
and collective action (i.e. unions) are argued to distort labor market supply and demand 
(Segenberger 2011).  Thus, this approach argues that in a free market, involuntary 
unemployment should not occur and the solution is to remove labor market rigidities 
and promote flexibility. Instances of varied quality of work, is argued to be 
homogenized in the market by providing higher wages for those in lower quality of 
work.  This is based on the theory of wage compensation differentials or equalizing 
differences and asserts that job quality should not be of concern if all other things are 
kept equal (Rosen 1986; Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011a).  However, empirical evidence 
has demonstrated that while the wage compensation differentials theory may be 
maintained in some jobs, it is not maintained in all jobs, even jobs characterized by 
extreme health risks (Purse 2004; Bonhomme and Jolivet 2009).   
In general, wages and income are considered to be an important measurement of 
quality of work (i.e. good jobs are high wage jobs, while bad jobs are low wage jobs) 
within the economic discipline.  However, they can only partly explain job quality 
(Kalleberg 2011), as they neglect other important non-monetary, intrinsic aspects of 
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quality of work such as, autonomy and satisfaction and assume that the individual, 
subjective evaluation of job quality depends mainly on wages (Clark 1998; Green 2006).  
In Samek Lodovici and Semenza’s (2012) study of precarious work among young 
workers, they find that wages are not always strongly associated with quality of work 
for young workers.  Furthermore, a focus on wages does not capture the welfare-labor 
market nexus and the varied distribution of benefits to certain groups of workers.  
Davoine et al. (2008) and other researchers (Dahl et al. 2009) also argue that higher 
quality of work actually increases productivity, economic growth and improves 
employment rates at the macroeconomic level.  These observations contradict the 
theory of wage compensation differentials and measuring quality of work based on 
solely monetary factors.  In addition, these arguments also confirm the importance of 
quality of work and its contingency on not only employment rates, but also overall labor 
market outcomes.  
While empirical evidence has questioned wage compensation theory and the 
neoclassical approach, both still have impacted European government labor market 
institutions and policy decisions.  In the 1970s and 1990s, European governments were 
pressured to increase labor market flexibilization when large unemployment 
discrepancies between Europe and the United States  became evident and were seen by 
economists as the result of labor market rigidities and the social welfare system,  thus 
coining the term ‘Eurosclerosis’ (OECD 1994; Segenberger 2011). However, flexible 
labor market policies have not always been found to be directly correlated to overall 
(un)employment rates.  Howell et al. (2007) found that the EU 1990s reforms on 
protective labor market institutions did not necessarily correlate strongly to labor 
market success in terms of (un)employment rates.  In addition, countries pursued 
varying degrees of flexibility in their labor markets, some of which reaped negative 
consequences for specific groups of workers.   
For example, Denmark increased flexibility and its welfare schemes among all types of 
workers from the 1990s onward, while Spain promoted ‘flexibilization’ at the margins 
(Barbieri and Scherer 2009; Jessoula et al. 2010; Bentolila 2011 et al.; Samek Lodovici 
and Semenza 2012).  This meant that in Spain, high employment protection legislation 
was left largely unchanged for permanent workers, while flexible labor market policy 
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was introduced at the margin, mostly among the vulnerable labor market groups, 
through an expansion of atypical work3 contracts and an overall increase in the divide 
between insiders and outsiders (Bentolila et al. 2011).  Because atypical employment is 
often strongly correlated to a higher probability of unemployment, lower wages and 
welfare provisions, and unfavorable working conditions, it has had and continues to 
have strong repercussions for quality of work (Standing 1999; Gallie 2007; Barbieri 
2009; Barbieri and Scherer 2009; Samek Lodovici and Semenza 2012; Vallas and Prener 
2012).4  Therefore, whether quality of work can be attained through flexible labor 
market policy is highly dependent on how these flexible work arrangements are 
distributed and how they intersect with larger welfare regimes.   
From a sociological perspective, academics have tended to consider non-monetary 
aspects to explain quality of work including, contract status, job security, labor market 
transitions, skill level and occupation, and working conditions.  Dual labor market theory 
and segmentation theory are two important tools used to explain some of these aspects 
of quality of work. Dual labor market theory maintains that a divide exists between 
those groups with skilled, well paid, secure jobs (primary jobs) and those with poorly 
paid, insecure and low mobility (secondary jobs) (Doeringer and Piore 1971). Initially 
this theoretical perspective assumed workers chose this kind of work and/or were not 
suitable for other types of work.  Segmentation theory improved dual labor market 
theory by recognizing the division of the labor market between primary and secondary 
sectors with discriminatory policies and practices allocating jobs in the secondary sector 
to certain groups who then had little opportunity to transition into the primary sector. 
Dual labor market and segmentation theory are often used interchangeably with the 
accepted definition closer to the latter (Harisson and Sum 1979).  At the organizational 
level, the classic model of internal labor markets (ILMs) theory is another approach 
                                                          
3
 Atypical forms of work encompass everything that is not full-time employment and academics generally 
specify whether atypical work refers to involuntary part-time and temporary work, self-employment 
and/or fixed term employment (see Keller and Seifert 2005 for a full review).   
4
 While quality of work is often associated with atypical contracts, the degree of poor quality of work also 
depends on the form and duration of atypical employment (Keller and Seifert 2005). For instance 
individuals with atypical contracts in some countries (i.e. Italy and Spain) have limited access to social 
(security) systems, whereas in other countries (i.e. Denmark and the Netherlands) atypical workers have 
similar rights and access to social (systems) as permanent workers.  
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closely linked to dual labor market theory and one that is often used to describe 
different quality of work dimensions. 
The ILM approach was developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971) to describe those firms 
within the primary sector, employers offering limited ports of entry but progressive 
internal career opportunities to train in firm specific skills, and firms within the 
secondary sector, employers hiring low-skilled, non-unionized workers through 
temporary contracts.  In ILM theory, the primary sector firms are argued to provide 
more job security and progression opportunities for employees, while the secondary 
sector firms offer limited mobility and low job security.  Therefore, primary sector firms 
are argued to shelter workers from external labor market competition, while also 
enabling workers to take advantage of internal competition for promotions and pay 
ladders. Within the ILM theory, primary sector firms value on-the-job training which 
facilitates the acquisition of firm specific skills linked to structured promotion ladders.  
In turn, this is argued to facilitate employee commitment within the firm and discourage 
high job turn-over.   While the ILM theory provides insights into the firm and the role of 
the employer in developing particular job quality dimensions, the ILM theory is often 
critiqued for being static and polarized in its division between primary and secondary 
firms (Grimshaw and Rubery 1998).  In addition, the ILM theory is argued to fail to take 
into account the intersection of external labor markets and how this shapes internal 
employment policies and practices in the firm (ibid).  Indeed, through a case study of 
four firms, Grimshaw et al. (2001) argue that within the UK a ‘dismantling’ of ILMs is 
evident, within a context of changing conditions in both the external and internal labor 
markets.  This was found to result in flatter organizational structures with horizontal job 
ladders, greater emphasis on external opportunities for promotion, down-sizing and 
outsourcing, individualized reward systems, fragmented pay structures and an emphasis 
on temporary employment contracts.  Subsequent research by Grimshaw et al. (2002) 
on the same four firms further argues that flatter organizational structures have also 
resulted in a ‘delayering’ process which eliminates intermediary positions on the job 
ladder, thus reducing possibilities for on-the-job training as a pathway towards 
promotion to the next level.  Despite this evidence of a dismantling process of ILMs and 
more generally a deterioration of many job quality dimensions (particularly for those 
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jobs at lower levels), the European Employment Strategy (EES) and EU member country 
employment strategies often continue  to deregulate existing external employment 
protections to enhance labor market flexibility.    
In the EU report, Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity More and Better Jobs 
through Flexibility and Security, reducing labor market segmentation between insiders 
and outsiders and facilitating labor market transitions for women, young workers and 
migrants are considered key policy objectives (European Commission 2007). At the 
national level, one can also observe the impact of these theoretical approaches.  For 
example, in the Spanish Employment Strategy 2012-2014 (Estrategía Española de 
Empleo 2012-2014 ), it explicitly aimed to decrease temporary contracts and labor 
market segmentation by decreasing employment protection legislation for primary 
sector or permanent workers (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración 2011).  Within the 
academic literature, labor market dualism/segmentation theory has also heavily 
influenced discussions concerning the distribution of atypical work, job security, 
occupations, and working conditions among certain groups.   
Countries with higher labor market segmentation are often found to have a higher 
number of workers on temporary contracts and greater problems for labor market 
transition between temporary contracts and permanent contracts (Jessoula et al. 2010 
and Bentolila et al. 2011). Leschke (2012) argues this labor market segmentation also 
extends to the social welfare system and the nexus between the two reinforce each 
other since access to social welfare often depends on one’s work contract status.  While 
segmented labor markets have been used to explain occupation allocation among 
certain labor market groups, occupational delineations can be problematic because 
within one occupation, different divisions and hierarchies can create different types of 
quality of work (Standing 2011).  Employment polarization is another approach that has 
been used to explain decreases in quality of work among specific labor market groups.  
This approach refers to the relative decline of certain occupations and has informed 
reports on the decline of low paid, low-skilled jobs (Eurofound 2013).   
Another approach that has been used to explain employment relations and quality of 
work in certain regions of Europe is the comparative institutional approach.  While the 
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focus of this research is on Spanish and Irish quality of job outcomes through ALMPs at 
the firm level, job quality outcomes within firms still must be considered in the context 
of the wider meso and macro institutional features of each country.  The comparative 
institutional approach to quality of work thus provides helpful typologies to identify 
convergent and divergent macro and meso level patterns that may emerge when 
examining job quality outcomes within Irish and Spanish firms.  While two approaches 
are presented, the latter of the two is deemed more relevant for the central research 
question given the focus on the firm and more specifically ALMP internships.   
The comparative institutional approach uses institutional typologies to compare work 
dynamics between countries (Gallie 2007).  While slight variations have been proposed, 
the two commonly accepted models are Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare capitalism 
regimes (derived from power resource theory and later adapted to employment regime 
perspective) and Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism (VoC) typology (also 
known as production regime theory). In terms of the two approaches, it can be said that 
the Welfare Regimes approach focuses more on the relationship between the employee 
and the welfare regime (national level), whereas the VoC approach centers on the 
relationship between the firm and other institutional actors (meso level). 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare capitalism regimes have been seen as important typologies 
in Europe because of the bridge linking employment and social welfare (Gallie 2007).  
Specifically, Esping-Andersen examines the degree of decommodification of social 
welfare policies and the degree of social stratification of social welfare among particular 
classes.  From this he derives three types of welfare taxonomies: the social-democratic 
Scandinavian model (FI, NL, DK, NO, SE), the Liberal Anglo-Saxon model (AU, CA, US, NZ, 
IE, UK, JP, CH), and the Conservative Central Europe Model (IT, BE, FR, DE, ES).  The 
Scandinavian countries are classified as having high decommodification and strong 
universal investment in welfare, while the Liberal Anglo-Saxon Model countries are 
classified as having low decommodification and place an emphasis on strong 
individualistic self-reliance in terms of means-tested assistance and social welfare 
investment. The last Conservative Central European countries are classified as having 
relative degrees of corporatism that embraces employers and trade unions, but grant 
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rights to social assistance according to class and status and thus have modest degrees of 
decommodification. 
While Esping-Andersen initially labeled Spain and Italy as immature continental welfare 
regimes, subsequent efforts were made to develop a Southern European 
(Mediterranean) welfare model. The Southern European welfare model was 
characterized by a low level of social assistance, modest levels of active labor market 
policies, varying degrees of protection from dismissal, and moderate and low degrees of 
collective bargaining on wages and terms of employment (Segenberger 2011). 
Mediterranean regimes are also particularly known for high segmentation of 
entitlements and status (Sapir 2006).   
Esping Andersen provides a thorough historical account of how these various models 
were formed, considering institutional, class, and political factors led to varying welfare 
regimes. While the welfare capitalism regime literature does not explicitly link welfare 
models to quality of work, the extent of welfare provision is highly dependent on the 
relationship between the state, the market and the family and individual’s ability to 
survive without working, or the extent of decommodification, thus this has obvious 
implications for security and well-being.  However, the model primarily examines the 
relationship between the state and the market, thus neglecting the firm.  Furthermore, 
it does not pay particular attention to the role of skill formation and training, something 
that is of particular interest to this thesis, given the interest in ALMPs. Therefore, the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) typology which focuses more extensively on the firm 
enables the identification of further factors which may impact Spanish and Irish job 
quality outcomes through ALMPs within the firm.   
The VoC typology divides countries into liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and examines the interaction of firms in their 
institutional settings (Hall and Soskice 2001).  Though reminiscent of the corporatist 
tradition, it shifts the focus from the macro to the meso level.  The VoC approach argues 
that different employment dynamics depend on the strategies firms use to solve 
coordination problems in relation to industrial relations, initial vocational training, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relation and employee cooperation. Central to this 
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idea is the modes of coordination and the institutional complementaries found in such 
economies.  Within Europe, LMEs consist of Ireland and the United Kingdom and are 
characterized by weak degrees of coordination and a lack of institutional 
complementaries.  More specifically, these economies have low union density, low 
collective bargaining, poorly organized employer associations and competitive, 
hierarchical markets, weak vocational training systems and highly polarized skill 
structures.  In contrast, CMEs consisting of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Sweden are characterized by high degrees of institutional coordination and higher levels 
of institutional complementaries.  Specifically, these economies have high union 
density, high levels of collective bargaining and collaborative, non-market relationships, 
strong vocational training systems and highly specialized skills.   
The two different production regimes of LMEs and CMEs are argued to then have 
varying implications for issues such as skill acquisition, relations between managers and 
owners, subcontracting, product and innovation strategies, industrial relations and 
welfare regimes.  Gallie (2009) argues that LMEs are worse for quality of work because 
these countries have marginalized unions, low employment protection, and weak social 
welfare systems which can lead to polarization by skill, class and work contracts. 
However, the emphasis of CMEs on specific skills can also lead to gender segregation, 
since career interruptions among women would lead to employers not wanting to 
invest in training, thus strong labor market stratification may also lead to deterioration 
in quality of work (Ibid). 
Spain, along with other Southern and Eastern European countries, was initially excluded 
from the VoC approach. Subsequently, a Mediterranean capitalism or Mixed Market 
Economies (MME) (Molina and Rhodes 2007; Edlund and Gronlund 2008) was proposed, 
an economy characterized by coordination through national legislation, resulting in 
serious coordination deficits and an absence of institutional complementaries (Molina 
and Rhodes 2007).  These economies are characterized by strong state intervention, 
weak autonomous organization of business and labor and the legitimization of labor 
and business through access to state resources.  MMEs may be considered worse for 
quality of work given the underdeveloped vocational training systems, low levels of 
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social protection and high employment protection, and low levels of investment in 
specific skills. 
Within the VoC typology, as well as the Welfare regime, typology both Ireland and Spain 
appear to fair worse in terms of job quality.  However, while the VoC literature is useful 
in drawing attention to certain institutional features that may impact job security and 
skill formation systems, as already argued previously in the examination of flexicurity, 
institutional complementaries are extremely rare and employment and social reform 
strategies are rarely coordinated (Burroni and Keune 2011).   In addition, within Ireland 
and Spain, the dominance of weak and fragmented institutions may mean that 
particular sectoral and firm level features occupy increased importance in jobs quality 
outcomes.  
In addition, the homogeneity of the VoC has also been critiqued.   Goergen et al. (2012) 
in his assessment of VoCs asserts the need for further research to assess regional and 
sectoral diversity within and between Southern European countries, particularly the 
role of the informal economy.   Spain particularly has large interregional differences 
according to industry types and levels of economic development.  The classification of 
Ireland as a LME, has also been critiqued, with Gallie (2009) arguing Ireland actually lies 
between the two models because of its high level of centralized collective bargaining 
and social security.   Thus, these findings suggest that while the VoC typology may prove 
helpful in assessing outcomes for quality of work at the aggregate level, it may not 
account for other explanatory factors that explain quality of work within or between 
countries.   
Therefore, for this research, the VoC approach is argued to be useful to enable the 
identification of the particular incentives created by macro institutional structures 
which can influence firm level preference related to the quality of the job recruited 
through ALMPs.  However, of interest is also the employer’s role in ALMPs and the 
particular processes firms undertake to develop particular strategies of engagement 
with ALMPs.  Therefore, this demands the consideration of the ALMP literature and why 
and how employers engage with ALMP internships.  The following review of the ALMP 
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literature, thus addresses the two last key concepts of the research: ALMPs and the 
employer.    
 
ALMPs and Employers 
Within the European Employment Strategy (EES), Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) 
play a central role in the combating unemployment, with young unemployed labor 
market entrants often the main target group.  In general these policies aim to activate 
the unemployed through a job matching system and raise the productivity and skills of 
participants  through public/private employment subsidies, job search assistance, labor 
market training, and wage subsidies (Kluve 2006; Boone and van Ours 2004). ALMPs 
also aim to prevent a depreciation of human capital and keep young labor market 
entrants in contact with the labor market.  
The existing literature on ALMPs primarily evaluates the supply side of ALMPs in terms 
of whether participation in an ALMP increases an individual’s probability of being 
employed, with a few empirical studies of Scandinavian countries that consider an 
individual’s probability of both employment and earnings (see Card et al. 2009 for a full 
review).  Because ALMP programs are continuously being modified and are highly 
diverse, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of a stable set of ALMPs.  Accordingly, 
in Kluve (2006) and Card et al.’s (2009) meta-analyses of the ALMP evaluation literature 
they find consistently that ALMP program type matters with some programs performing 
better than others.  Specifically, they find that on-the-job training programs, which 
would include ALMP internships, tend to demonstrate favorable outcomes in the 
medium and short term.  Unfortunately, none of these supply side evaluation studies 
consider the role of the employer in shaping such ALMP outcomes, nor do they consider 
other aspect of job quality beyond earnings outcomes.  Indeed, Berry (2014) argues that 
ALMPs are part of the UK’s wider welfare-to-work agenda and simply provide a ready 
supply of low-paid and flexible workers.  Others also argue that while work-based 
ALMPs may be considered more effective in terms of employment outcomes, they are 
also highest in scope for substitution, deadweight, and displacement effects for non-
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participants (Piopiunik and Ryan 2012). Therefore, why and how employers participate 
in ALMPs appears particularly important in relation to job quality outcomes.  
A small, but growing number of studies exist that examine the supply side, or the 
employer side, of the ALMP relationship (Swank and Martin 2004; van Berkel and van 
der Aa 2014; Ingold and Stuart 2014,2015; Ingold and Valizade 2015; Bredgaard and 
Halkjær 2016; Bredgaard 2017).  All of these studies focus on the question of why and 
how employers participate or engage with ALMPs.  Thus far, these studies have been 
primarily based within Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, and France with two 
comparative studies of Denmark and the UK.    
The first of these studies was conducted by Swank and Martin (2004) and focuses on 
how the organization of firms influenced the support and participation of employer’s in 
social policies. While examining within and across country variation, Swank and Martin 
find that the representational power of business, coordination across business units and 
integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums, increases employer 
support and participation in social policies. They find strong links between ALMP 
spending levels and the centralization and coordination of employers and the 
integration of employer’s organizations in corporatist policy making forums.  Specific to 
the Danish corporatist model was the positive effect between employer membership in 
an employer’s association and ALMP participation, a finding that was not supported in 
the pluralist UK.  Therefore, this study suggests that higher levels of firm organization, 
such as in the case of Denmark, create broader levels of support for ALMPs as 
contributing to human capital and enhancing, rather than hindering the production 
process.  Thus, encompassing business associations may facilitate collective and shared 
concerns and value ALMP policies for skill upgrading, human capital development and 
solidarity (Schmitter 1981; Streeck 1992).    
Despite Swank and Martins’ (2004) findings, Ingold and Valizade (2015) found in their 
examination of the different types and degrees of UK and Danish employer engagement 
that membership in a regional or local business association did play a role in UK 
employer engagement, while it played less of a role in Danish employer engagement.  
They argued for strong variation in how employers engage with ALMPs between the 
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two countries, with UK employers more likely to be ‘instrumentally’ engaged, based on 
one-off or ad-hoc activities, and Danish employers more likely to be ‘relationally’ 
engaged, which involved repeated and sustained engagement.  The UK’s employer 
‘instrumental’ engagement was found to be largely related to individual and firm level 
policies such as corporate social responsibility and membership in regional and local 
business associations, whereas the Danish ‘relational’ engagement was found to be 
related to collective agreement coverage.  Therefore, this may suggest that in the 
absence of strong trade unions and broad collective agreement coverage in the UK, 
regional and local business associations provide an alternative mechanism to encourage 
firm engagement in ALMPs.  However, given that UK employer primarily engage on an 
ad-hoc, one-time basis, it should be questioned the extent to which membership in a 
regional and local business association represents a viable strategy for firms to develop 
sustained engagement with ALMPs.  In addition, Ingold and Valizade (2015) also found 
that within the UK a large number of the employees recruited from ALMPs were on zero 
hour contracts, thus further questioning the extent to which UK employer membership 
in regional and local business associations actually contributes to employers collectively 
valuing ALMPs as a strategy for skill upgrading and the development of human capital.   
Bredgaard and Halkjær (2016) further unpack the reasons why Danish employers 
engage with ALMPs through an examination of employers’ participation in wage subsidy 
schemes.  While relying on a variety of theoretical perspectives, they argue that Danish 
employers are more likely to participate in wage subsidy schemes when they are 
characterized by many unskilled workers, a higher coverage of collective agreements, a 
deteriorating economic situation, a domestic or Danish ownership structure and when 
the firm is part of the public sector. Thus, key hypotheses were developed according to 
the degree of firm skill-levels, the sector, the extent of collective agreement coverage, 
the economic situation of the firm, and internationalization of the firm.   Many of these 
same factors also influenced not only firm participation, but also how firms organized 
their workers according to particular production strategies which have implications for 
job quality. 
Similar to Ingold and Vilzade’s (2015) categorization of different types of employer 
engagement with ALMPs, Bredgaard (2017) develops a typology of four types of 
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employer engagement with ALMPs which he uses to assess Danish employers’ 
preferences and behavior towards activation policies.  Specifically, the typology defines 
four types of employers:  the committed employer (positive attitudes and participation), 
the skeptical employer (negative attitudes but participation), the dismissive employer 
(negative attitudes and no participation), and the passive employer (positive attitudes 
but no participation).  Bredgaard (Ibid) finds that few Danish employers are classified as 
committed employers, with the majority as either dismissive or passive.  Thus, though 
Denmark’s employer participation in ALMPs is still considered high when compared to 
other countries, Bredgaard (Ibid) suggests this may indicate greater scope for employer 
outreach and a need for improving employer attitudes and participation towards 
ALMPs.  
While adapting a slightly different perspective from the previous studies, Ingold and 
Stuart (2015) consider employer engagement, while surveying both employers and 
providers.  Specifically , they focus on the UK welfare-to-work program, ‘The Work 
Programme’ (WP) and the engagement between private, ‘pay-by-results’ providers and 
employers primarily in private and third sector SMEs.  They found that SMEs had little 
knowledge and scarcely recruited through the WP, and providers faced intense 
competition to access SMEs and large firms.  Ingold and Stuart (Ibid) conclude that while 
employers are central to the success of the WP, the nature of UK employers as less 
organized and weak policy actors, means that an automatic interest and propensity for 
employer’s to willingly engage with ALMPs does not exist.  In addition, the ‘pay-by-
results’ funding model only focuses on increasing numbers of repeat vacancies to the 
detriment of funneling more resources towards employer engagement. Importantly, 
they stress that an acknowledgement of the centrality of employers moves the ALMP 
thesis away from the assumption that the unemployed must be persuaded to take up 
available jobs, to one where, ‘jobs are available if only employers can be persuaded to 
offer them to the jobless’ (2015: 458).  Thus, they argue the WP is erroneously 
predicated on supply-side ideology while ignoring the importance of the demand side 
for success.   
The final two studies on employer engagement and participation in ALMPs are more 
exploratory in nature.  In the first study, Salognon (2007) explores the role of an ALMP 
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interventionist approach to change employer’s assessment and recruitment practices 
for vulnerable candidates.  Specifically, the ‘back-to-work’ is explored, a program that 
relies on provider teams to persuade and negotiate with employers to encourage them 
to recruit those unemployed furthest away from the labor market onto stable jobs and 
reduce selectivity when hiring.  Salognon (Ibid) finds that this particular interventionist 
approach creates a tri-partite negotiation process that shifts the balance of employer 
recruitment criteria (work experience, education level, etc.).  
Along a similar vein, Van Berkel and Van der Aa (2014) explore the nature of employer 
motivation and engagement in ‘innovative employer-oriented’ activation policies, or 
policies that aim to influence employers’ willingness to hire, train and guide 
unemployed people, in two Dutch cities.  They found three possible motivations for 
employer participation:  to hire new workers, to lower costs, and to enact social 
responsibility.  Satisfaction levels were then accounted for by two groups of employers, 
those that engage in the implementation of ALMPs in client or co-producing roles, with 
the latter increasing employer willingness to be flexible concerning demands and also 
having great satisfaction with the activation policy. Specifically, they emphasize the 
importance of focusing on the interaction between demand and supply oriented 
activation policies, where an unmotivated ALMP candidate forced to uptake an 
activation program may deter firm participation, even when they offer training and 
personal guidance to new workers.  
 
From this brief review of the literature on ALMPs and employers, it is apparent that this 
area of research is still fairly new and future research directions are possible.  This thesis 
aims to move beyond the existing analyses on employer engagement with ALMPs to 
consider how employers that recruit through ALMPs construct flexible and secure job 
quality outcomes.  In addition, the majority of these studies do not consider the sector 
of the firm beyond the public-private divide.  This is a clear gap in the literature given 
that a sector level analysis can provide for similar institutional arrangements, market 
environments and job quality demands, something particularly relevant for cross-
national comparative case studies.  
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The comparative studies between Denmark and the UK suggest that ALMP engagement 
is more frequent among Danish employers, and that UK employers may only 
periodically engage with ALMPs.  Ingold and Valizades (2015) find that the majority of 
UK employers are using ALMPs to recruit individuals onto zero hour contracts, thus 
suggesting that ALMPs are valued by many UK employers as a ready supply of flexible 
labor.  This in turn suggests that ALMPs among UK employers may have a higher 
propensity to facilitate poor job quality outcomes.  While variation exist within Denmark 
in relation to firm engagement with ALMPs, corporatist Denmark still appears to have 
particular institutions that facilitate employer engagement with ALMPs, some which 
may also constrain how employer use ALMPs in their overall production strategies and 
support higher quality of job outcomes.  Specifically, the high levels of trade union and 
employer organization and the coordinated and integrated policy processes appear to 
provide particular capacities for Danish firms to engage with ALMPs, capacities that are 
lacking in the UK.  According to the VoC literature, Irish and Spanish firms would be 
embedded in less coordinated and integrated policy processes with a lack of highly 
coordinated trade unions and employers associations, characteristic of LME and MME 
regimes.  
Therefore, further nuances may be found at the sector and firm level which play an 
important role in how employers use ALMPs to facilitate flexible or secure job quality 
outcomes.   Importantly, Bredgaard and Halkjær (2016) also consider other firm factors 
which may intersect with meso and macro level institutions to influence employer 
engagement with ALMPs.  These include the degree of firm skill-levels, the sector, the 
extent of the economic situation of the firm, and the internationalization of the firm.  
Thus, in addition to the Irish and Spanish macro and meso level institutions, these firm 
level factors will also be considered.   
Finally, the last three studies on ALMP employer engagement relate more to the 
intersection of PES or intermediaries and employers.  These studies suggest that more 
interventionist and co-producing methods of employer engagement with intermediaries 
and providers, outside the pay-by-results model, may lead to increased employer 
engagement, higher satisfaction levels, and in the case study of France, a change in 
employer behaviour for recruiting vulnerable labor market groups. Therefore, these 
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studies stress the importance of positive, intensive and collaborative interactions with 
PES institutions so as to encourage consistent employer participation and shifts in 
employer hiring behaviour.  Therefore, along with the previously mentioned factors, the 
interaction between the PES and Irish and Spanish ALMPs is also considered a possible 
factor in influencing employer decision on job quality outcomes when hiring through 
ALMPs.  
Conclusion 
Through a review of the literature on flexicurity, quality of work, and ALMPs and 
employers, a clearer understanding was attained of some of the key research gaps and 
key aspects of the central research question. The flexicurity literature was argued to 
focus primarily on flexicurity balances attained through national and sectoral collective 
bargaining regulatory institutions, thus neglecting the actual flexicurity balances that 
occur in practice.  In addition, the level of analysis in the flexicurity literature has 
primarily been restricted to the national level focused on clustering countries according 
to different analytical frameworks and the sectoral level with a tendency to focus 
primarily on sectoral and firm level collective bargaining.  ALMPs are also argued to 
occupy an ambiguous position in the literature on flexicurity, with it remaining unclear 
exactly how ALMPs facilitate balanced flexicurity outcomes, particularly in countries 
such as Ireland and Spain which lack the coordinated employment institutions of the 
classic example, Denmark. Last, while some institutional (i.e. collective bargaining) 
conditions are suggested as necessary to support flexible and secure job quality 
outcomes, detecting these contributions may be less apparent in countries such as 
Ireland and Spain, given the absence or weakness of these conditions and may result in 
more diversity for flexible and secure job quality outcomes across sectors and firms. 
Therefore, this research adopts an analysis of flexible and secure jobs at the sectoral 
and firm level, one that takes into account flexicurity outcomes in practice. It also 
adopts the conceptual and analytical flexicurity framework of Ibsen and Mailand (2009) 
to assess job quality, while extending it to address flexible and secure job quality 
outcomes in practice among Irish and Spanish ICT firms. 
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Through an examination of the comparative institutional literature on quality of work, 
Ireland and Spain are concluded to fare poorly in job quality.  According to the VoC 
literature, Ireland’s position as a LME country is argued to provide for worse quality of 
work due to its marginalized unions, low employment protection, weak social welfare 
systems, and underdeveloped vocational training systems which can lead to polarization 
by skill, class and work contracts. Similarly, Spain’s position as a MME country means 
low levels of social protection and high employment protection, weak unions, low levels 
of investment in specific skills, and underdeveloped vocational training systems which 
may be considered worse for quality of work. However, the critiques of the VoC 
literature question the extent to which institutional complementaries and coordinated 
social reform strategies exist.  Consequently, this research selects to use the VoC 
literature as a guide to direct attention towards certain institutional features within 
Ireland and Spain that may impact job quality outcomes through ALMPs. 
Last, the literature on ALMPs and employer engagement was examined.  While the 
studies provide a great deal of insight into why and to what extent employers engage 
with ALMPs, less attention is paid to how employers that recruit through ALMPs 
construct job quality outcomes and what factors explain this.  In addition, the majority 
of these studies examine employer engagement with ALMPs at the firm level, even 
when comparing across countries.  Therefore, this research aims to fill these gaps by 
adopting a sectoral approach and one that takes into account how employers that 
recruit through ALMPs construct job quality outcomes.   
The research also considers what macro, meso and micro level institutions and 
processes contribute to these job quality outcomes.  Given Spain and Ireland’s less 
coordinated and integrated policy processes with a lack of highly coordinated trade 
unions and employers associations, the existing literature suggests that Irish and 
Spanish employers would not have the same institutional capacities as those evident in 
the ALMP employer engagement literature on Danish employers.  Therefore, other firm 
level features suggested in this literature including firm skill-levels, the sector, the 
economic situation of the firm, and the internationalization of the firm are also 
considered given the implications they may have on employer behavior not only in 
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engaging with ALMPs, but also adopting particular job quality outcomes when hiring 
through ALMPs.   
Lastly, the literature also suggests a focus on the importance of positive, intensive and 
collaborative interactions with PES institutions so as to encourage consistent employer 
participation and shifts in employer hiring behavior.  Thus, the PES is also considered to 
potentially play a dominant role in constructing employer hiring behavior.  Therefore, 
the flexicurity literature enables the operationalization and conceptualization of job 
quality, while the VoC literature and the literature on employer engagement in ALMPs 
enables the identification of key macro and meso institutions and firm level features 
that may impact how ALMP internships facilitate particular job quality outcomes within 
the Spanish and Irish ICT sectors.  
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
This chapter aims to describe the research design undertaken to study the extent to 
which Spanish and Irish ALMP internships facilitate job quality at the firm level within 
the ICT sector. First the chapter will discuss the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological orientations and how this informed the methodology adopted and research 
methods used. Then, it will continue with a discussion of the qualitative methodology 
and comparative case study research approach used, including explanations for case 
study selection at the national, sectoral and firm levels. Following this, details related to 
the interview process, and sampling methods and data analysis are discussed.  Lastly, 
ethics and some of the limitations of the research methodology are considered.  
 
Epistemological and Ontological Orientations 
 A researcher’s epistemological (the construction of meaning) and ontological (the 
nature of reality) orientations form the foundation for the theoretical perspective 
adopted, methodology selected and the choice of methods undertaken (Crotty 1998; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2011).  In other words, ‘The gendered, mulitculturally situated 
researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework (theory, ontology) 
that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) which are then examined (methodology, 
analysis) in specific ways’  (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 11).   
This research adheres to the epistemological and ontological tenets of the constructivist 
paradigm which assumes a relativist ontology (multiple realities exist), subjectivist 
epistemology (knower and respondent co-create understandings) and naturalistic 
methodological strategies.  This perspective assumes that the knower and respondent 
are inseparable and thus the participant cannot be isolated from natural settings or 
context (Lincoln and Guba 1985).  In line with this orientation, the researcher chose to 
adopt an (interpretive) case study approach so as to understand not only the 
relationship between ALMP internships and job quality dimensions, but also how this 
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reality is constructed at the intersection of the firm, while taking into account the 
embeddedness of the firm in wider sectoral and national settings.  A qualitative 
research methodology was adopted relying principally on semi-structured interview 
methods alongside the analysis of government policy, collective agreements, labor 
market legislation and firm level documents and web pages.  
 
Qualitative Research 
An extensive literature exists evaluating the effectiveness of ALMPs in terms of a range 
of factors (i.e. ALMP type, individual characteristics, program duration, institutional 
factors) according to individual employment outcomes and earnings (see Card et al. 
2009; Kluve 2006 for an overview).  Importantly, these studies conclude that program 
type and duration matter, with programs that are closer to the labor market more 
effective.   However, these studies also focus on the supply side of ALMPs and examine 
ALMPs primarily in terms of quantitative employment and/or earnings outcomes, thus 
neglecting the demand side, the firm as well as other quality of job dimensions that 
result from ALMPs.  The lack of quantitative data on employer engagement in ALMPs 
within Ireland and Spain, and more generally very limited empirical studies that address 
the demand side using a comparative case study design (see Ingold and Valizade 2015; 
Bredgard 2017), provided further impetus for the need to obtain a more complete 
picture of how and why Spanish and Irish ICT firms engage with ALMP internships within 
their sectoral and national contexts.  Taking into account this perceived research gap, 
this thesis aims to understand more fully the combination of factors that may impact 
job quality dimensions for firms that hire through ALMP internships.  Thus, this thesis 
chose to adopt a case study design using semi-structured interviews that was deemed 
appropriate given its conduciveness to elicit key information when analyzing 
relationships in a social phenomenon in order to convey a more complete picture of 
reality (Berg 1998).    
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Comparative Case Studies  
The case study design is argued to enable the use of qualitative research methods so as 
to study a social phenomenon in its bounded system (Yin 2014).  An advantage of the 
case study design is that one can ‘preserve the integrity of the case and understand it as 
a configuration of features embedded in a specific context and time’ (Fizz 2008:  417) or 
‘catch reality in flight’ (Buchanan and Bryman 2009:  6).  Unlike many quantitative 
research strategies which control for a specific set of features, the case study design 
enables the collection of many types of data, can involve multiple or single case studies, 
various methods of data collection, as well as several levels of analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Yin 2014). Indeed, the complexities of organizational studies, with increased 
outsourcing, informal types of work (i.e. internships), and the reliance on inter-
organizational  collaboration mean that studies relying solely on closed ended 
questionnaires may be met with confusion surrounding the particular project or 
organization in question and more generally present a rather static measurement of 
reality (Buchanan and Bryman 2009).   
This thesis adopts a comparative case study design through the examination of multiple 
bounded cases (firms within countries) to examine the specific conditions that explain 
how ALMP internships facilitate job quality outcomes in different sectoral and national 
contexts.  An important aspect of case study research is the triangulation of data from 
different sources to determine the consistency of findings.  Thus, multiple types of 
evidence must be accessed to increase the construct validity of the study (Yin 2014).  
One of the most common strategies is to identify stakeholder groups and conduct in-
depth interviews with different individuals in these groups.  This particular research 
relies on data triangulation from a variety of stakeholders including officials from public 
employment services, representatives from trade unions and employers’ associations, 
managing directors or Human Resource (HR) directors/managers from host companies, 
policy experts and former ALMP interns/employees.  In addition, national labor market 
legislation, collective agreements, policy documents and descriptive data were also 
important sources used to illuminate key findings and to inform decisions about the 
selection of dominant sectors and host companies.   
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One important consideration in comparative case studies is the selection of cases.   The 
choice of Ireland and Spain is related to theoretical and empirical considerations.  
Ireland is generally positioned as a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) and 
liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001), whereas Spain is considered a 
Mediterranean welfare regime (Ferrera 1996) and a mixed market economy (Molina 
and Rhodes 2007). Education and training strategies, including ALMPs, can be perceived 
as important to the effective functioning of competitive production regimes.   Despite 
these different socio-economic taxonomies, Ireland and Spain’s ALMP systems have 
been similarly characterized by relatively moderate levels of ALMP spending and 
uncoordinated and fragmented ALMP policies with low levels of employer engagement 
in ALMP training.  Thus, neither Ireland nor Spain represents a ‘best-practice’ case for 
ALMPs.  Therefore, firms that participate in ALMP internships represent an anomaly in 
Ireland and Spain.    
The uncoordinated and fragmented Spanish and Irish ALMP policies have developed in 
tandem with an education system that lacks strong institutional links, such as vocational 
schools or apprenticeships, between education and the labor market.  Both Ireland and 
Spain’s education systems can be classified as having educational systems that generate 
general or school-based skills.  Therefore, occupation-specific skills would be expected 
to be learned primarily on-the-job, as opposed to through vocational and 
apprenticeship systems.  One of the implications of this is that employers are less 
familiar with the knowledge and skills acquired in school based systems and therefore a 
weak link exists between education and the workplace (de Lange et al. 2014).  Thus, on-
the-job training through ALMPs may be increasingly important among young people 
with little work experience to signal employee productivity and improve labor market 
integration in both Ireland and Spain (Chillas et al. 2015; Piopiunik and Ryan 2012). It 
should be added, however, that the existence of a general education system (as well as 
for countries with vocationally specific education systems) does not diminish the 
important signal generated by university qualifications for youth labor market 
integration (de Lang et al. 2014).  Those lacking university level qualifications would still 
be expected to have more difficulties finding secure jobs, particularly in light of the 
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large expansion of university level qualifications among young people within Ireland and 
Spain.   
In general, the lack of strong institutional links between education and the labor market 
would be expected to create more fragmented transitions for young people in Ireland 
and Spain, between ALMPs, atypical employment and unemployment.  The relatively 
fragmented organization of the Irish and Spanish employers’ federations and unions 
also means that more nuanced job quality outcomes would be expected at the sectoral 
and firm level.  Thus, Ireland and Spain enable an interesting comparison as to how the 
intersection of institutions and firms may enable or inhibit specific job quality 
dimensions.  
Adopting a sector level analysis provides for similar institutional arrangements, market 
environments and job quality demands.  The ICT sector was chosen because it tends to 
be considered representative of the knowledge economy and is an area that covers a 
wide range of skilled occupations and tasks (Chillas et al. 2015).  It also is known for its 
dynamic changes which lead to new forms of work organization, including outsourcing 
and inter-firm collaboration, thus providing for an interesting case study of post-
industrial society and service economy.  The economic well-being of the ICT sector was 
also a consideration to mitigate the economic crisis as a determinant variable. In 
addition, the prevalence of young workers in the ICT sector was also a key factor in 
sector choice.  Moreover, Ireland has a long history of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the ICT sector, attracting both large MNC firms, as well as an ever growing number of 
domestically grown SME ICT firms (Wickham and Bobek 2016). This provided for 
potential variation on firms size and domestic/MNC firms. 
Within Spain, the study was limited to the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. This 
region was chosen because it has the second highest concentration of ICT firms in Spain 
(23%) with a diversity of firms sizes  (16.1% large firms , 23%  medium firms and 45.3% 
small/micro firms) (Ministerio de Energía, Turismo y Agenda Digital 2016).  It also 
accounts for 36% of all foreign investment in Spain (Barcelona City Council 2012) and 
21% of Spanish R & D.  It has invested heavily in ICT research centers and provided for 
incubators for ICT firms. The Autonomous Community of Catalonia was also one of the 
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first (along with Galicia) to receive autonomous powers from Madrid to undertake 
occupational training in Spain in 1992 (Ramos et al. 2009), and thus has a highly 
developed and extensive range of ALMPs.  Thus, these features provide for institutional 
conditions to potentially manifest various forms of public-private inter-firm 
collaboration for ALMP training, as well as potential variation in training and job quality 
dimensions on firm size. 
The choice of the two ALMP internship programs, within Ireland (The National 
Internship Programme JobBridge) and Spain (Practicas no Laborales en Empresas or 
Non-Labor Internships in Firms), was largely informed by the research objectives which 
aimed to examine explicitly demand-side ALMP programs that had the largest 
opportunities for firm engagement.  While some ALMP programs in Ireland and Spain 
integrate supply-side approaches (i.e. education and training) with demand side 
approaches (i.e. work experience/internships), the research was interested in solely 
demand-side approaches given the potential to enable a more complete understanding 
of how firm training and hiring through ALMPs may impact job quality dimensions in 
particular sectoral and institutional contexts.  In addition, the literature suggests that 
programs closer to the actual labor market have higher scope for employment 
outcomes (Kluve 2006; Card et al. 2009), thus enabling a higher probability to sample 
firms that hired participants following the internships.  
 
Semi-structured Qualitative Interviews 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews are one of the most common instruments used by 
researchers and are particularly useful when adopting an inductive approach to 
research (Berg 1998).  Thus, 36 semi-structured interviews were developed with experts 
in the field, government officials, trade unions and employers’ federation 
representatives, former ALMP interns/employees and ICT firm directors and HR, and 
were conducted from February 2015- February 2017.  The majority of the Spanish 
interviews took place during a fieldwork trip in the spring of 2015 and during a three 
month period in the spring of 2016 as a visiting researcher at the Autonomous 
University of Barcelona’s Department of Sociology’s, Sociological Research Centre on 
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Everyday Life and Work (QUIT) - Institute for Labour Studies (IET).  While these 
interviews were all face-to-face, some successive interviews took place via skype due to 
distance constraints.   
All of the interviews were digitally recorded with the interviews ranged from 40 minutes 
to 150 minutes, thus illustrating the flexibility and strength provided through semi-
structured interviews to probe further and digress from predetermined questions to 
elicit detail.  Given the researcher’s proficient level of Spanish (a Spanish B.A. degree 
and studying and working in Spanish speaking countries for five years, including Spain) 
the researcher had a proficient level to conduct all interviews in Spanish.  All of the 
interviews were transcribed and analyzed using the qualitative software MaxQDA which 
aided to organize the interviews. While using MaxQDA, the research was able to 
develop codes, sub-codes and finally emerging themes. 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
The research process is often messy and full of challenges; with issues of access and 
power dynamics, the negotiation of cultural and linguistic norms, and openness to an 
ever shifting research design.   While these issues can arise within any research project, 
many are perhaps more commonly associated with research that solicits data and 
interviews from the so-called elite (Welch et al. 2002).  Indeed, one of the central 
challenges of this research was building trust to negotiate access to the firms that 
participated in the ALMP internship programs.  Therefore, non-probability purposive 
sampling through snowballing was employed.  
 Initially, interviews were conducted with experts and key stakeholders in the area of 
Irish and Spanish ALMPs and educational and vocational training systems more 
generally.  While the interview topic guide focused on the broader systems of training, 
where relevant (i.e. PES institutions), questions were also asked related to the selected 
ALMP internship programs.  Access to the initial stakeholder interviews proved far 
easier than overcoming barriers to access ICT firms.  Indeed, access to firm interviews 
was constrained by key gatekeepers, thus limiting the sample of interviews within the 
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firms themselves.  Given the project frame, all of the firm cases also had to have 
participated and hired ALMP interns, as well as be within the ICT sector. Another 
interest of the study was to account for firm size, given that within Spain firm size has 
different implications for the presence of collective bargaining institutions within the 
firm and more generally firm size tends to vary on many dimensions of job quality 
(Ashton et al. 2008; de Kok et al. 2011).   This was attained through non-probability 
purposive sampling with one small, medium, and large firm within Spain and one small 
and medium firm within Ireland.  In addition, two of these firms were subsidiaries of 
MNCs, thus widening the ability to examine the influence of different production 
structures and organization of labor on job quality dimensions for participants recruited 
through ALMP internships. 
For the employer interviews, a key sampling criterion was that individuals be well-
versed in the firm’s recruitment and training strategies, as well as the firm’s 
participation within the ALMP internship program. Therefore, all employer interviews 
were conducted with individuals of upper level positions, as firm managing directors or 
HR directors/managers.  Criteria for interviews with former ALMP internship 
participants/current employees were conditioned on the fact that they participated in 
the ALMP internship within the firm and that they were subsequently hired by the firm.  
While no specific criteria were set for age given the difficulties accessing the ICT firms, 
all of the ALMP internship participants were between the ages of 25 and 28, thus 
reflecting the nature of the ALMP internship profile which is commonly used among 
young people.  The sample of ALMP internship participants/employees was also derived 
through a snowballing technique (i.e. referral from their employers).  While this 
sampling strategy could represent selection bias, given that employers could select 
ALMP internships with positive job quality outcomes, the research was also interested 
in identifying the conditions and dynamics that facilitated particular pathways towards 
these job quality outcomes.  Thus, topic guides for employers were designed in two 
parts: 1) to address the wider production and labor market organization practices the 
firms adopted that could potentially influence job quality, and 2) the ALMP internship 
and the processes leading to specific job quality outcomes.  The intern interview 
provided further opportunities to triangulate the data, as did the examination of firm 
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strategies, websites and collective agreements (where relevant), thus providing further 
validity for the study. 
In terms of the gender equality, a fairly equal sample was sought and attained through 
purposive and snowball sampling among firm employers and ALMP interns/employees. 
This was particularly important given that the IT sector particularly, is generally a male 
dominated industry and some job quality dimensions may be subject to gender bias (i.e. 
earnings).  Among the ALMP interns/employee interviews, two out of the five 
interviews were male, whereas among the firm employer interviews, three out of the 
five employers were female.  Therefore, this broadened the possibility for a variety of 
perspectives across genders.  
 
Contextualizing the Spanish and Irish ICT Firm Case Studies 
A total of five ICT company case studies were conducted with firms that participated in 
the selected ALMP internships programs and subsequently hired young workers.  In 
terms of size the case studies included two small Spanish and Irish ICT firms (12 and 10 
employees), two medium Spanish and Irish firms (120 and 200 employees) and one 
large Spanish firm (800 employees).  To protect anonymity, all of the firms were given 
pseudonyms.  For Spain, these are the SPS (Spanish small) firm, SPM (Spanish medium) 
firm, and SPL (Spanish large) firm. For Ireland, these are the IRS (Irish small) firm and the 
IRM (Irish medium) firm.   
The Spanish and Irish ICT firm case studies included one rural firm, the SPS firm, 
whereas the SPM, SPL, IRS and IRM firms were located within Dublin and Barcelona city 
or the nearby suburbs.  Unique to the SPL and IRM firms, are the firms’ positions as 
subsidiaries of MNCs.  The mother company of the SPL firm is based in Germany with a 
total of 4,870 employees worldwide in 11 countries, half of those based in Spain, 
whereas the mother company of the IRM firm is based in the US and operates in 180 
countries with a total of 3, 700 employees.   In comparison, the SPS, SPM, and IRS firms 
are all domestic firms with their main products sold on the domestic market.  
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In relation to area of specialization, the SPS firm specialized in software development 
and IT support services for travel agencies, whereas the IRS firm specialized in web 
design and property cloud systems.  Given the direct impact of the 2008 economic crisis 
on the Spanish tourism industry and the Irish housing sector, both firms were directly 
impacted.  However, the SPS firm was able to avoid reducing wages and making 
employees redundant, whereas the IRS firm had only two permanent employees at one 
point during the crisis.  
The SPL firm specialized in software and IT consulting for the finance sector, more 
specifically retail and investment banking, private asset management and the insurance 
industry, whereas the IRM firm specialized in software for the airline and hospitality 
sectors. While the SPL firm expanded rapidly throughout the economic crisis, it did cut 
some labor costs to facilitate this expansion, particularly in the non-technical 
departments, through the use of flexible contracts for young, new entrants.  The IRM 
firm continued to rapidly expand throughout the crisis, primarily due to its export 
orientation and customer base, who continued to innovate through mobile software 
products so as to cut costs and increase revenue.  The last firm, the SPM firm, 
specialized in online journalism and advertisement through social media platforms.  
Given its reliance on a large share of its revenue from advertisements to support its 
online journalism websites and the decrease in advertisement campaigns during the 
crisis, the SPM firm was also forced to reduce its labor costs through involuntary 
redundancies.  
Outsourcing, particularly nearshore and off-shore, is a dominant feature of the Spanish 
and Irish MNC ICT subsidiary firms, whereas it is less prevalent in the Spanish and Irish 
domestic subsidiary firms.  The only exception was the SPS firm, which outsources work 
through contracting, albeit to a small number of contractors (i.e. 20 individuals) based 
within Spain.    
Given the variation in Irish and Spanish industrial relations, unsurprisingly the three 
Spanish ICT firms were unionized, whereas the two Irish ICT firms were non-unionized.  
In addition, only one of the three Spanish ICT firms had a work council.  As previously 
mentioned the variation of these ICT firm features was an important sampling criterion, 
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particularly given the implications this can have for the organization of work and job 
quality.   
For all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, this was the first time the firms participated in 
any type of ALMP internship program.  While the numbers of former intern interviews 
were restricted due to the reliance on the firms to provide access to interviewees, the 
number of intern participants and individuals hired varied greatly among the ICT firms. 
The SPS firm and IRM firms hosted and hired one ALMP intern, whereas the IRS, SPL and 
SPM firms participated and hired through the ALMP internship schemes more 
frequently.  Specifically, the SPM firm hosted twenty interns and hired approximately 18 
interns, whereas the SPL firm hosted eight interns and hired approximately three 
interns.  The last ICT firm, the IRS firm, hosted approximately six interns and hired two 
interns.  Finally, with the exception of the IRM firm and the SPM firm,5 all of the ALMP 
interns interviewed within the five ICT firms had technical or university level 
qualifications.   
 
Table 2: Summary Table of Spanish and Irish ICT firms 
 
 Spanish ICT firms Irish ICT firms 
SPS SPM SPL IRS IRM 
Firm Size 12 200 800 10 120 
Area of 
specialization 
software 
development 
& IT support 
services for 
travel 
agencies 
online 
journalism & 
advertisement 
through social 
media 
platforms 
software & 
IT 
consulting 
for the 
finance 
sector 
web design 
& property 
cloud 
systems 
software 
for the 
airline & 
hospitality 
sectors 
                                                          
5
 Despite many attempts to conduct an interview with an individual who was hired through the ALMP 
internship, the SPM firm was not in a position to grant access to conduct this interview.  Consequently, 
data gathered for the SPM firm analysis primarily relies on data triangulated from the interview with HR, 
government policy documents, the sectoral collective agreement and Spanish labor market legislation. 
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Urban or 
rural location 
Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban 
Domestic or 
MNC 
subsidiary 
Domestic Domestic MNC 
subsidiary 
Domestic MNC 
subsidiary 
Unionized Yes Yes Yes No No 
Work council No No Yes - - 
ALMP interns 
hosted 
1 20 8 6 1 
ALMP interns 
hired 
1 18 3 2 1 
Education 
level of  
former ALMP 
intern 
interviewees 
Technical 
degree level 
- Master 
degree 
level 
Bachelor 
degree 
level 
Upper 
Secondary 
degree 
level 
 
 
Data Analysis and Coding 
One central difference between qualitative and quantitative research is the emphasis 
on meaning as opposed to numbers.  Central to qualitative data analysis is the ability to 
analyze meanings through conceptualization.   Indeed one of the critiques of 
quantitative research is that despite increasingly advanced statistical and mathematical 
manipulation, concepts are still reduced to a set of indicators which enable 
measurement, concepts which in themselves are value-laden (Sayer 1992).  The process 
of quantitative research is often linear with concepts defined from the beginning, thus 
often preventing opportunities for reconceptualization of the data.  Dey (1993) 
describes the qualitative data analysis process as a circular process of describing 
phenomena, classifying it and seeing how the researcher’s concepts interconnect. 
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Figure 1: Qualitative Data Analysis Process  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Dey 1993 
 
The key to this process is to move from the descriptive level to the theoretical ideas.  
Coding is argued to be the ‘pivotal link’ between collecting data and developing 
emerging theory to explain the data (Charmaz 2006:  46).  Thus, thematic analysis was 
used to classify the data through coding.  The initial process of coding was informed by 
a broad conceptual framework based on the job quality dimensions established in the 
literature with new categories later added.  This conceptual framework was refined 
through the consistent back and forth between the data and the literature.  Broader 
themes then were developed and substantive connections were made between them.  
However, Dey (1993) asserts this does not necessarily imply causation or even a 
connection between the variables.  Therefore, it demands that the researcher return to 
the data to not only search for evidence of the connection but to also ask why these 
events were connected in this way.  This was an important aspect of the qualitative data 
analysis process given that the research objective was not simply to understand how 
ALMP internships impacted job quality dimensions, but rather to also further an 
understanding of how the interaction of particular social structures may enable or 
constraint particular job quality dimensions through ALMP internship recruitment 
strategies within the Spanish and Irish ICT firms. 
Describing 
Qualitative 
Analysis 
Classifying Connecting 
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Ethics 
As part of the requirements of the Irish Research Council Government of Ireland post-
graduate scholarship, the researcher was required to apply for ethical approval from the 
Maynooth University Ethical Approval Committee within the first three months of the 
scholarship.  Ethical approval was received in December 2014.   Informed consent was 
sought from all participants prior to the initiation of all interviews.  The researcher 
provided a verbal description of the research project as well as an informed consent 
form detailing the research objectives, re-affirming the preservation of confidentiality 
and anonymity, data storage, the use of the data, as well as any potential risks 
associated with participation. Informed consent forms were provided in both English 
and Spanish for English and Spanish speaking participants. All interview data was 
recorded, and transferred to a password protected and encrypted laptop.  Copies of 
both the English and Spanish versions of the informed consent forms can be found 
within Appendix C.   
 
Limitations and Reflections 
The adoption of a constructivist paradigm using a comparative case study approach 
through an interpretive lens means that the researcher is constantly constructing 
meaning.   This meaning is not separate from the researcher’s own assumptions.  
Indeed, Crotty (1998: 17) asserts that ‘at every point in our research- in our observing, 
our interpreting, our reporting, and everything else we do as researchers- we inject a 
host of assumptions.’  Therefore, the researcher’s interpretation of the firm, ALMP 
internships, and job quality dimensions may be influenced by nationality, gender, class, 
age, and employment history.  Indeed, the researcher’s role as a female in her 30s, from 
a middle-class background, with extensive employment in unpaid internships may have 
influenced her interpretation and construction of the cases from the employer’s 
perspective.  However, the subjectivist epistemological stance adopted for this PhD 
project required ‘knower and respondent co-created understandings’ such that the 
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researcher’s assumptions were consistently challenged and unpacked through 
reflection and consistent back and forth between the data and the literature.  
 The researcher was also acutely aware of her ‘outsider’ status as an American 
conducting research in Ireland and Spain.  While the researcher had previously lived and 
conducted research briefly in both countries, the research project demanded increased 
sensitivity to cultural and linguistic norms, throughout all phases of the research.  This 
was particularly important when organizing and conducting interviews so as to establish 
rapport, to elicit key information and referrals for further participants.  One strength of 
the researcher’s role as an outsider meant that she could maintain distance from social 
and political tensions, which was particularly important when conducting interviews 
with government and state officials. Indeed, Welsch et al. (2002) suggests that a 
researcher’s role as an outsider when conducting elite interviews also elicits openness 
from interviewees to discuss topics that may be controversial for someone with regional 
alliances and local contacts.  
Importantly, the original design of this research was for a comparative case study design 
across two countries and two sectors, specifically the ICT sector and the retail sector.  
The aim was to provide variation between high-skilled sectors and low-skilled sectors, 
as well as to account for differences in overall job quality between the two sectors 
(Eurofound 2014). Some of the Irish retail sector firms are also covered by company 
level collective agreements, thus providing an interesting comparison to the Spanish 
retail firms which are all covered by collective agreements.  Unfortunately, gaining 
access to the Spanish retail firms, proved more difficult than anticipated.   Despite many 
attempts to contact retail firms in Spain, the Spanish retail firms were not in a position 
to grant access to interviews.  This barrier constrained the ability of this thesis to 
account for varying cross-sectoral dynamics surrounding skill levels, collective 
bargaining arrangements and job quality.  While access was still challenging in the ICT 
sector, access was gained to three Spanish ICT firms and two Irish ICT firms. These firms 
were of varying size and two were subsidiaries of MNCs, thus providing for further 
possible divergences or convergences in terms of the job quality outcomes through the 
ALMP internships.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter began by defining the roots of the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological foundations through the constructivist paradigm which provided the basis 
for a comparative case study approach, while adopting a qualitative research 
methodology which used semi-structured interviews, alongside the analysis of policy 
documents and firm level documents, collective agreements and web pages.  The 
comparative cases study approach provided strength for this study because it allowed 
the researcher the opportunity to examine the complex combinations of factors that 
could potentially result in ‘good’ or ‘bad’ job quality dimensions through recruitment via 
ALMPs.   
The sample size of individuals interviewed within firms was limited due to constrained 
access by gatekeepers.  In addition, the researcher faced barriers accessing the 
originally proposed comparative retail sector.  However, the researcher overcame some 
of this deficit in sampling numbers by accounting for diversity within firms by providing 
for variation in size, diversity in MNC/domestic firms and a range of interviews across 
genders within firms.  In addition, firm websites, policy documents and collective 
agreements provided further insight into firm organization and production strategies 
which could potentially impact job quality dimensions through recruitment via ALMPs.  
In conclusion, this chapter has presented the process through which the researcher 
arrived at particular methodological decisions and data analysis, as well as taken into 
account the researcher’s awareness of ethical issues and potential limitations during the 
research process.  Clearly delineating this research process is important to affirm the 
trustworthiness, quality and rigor in the research findings.  In the following section, the 
thesis will present the central empirical findings to more fully explain how specific 
combinations of factors may impact job quality dimensions for firms that hire through 
ALMPs.   
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Chapter 4:  Irish and Spanish ALMP 
Systems  
 
While Ireland and Spain’s unemployment supports are traditionally regarded as 
‘passive’ (Murphy 2012), since the 2008 economic crisis and Ireland’s Troika 
(IMF/ECB/EU) bailout and Spain’s ECB bailout, a policy shift occurred at the national 
policy level, towards increasing employer involvement in ALMPs to activate the 
unemployed.  Since 2008, both countries have developed national activation strategies.  
Ireland’s Pathways to Work was first launched in 2012 and Spain’s Activation Strategy 
for Employment was first launched from 2010-2014 (Estrategía Espanola de Activación 
para el Empleo), (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2014).  Both of these 
activation strategies focused on targeting the activation of young labor market entrants 
through ALMPs while stressing the importance of activation through firm sponsored 
work experience or internships.  Both strategies have strikingly similar objective: to 
reform the unemployment systems to improve efficiency and coordination, to establish 
clearer links between active labor market policies through sanctions and evaluations, 
and to incentivize employers to provide jobs for the unemployed through subsidies.   
The emphasis on ALMP internships closely reflects existing academic research which 
suggests employment increases when training programs are closer to the labor market 
and more fully integrated with employers (Lopez Mayan and Nicodemo 2013; 
McGuinness et al. 2011).  For young labor market entrants, internships are often 
suggested to present an opportunity to gain certain ‘soft skills’ (Chillas, et al. 2015), as 
well as enable young labor market entrants to gain access to contacts and networks.  
Indeed, the importance of networks in obtaining a job in Spain has been argued to be 
higher when compared to Northern Europe (Franzen and Hangartner 2006) and a recent 
OECD report (2014b) found that only 35% of private sector employers in Ireland used 
the PES to fill vacancies, with most preferring informal channels.  Indeed, internships 
through ALMPs may also provide an institutional structure for the inclusion of young 
 
 
55 
 
labor market entrants as well as provide a structure through which employers can be 
more integrated into the employment process, particularly for Small Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) (Trade Union Representative, ICTU, 2015).   
However, the institutionalization of internships through ALMPs has led to increased 
concerns over internship learning content, practices, and working conditions (European 
Commission 2012).  This has led some to argue that the ‘stepping stone’ hypothesis may 
not always hold for young labor market entrants, but instead may result in a ‘churning’ 
process where individuals are trapped in a cycle of traineeships, temporary work 
positions, and periods of unemployment  (European Commission 2012; Samek and 
Samenza 2012;  Murphy 2015).  In some countries, such as the UK, this ‘churning 
process’ has been found to be particularly true in sectors such as retail and wholesale, 
sectors that traditionally have an abundance of low paid jobs, individuals with low 
education qualifications and skills, and low levels of training amongst entry-level 
employees (UK Commission for Employment and Skills 2011).  Chillas et al. (2015) also 
assert that internships are not limited to low-skilled sectors, but also are prevalent in 
other high skilled sectors, such as ICT.  Within the ICT sector, they argue that interns are 
often exploited as a source of cheap labor, where employers may take advantage of 
interns’ desire and need to obtain a specific combination of technical and soft skills 
through work experience so as to enhance their employability in the industry.  Other 
research has argued that internships or work placements carry the highest probability 
of displacement given that interns can act as a substitute for cheap/free labor (Piopiunik 
and Ryan 2012).   Despite these debates, existing research tends to consider the exit 
rate to employment, thus neglecting the reasons ALMP internships may result in 
particular types of job quality.  These firms are also embedded in the particular national 
training systems, systems that have the potential to influence firm level decisions.  
Therefore, prior to examining how ALMP internships may result in particular types of 
job quality, the firms must first be contextualized within each of their national level 
training and education systems.  First, this chapter provides a general overview of ALMP 
spending and types within Ireland and Spain and situates the extent of firm involvement 
within specific ALMP types.  Secondly, ALMPs are contextualized within the wider Irish 
and Spanish training and education systems and some of the challenges each system 
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poses for initial and continuous firm level training are considered. Finally, this chapter 
considers the extent to which ALMPs within the context of the Irish and Spanish training 
and education systems present particular enabling or disabling features for firms hiring 
and training strategies, and ultimately job quality.  
 
Irish and Spanish ALMP Investment 
The standard classification of labor market policies according to the OECD is 
distinguished between passive (unemployment insurance and related welfare benefits 
paid to the unemployed) and active labor market policies (public/private employment 
subsidies, job search assistance, labor market training, and wage subsidies).  
Historically, both Ireland and Spain have represented cases where the tendency to 
invest in active labor market policies has been above the OECD average.  However, this 
spending has been primarily concentrated on passive policies, with Ireland and Spain’s 
passive policies being substantially above the OECD average. 
 
Table 3:  Total Expenditure on Active Labor Market Policies (%GDP) 
 
Source:  OECD 2016 
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While spending on passive labor market policies is clearly related to increases and 
decreases in unemployment levels as illustrated during the crisis years, spending on 
active policies is not related to unemployment cycles, nor are increases related to 
decreases in unemployment (NESC 2011).  Indeed, spending on ALMPs did not fluctuate 
greatly during the crisis years despite high levels of unemployment, thus supporting the 
conclusion made by others (Murphy 2012) that active labor market policy spending is 
not correlated to economic cycles of unemployment. Hence this does not actually 
provide a clear image as to Ireland and Spain’s ALMP efforts.  Instead, ALMP spending is 
often related to other external factors such as shifts in political parties, ideologies and 
ALMP priorities (Murphy 2012).   Clasen et al. (2016) argue that data sets that examine 
ALMP expenditure suffer from serious validity (i.e. extent to which ALMPs genuinely 
measure work-focused support for the unemployed), as well as reliability (i.e. ability to 
measure sub-national expenditures) issues.    
Indeed, within Spain, national legislation for ALMPs originates from the central 
government, but both the State and Autonomous Communities finance the Active Labor 
Market Policies. Thus, ALMPs remain highly decentralized with the Autonomous 
Community’s regional Public Employment Services (PES) determining the programs 
developed and the particular ALMPs adapted to regional and local needs (Malo 2011). 
This means that large variation can exist in regard to ALMP funding, design and program 
models, as well as the extent to which some Autonomous Communities are more active 
than others. Thus, the extent to which all sub-national ALMP expenditures are 
accounted for nationally may be questioned.  
While Irish ALMP funding and legislation has remained highly centralized, until 2013, 
the benefits agency and PES were separate. This meant that ALMP placements were 
highly decentralized, with the PES determining the provision and implementation of 
ALMPs. Martin (2015) argues that Irish ALMPs have traditionally overlapped in 
objectives, target groups and lacked institutional coordination. Murphy (2012) 
attributes this to a general lack of data and information sharing as well as institutional 
battles between placement agencies and the central government funding Department.  
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Therefore, ALMP expenditures within Spain and Ireland may not actually reflect the 
intensity of work-focused support for the unemployed, given the possibility for the 
omission of some sub-national expenditure data, as well as other factors that influence 
ALMP spending, such as institutional conflicts over funding. Another disadvantage of 
using data that amalgamates ALMP expenditure is that it does not examine specific 
program type nor consider target groups. Indeed, Kluve (2006) argues that ALMP 
effectiveness is more dependent on the type of program and targets groups. The 
interest here is not necessarily to evaluate the effectiveness of ALMPs, but rather to 
understand why ALMP internships may result in particular types of job quality and what 
institutional conditions and processes are necessary to facilitate this within firms.  
Indeed, firms within Ireland and Spain are provided access (or negated access) to 
particular ALMP types and thus the availability of these ALMP types has the potential to 
impact firm level decision making in terms of hiring strategies and training.  
Furthermore the interaction these firms have with not only different ALMP types but 
the various institutions that develop and implement ALMPs also may influence firm 
level hiring and training behavior.   Therefore, ALMPs must be further disaggregated by 
type and the institutional configurations of each country mapped to further unpack the 
central research question.   
 
ALMP Types and Evaluations 
Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) argue that within the literature four broad types of 
programs can be distinguished as important youth ALMPs:  job search assistance and 
monitoring, labor market training, employment incentives or wage subsidies and direct 
job creation through public sector work programs.  The first youth ALMP, job search 
assistance and monitoring falls within the category of labor market services, and 
includes all measures to enhance job search efficiency such as job clubs, vocational 
guidance counselling and monitoring, and sanctions.  Financial resources for job search 
assistance and monitoring are generally considered to be one of the least expensive to 
implement and thus ALMP spending would be expected to be low. While sanctions are 
generally not included in terms of ALMP type spending, Kluve (2006) has chosen to 
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include this in his ALMP category of job search assistance, given that this is also geared 
towards increasing the proficiency of the job matching process.  As will be shown in the 
case of Ireland, sanctions are also often integrated into job placement schemes.  For 
young people, monitoring and sanctions are considered a double-edged sword as they 
can create low-quality job matches, decreased employment stability, and even lead to 
the complete withdrawal of youth from the labor market (Caliendo and Schmidl 2016).    
The second ALMP type labor market training encompasses classroom training, on-the-
job training and work experience, and aims to foster individual skills that enhance 
participant employability (Kluve 2006; Caliendo and Schmidl 2016).  For youth with little 
work experience, on-the-job training within firms is often argued to signal employee 
productivity, thus improving labor market integration (Chillas et al. 2015).  The third 
youth ALMP, employment incentives or wage subsidies, aims to alter employer and 
employee behavior in the private sector through direct wage subsidies for employers or 
financial incentives for workers (Kluve 2006).  For youth, these subsidies often 
encourage employers to hire young workers with a limited skill set with low levels of 
productivity.  These subsidies aim to compensate employers for a short period of time 
until workers can obtain a skill set which enables them to move onto a regular contract 
within that firm or another (Caliendo and Schmidl 2016).  The last youth ALMP is direct 
job creation through public employment schemes which involves the production of 
socially valued goods or services. 
Existing studies assert that job search assistance and monitoring is effective in the 
short-term, while training, particularly on-the-job training programs are effective in the 
medium and long-term. Private sector incentive programs may also be effective, but 
they are often subject to the potential for displacement and substitution effects or 
deadweight loss. Finally, public employment schemes have consistently been found to 
not be effective since the schemes lack contact with firms and employers thus 
mitigating the rapidity of individual labor market integration (Card et al. 2010; Martin 
2015; Caliendo and Schmidl 2016; Kluve 2006).  
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Table 4:  Spending on ALMPs by Type in Ireland and Spain, 2007 & 2015 
 
 
Source:  OECD 2016 
 
Job Search Assistance and Monitoring 
Within Ireland and Spain job search assistance and monitoring have not fluctuated 
greatly in terms of spending.  When compared to the OECD average for 2007 (12%) and 
2015 (13%) (OECD 2016), Ireland has maintained mostly on average spending levels, 
whereas Spain has consistently spent below the OECD average.   Within Ireland funding 
for job search assistance and monitoring is coordinated centrally and managed by 
various institutions at the national, regional and local levels, whereas within Spain 
funding for job search assistance and monitoring is coordinated nationally, but 
managed at the regional and local levels.   
The PES institutions in both countries have faced criticisms for their structural weakness 
and lack of capacity to assist the unemployed in finding jobs.  The PES institutions are 
under resourced with Spain having 260 job seekers for every PES worker and Ireland 
having 778 for every PES worker, the highest in the EU (OECD 2015).  The Irish PES also 
has historically suffered from fragmented PES institutions, where service overlap, 
institutional coordination, and employer integration have been lacking (Murphy 2012; 
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Murphy et al. 2017).  Indeed, a recent OECD report (2014) found that only 35% of 
private sector employers in Ireland used the PES to fill vacancies, with most preferring 
informal channels.  Within Spain, administrative burdens, limited personnel and a lack 
of employer integration and trust with the PES also impede its functioning. Similar to 
Ireland, firms tend to not rely on the PES to hire staff. In 2013, only 403 thousand job 
offers were managed through PES out of a total of 15 million (Begoña and Suárez 2014).  
Indeed, the low trust firms have in the PES is reflected in the supply of jobs on offer 
through the PES that tend to be low-skilled (i.e. 50%) (Ibid).  This concentration of low-
skilled jobs on offer through the PES, largely results from the PES functions prior to 1994 
reforms, when the PES selected long-term unemployed jobseekers and recipients of 
unemployment benefits for job offers regardless of their suitability for the job.  This led 
to a loss of trust in the PES and thus firms continue to use the PES to avail of firm 
selected subsidized candidates.   While many of these issues persist with the PES, both 
countries have gone through structural and program changes since 2008, that have 
changed the delivery of employment support services and in the case of Ireland, 
increased sanctions, albeit at a modest pace.  
From 2012, as part of the Activation Strategy Pathways to Work (2012-2016), Ireland’s 
Department of Social Protection merged its Public Employment Service and Income 
Support Service, thus creating a more centralized system of job search assistance. As 
part of this reform, ‘one-stop-shops’ for job search assistance were created, known as 
Intreo.  Coordinated centrally by the Department of Social Protection, Intreo centers 
consist of sixty-one offices scattered throughout the Irish provinces and counties.  In 
addition to the regional job search assistance available, Ireland also has an existing 
network of local employment service networks (LESNs) and job clubs which have existed 
since 1994 and provide job search assistance for disadvantaged areas and cater to the 
long term unemployed.  While they were previously under the auspice of FÁS, they have 
since been subsumed into Intreo.  Though these mergers have doubled the capacity of 
the Irish PES, the result is argued to be more managerial focus to local PES, with less 
individual oriented services (Murphy and Collins 2016).  Another shift in job search and 
placement services is the Department of Social Protection’s attempt to increase 
employer involvement in ALMP training through the development of an employer’s 
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relation unit, exclusively committed to providing employer information and support, as 
well as a new government supported free job search website and ‘Employer Roadshow’ 
events to increase employer links through information provision and exchange to 
improve the PES.   
Within Ireland, sanctions continue to remain low by international standard, .3% of the 
unemployed (Murphy 2012).  However, this represents an increase from Ireland’s 
historical tendency to resist implementation of sanctions in practice, with sanctions 
increasing from 359 in 2011 to 6500 in 2014 (Murphy and Collins 2016).  This is largely 
in response to specific reforms which target long-term unemployed and young people 
under 25 through a new privatized PES pay-by-results model.  From 2014, PES services 
were contracted out to two private institutions, Seetec and Turas Nua, to provide job 
search assistance through a pay-by-results model through a government program 
JobPath (European Commission DG, Employment and Social Affairs and Inclusion 2017).  
This new job search assistance model profiles the unemployed according to low, 
medium, high risk (as defined by length of unemployment/age) and requires active 
engagement of the high risk unemployed (i.e. meeting with caseworkers and engaging 
in training/work experience) with social welfare payment reductions or sanctions 
dependent on meeting these obligations.   
Within Spain, reforms of the PES have been more modest than Ireland but also 
noticeable since the 2008 crisis.  Given that the Spanish Constitution decentralizes 
competencies for the management of professional education, employment support and 
labor intermediation to Autonomous Communities, ALMP reforms are fairly general, 
with Autonomous Communities determining how to coordinate and manage them.  For 
example, the PES and Income Support Services cannot be fully centralized.   However, 
the PES offices within each Autonomous Community are shared with the Central PES 
staff who administers unemployment benefits and staff hired by the Catalan 
Autonomous Community who manage ALMPs.  In addition to sharing the same space, 
the unemployment benefits and ALMPs share the same technical and centralized 
information portal, the information system for the PES or Sistema de Información de los 
Servicios Publicós de Empleo, thus providing access to information on firms and 
unemployed individuals.  However, despite these efforts to centralize and integrate 
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passive and active ALMPs, through a ‘one-stop-shop,’ data on particular ALMP programs 
and individuals remains highly fragmented, with the central government suffering from 
serious data deficits in relation to ALMP participant numbers and outcomes. These data 
deficits are problematic for ALMP programs legislated for centrally, as it prevents 
rigorous quantitative evaluations.6  Thus, uncoordinated data sharing on the 
unemployed can hinder efforts to improve ALMP services and programs, as well as 
improve the interaction between passive and active labor market policy.  Indeed, while 
the Spanish Activation Strategy for Employment or Estrategía Española de Activación 
para el Empleo 2010-2014 and 2014-2016 reforms did aim to improve the PES and the 
management of ALMPs, improving the coordination and interaction between 
unemployment benefits and services was not part of these reforms.  Instead it 
established six national objectives in which each Autonomous Community’s ALMPs 
should fulfil to determine how ALMP funding is allocated.  This was not an effort to 
evaluate programs but rather to ensure the Autonomous Communities meet specific 
national priorities (Lope 2016).  Given that actual ALMP programs and actions may 
differ within these categories, these objectives can be fulfilled differently and indeed 
managed differently at the level of the Autonomous Community.  Within Catalonia two 
such areas of reform linked to the ALMP type job search assistance and monitoring took 
center stage and 1) increased private-public collaboration between the Catalan PES and 
2) individualized support for vulnerable groups of unemployed.   
In 2011, the Catalan government enacted the national government’s 2010 National 
Labor Market reform (Real Decreto RD 1796/2010) which introduced and regulated the 
contracting out of Employment Services. Under this reform, the Catalan government 
approved approximately seventy private job placement agencies for public-private 
collaboration in addition to its seventy-two small local employment offices it shares 
with the national Spanish PES (SEPE) scattered throughout the region.  This resulted in 
the Catalan PES, similar to Ireland, increasing private-public collaboration by contracting 
out orientation and job search assistance based on pay-by-results model.  This 
                                                          
6
 The head of the National Statistics Institute or Instituto Nacional de Estadistica revealed that the central 
government had no record of the number of participants in the ALMP internship program, non-labor 
internships, a program legislated for and funded centrally. Thus there appears to be a lack of data and 
information sharing between Autonomous Communities and the central government. This lack of quality 
sources of statistical data gathered central level has also been noted by other researchers (Lope 2016). 
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represented a shift towards privatization of the PES that was previously was uncommon 
in Catalonia.  Similarly, the Catalan PES developed a more personalized system for the 
unemployed called Cuestionarios de Factores de Culpabilidad, a questionnaire which 
allocates unemployed individuals according to risk (i.e. length of unemployment, age, 
etc.) to determine appropriate support (i.e. employment, training).  However, unlike 
Ireland, this individualized employment model was not directly linked to sanctions.   
Indeed, recent reforms have not necessarily resulted in an increase in sanctions as in 
the case of Ireland.    
In terms of increased integration of employer involvement in ALMPs, national level 
reforms within Spain continue to focus on integrating employers through training and 
employment incentives (see Appendix C ), as opposed to opening new lines of 
communication with employers through information exchange and feedback loops.  
Given the weaknesses of the PES, a government official from the Catalan PES expressed 
optimism that the privatization of PES services would increase employer and jobseeker 
use of the PES.   
We are going to hire some [private] agencies to search for companies and young 
people through the Youth Guarantee, ones [private agencies] that understand 
the young person’s profile. Then we will see if they [private agencies] can 
manage to set up six month non-labor internships or an internship contract for 
six months.  Then we will pay the agencies and the agencies will pay the young 
person’s wages. 
Government Official, SOC, 2015 
 
However, while the privatization of job search assistance may improve the capacity of 
the Catalan PES, it remains unclear how these new privatized institutions will establish 
connections with firms and indeed re-establish trust in the quality of the PES services. 
Shifting to ALMP type, monitoring and sanctions, Spain has not increased its historically 
fairly relaxed implementation of sanctions.   Within Spain according to the Law on 
Infractions and Sanctions (Real Decreto RD 5/2000), all unemployed receiving 
unemployment benefits or subsidies should register with the regional PES office and 
comply with a commitment to activity (compromiso de actividad), which compromises 
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the jobseeker to actively search for a job, accept an appropriate placement, and 
participate in specific activities related to motivation, training, retraining or professional 
placement purposes aiming to increase employability as well as meet the obligations 
described in the unemployment benefits regulations.  Failure to comply with obligations 
results in light’ or ‘severe’ sanctions of 6 months loss of unemployment benefits and/or 
a complete discontinuation of them (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2017).  
However, ‘an appropriate placement’ remains ambiguous, thus enabling Autonomous 
Communities to exercise their own discretion regarding the implementation of 
sanctions.  This is reflected in the National PES which asserted in 2010, that only 3% of 
individuals who lost their unemployment benefits were due to sanctions, with others 
simply exhausting their benefits or obtaining employment.   Indeed, in 2002 the central 
government attempted to define an appropriate placement as one that ‘resembles any 
job held previously by the jobseeker for a period of 6-12 months at any point in their 
life’ (Kluve 2005: 17). However, this proposal was short-lived and was met with a 
general strike and eventually retracted (Kluve 2005).  In 2012, the central government 
attempted to recentralize competencies to implement sanctions for jobseekers 
breaching any obligations they had with the PES (i.e. rejecting an employment or 
training offer).  However, this legislation was annulled by the Constitutional Tribunal 
shortly after, as it was deemed to interfere too much in the competencies of the 
Autonomous Communities. 
 
Labor Market Training  
For the second youth ALMP, labor market training, Ireland has historically invested 
more than Spain, well above the OECD average (13% for 2007 and 2015) (OECD 2016), 
whereas Spain has been closer to the OECD ALMP training average.  However, both 
Spain and Ireland’s training schemes have suffered from program overlap, 
administration costs and information asymmetries and more generally weak labor 
market linkages, with a preference in both countries to fund programs that have 
preferred standard classroom vocational training with limited employer involvement 
(McGuiness et al. 2011; Murphy 2012; Kluve 2005; Ramos et al. 2009).  In addition, the 
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lack of an evaluation culture in both countries means that in the case of Ireland only a 
few evaluation studies exist on training programs, with evaluation of labor market 
training even sparser in Spain (Kluve 2006).  Within Ireland these ALMP training issues 
have led to significant reforms to restructure the ALMP training system, whereas the 
Spanish reforms directed at ALMP training, similar to the reforms of the ALMP type job 
search assistance and sanctions, has been far more limited given that ALMP training is 
primarily provided at the level of the Autonomous Community.  
Within Ireland, prior to 2014, most ALMP training was coordinated through the Irish 
training authority FÁS7.  This autonomous regional organization was governed by a 
board of social partners who were solely committed to managing local training.  While 
FÁS depended on central government funding, its success at accessing EU structural 
funds, as well as establishing strong links with local politicians meant that despite its 
limited impact on providing training programs that addressed the long-term 
unemployed or that integrated employers, most efforts prior to 2014 to restructure FÁS 
(so as to integrate it into the unemployment insurance system) were resisted (Murphy 
2012).  This resulted in the institutional battles between the Department of Social 
Protection (DSP) (formerly the Department of Social Welfare) and a situation where the 
DSP often bypassed FÁS to implement its own training programs.  Thus, given the 
inefficiency of FÁS and following the emergence of a number of political and corporate 
scandals, FAS was replaced in 2013, along with the local authority Vocational Education 
Committees (VECs), by a new national training agency Solas.   Along with Solas the local 
VECs and local FÁS training centers were merged to create sixteen regional Education 
and Training Boards (ETBs).  These ETBs were delegated responsibility for coordinating 
(adult) further education through different regional colleges, as well as one time funded 
training courses (i.e. work placements), as well funding collaborative training projects 
with Local Employment Service Network (LESN) and firms.  While interviews conducted 
with government officials assert that the restructuring of the ALMP training system was 
overwhelmingly positive, the links and integration of the different institutions were 
                                                          
7
 FÁS was developed in 1988 through a merger of the National ManPower Service, the Youth Employment 
Training Agency and AnCo, the industrial training authority (Murphy 2012). 
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noted to be still lacking in some areas such as the inability of Intreo to refer individuals 
to ETBs (Employer Federation Representative, IBEC 2015).   
ALMP training is also coordinated through Pobal, an intermediary institution that 
collaborates on behalf of the Department of Social Protection to coordinate DSP 
training programs at the city and county council level.  The only social partner (i.e. trade 
unions and employers) coordinating and delivering an ALMP training program is the 
Irish employer’s confederation IBEC which delivers one training program, Skillsnet.  
However, this program is primarily directed at continuous formal training for the 
employed (85%), as opposed to the unemployed (17%) (Skillsnet Evaluation 2015).  
While the Irish trade unions, as well as employer representatives were previously 
involved in some programs through the training institution FAS, as well as through the 
apprenticeship system, since the restructuring of the PES institutions, trade union 
involvement in ALMP training has been limited to an advisory role (i.e. representation 
on the advisory board on the Labor Market Council).  Consequently, Irish trade unions 
focus on issues of pay bargaining and reform processes and dispute mechanisms 
(Murphy et al. 2017).   
From the mid-1970s, both classroom based training and on-the-job work experience has 
been a key element of Ireland’s ALMP menu.  However, the training programs linked to 
on-the-job work experience have often struggled to make clear links with firms.  Three 
types of post-secondary education and training have historically existed in Ireland for 
the unemployed:  VEC vocational education, FÁS vocational training and apprenticeship 
training.  The VEC vocational education training, under the auspice of the Department 
of Education and Skills and coordinated by the Vocational Education Committees 
through the technical colleges was generally structured around the academic year by 
semesters or terms and relied more on formal classroom training with any employer 
links dependent on motivated leaders in the individual colleges and schools.  Training 
included post leaving certificate course (PLC), vocational training opportunities schemes 
(VTOS), Youthreach, Community Education, adult literacy and Back to Education 
Initiative (BTEI), with the majority of courses resulting in accredited educational 
certificates (FETAC awards) and only the VTOS specifically targeted at only the 
unemployed.  The FÁS vocational training courses involved mixed classroom and on-the 
 
 
68 
 
job training year round and supported skill acquisition in short modular forms and 
through longer courses that in theory responded to employer demands.  They included 
apprenticeships (classroom training interspersed by practical workplace experience 
during a seven phase training cycle over the course of three or four years), traineeships 
(min 30% time in the work place), specific skills training, momentum, and 
Bridging/Foundation.  While some of the training courses complemented each other, 
many courses were fraught with rivalry and duplication.  Indeed, a Former FÁS Staff 
Member (2015) remarked, ‘There was a lot of duplication and a lack of coordination. 
You could have two of the same programs, one within FÁS and the other within the 
Institute of Technology.’  In addition, the VEC vocational education courses tended to be 
negatively perceived by individuals, and associated with low-skilled jobs, as well as 
lacked employer integration, whereas the FAS vocational training courses were 
undervalued by firms with courses often perceived as lacking relevance and depth 
(Sweeney 2013).   
Ireland’s apprenticeship system suffered similar problems, with it being undervalued by 
both firms and potential participants alike and limited to construction, electrical, motor, 
engineering and printing sectors (Department of Education and Skills 2013), with heavy 
concentration of apprentices in construction. In addition, a stark gendered occupational 
divide existed between apprenticeships and traineeships, with traineeships 
concentrated in female dominated occupations (i.e. childcare, hairdressers, etc.) and 
apprenticeships in male dominated occupations (i.e. carpenters, bricklayers, etc.).  
Following the 2008 economic crisis, the apprenticeship scheme fell into disuse as the 
construction industry collapsed and in 2016 a new apprenticeship scheme was 
developed. However, this new apprenticeship scheme continues to mirror its 
predecessor with only the printing sector eliminated and the Finance and Hospitality 
sector added.  The largest change is perhaps that the QQI (Quality and Qualifications 
Ireland) has been raised up to level ten, firms are fully responsible for apprentice pay, 
and the consortia where apprenticeships are designed include only industry and 
education partners, thus excluding trade unions.  While trade unions are included on 
the Apprenticeship Council, the exclusion of trade unions from the consortia means that 
apprenticeship working conditions and access to trade union representation are no 
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longer considered key aspects of apprenticeship design or implementation,8 thus  ‘one 
of the fundamental legs of the stool is missing’ (Trade Union Representative, SIPTU 
2017).   
Alongside the redistribution of trade union involvement in training schemes and the 
more general amalgamation of the VEC and local FAS training centers into the ETBs, 
efforts were made to improve the link between skills and firm demand through skills 
consultation bodies.  Within Ireland existing (i.e. Expert Group on Future Skills Needs, 
EGFSN) and new consultation groups (i.e. The National Skills Council) were established 
to rapidly respond to changing skill need.  However, while these groups encourage 
social dialogue and an exchange of information and ideas between training providers 
and firms, the lack of statutory power of these institutions means that they are limited 
to an advisory role and recommendations are not legally binding and lack 
implementation mechanisms.    
I remember the committee on the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs in the 
retail and wholesale sector and  well the unfortunate part, is that FORFAS is not 
in charge of implementation, it just makes recommendations, but we came up 
with what I thought was a really good model in the skills development in the 
retail sector, going right from level 5, entry level and up to level 9 and indeed Aldi 
and Lidl do have Masters in retail management and we developed with the 
sector kind of a career structure and mapped it across to the framework of 
qualifications so it wouldn’t be just a job in the shop and for those who wanted it 
there would be a possible career structure but there was nobody to do it in terms 
of implementing it. 
 Employer Federation Representative, IBEC, 2015 
 
Thus, while these new consultation bodies are important to improve the link between 
firm and industry need, the institutions appear to have little capacity to implement 
training and skill strategies.  Perhaps the highest levels of employer integration through 
training in the workplace for the unemployed was through the DSP’s JobBridge 
internship scheme developed in 2011 by the head of the Labor Party, Joan Burton. The 
scheme aimed to provide work experience for individuals for six or nine months as new 
                                                          
8
 The scheme was highly regulated under the under FÁS with firms and social partners playing a key role 
in its governance structure, including the development of recognized certifications, learning content, and 
working conditions . 
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labor market entrants or as unemployed workers who wanted to obtain new skills.  One 
aspect that was different from past training schemes such as FÁS traineeships and the 
Apprenticeship Scheme is that internships through JobBridge were not considered an 
employment relationship and thus unlike previous training schemes, firms were not 
required to legally pay the minimum or trainee/apprentice wage, and interns were 
excluded from employment protection and any type of social insurance coverage (Social 
Welfare and Pensions Act 2011). Instead host organizations were permitted (at their 
own discretion) to provide expense reimbursement and interns were provided a top up 
of fifty euros per week in addition to their social welfare.  The scheme was also 
designed to be highly employer driven; enabling firms to participate in a recruitment 
process that closely mirrored normal employer recruitment and the selection of their 
own interview candidates. While the JobBridge scheme was one of the smaller ALMP 
schemes in terms of participation and received relatively favorable evaluations in terms 
of employment outcomes, it also received a great deal of negative media attention 
given its potential for displacement and substitution effects (which could not be 
accounted for in the DSP Indecon evaluation report) and consequently was discontinued 
following the general elections in 2017 and substantial loss for the Labor Party who 
originally developed the scheme. 
Within Ireland training is mostly provided by the firm at the point of entry (i.e. on-the-
job training/firms sponsored internships) or firm’s recruit individuals directly upon 
obtaining their university qualification.  Indeed, particularly in high skill sectors, firms 
continue to value and more readily recognize university degrees than derived lower 
level qualifications that may be derived through ALMP training.  Indeed, a great deal of 
ALMP training continues to be concentrated on the Back to Education Allowance 
Scheme.   While average spending on most training programs doubled between 2007-
2012, spending on the Back to Education Allowance Scheme, which provides second or 
third level education courses to the unemployed, lone parents and the disabled, tripled, 
from €64.1 million to €199.5 million, with participant numbers increasing from 6,000 to 
25,000 (Kelly et al. 2015).  In the absence of strong graduate skills, the Irish government 
has also consistently turned to migration to fulfil skill’s deficits instead of up-skilling 
harder to reach groups through ALMP training (Murphy 2012).  Therefore, demand side 
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training schemes that encourage employer involvement diverge from most ALMP 
training schemes, which tend to focus on formal qualifications through skills gained in 
education.   
Within Spain ALMP training is funded centrally through the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Security’s State Public Employment Service or Servicio Publico de Empleo Estatal 
(SEPE) and managed and planned by the regional PES of each Autonomous Community. 
In the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, ALMP training is the responsibility of the 
Catalan PES, the Servei Públic D’Ocupació de Catalunya (SOC) but is managed and 
implemented by public and private training centers throughout the region linked to 
social stakeholders (unions and employers), municipalities, foundations and other types 
of associations.  While the Catalonia Public Employment Service has seven of its own 
Centers for Innovation and Employment Training (CIFOs), adapted to the sectoral needs 
of each region and area (i.e. ICT, graphic design, metal manufacturing, etc.), the CIFOs 
are vastly underfunded and understaffed with each center concentrating on one area 
and their locations being scattered throughout Catalonia.  Therefore, the capacity of the 
Catalan PES to provide training through these centers is extremely limited and depends 
on collaborating with other training providers through social partners, municipalities, 
and other organizations.   
While some formal accredited training schemes fall in the realm of supply side sectoral 
vocational training coordinated by social partners through vocational training centers 
(Lope 2015), most training aimed at the unemployed is coordinated through the 
Regional PES.  Training programs are selected by each Autonomous Community, but 
since the implementation of the 2014-2016 Estrategía de Empleo de Empleo, these 
programs must be defined within Employment Plans approved by the regional 
governments and should fall within six general objectives established centrally, with 
some indicators holding more weight than others.  Though Autonomous Communities 
often jointly fund training programs using regional and state funds, failure to meet 
these common national objectives can result in reduced funding from the central 
government (Lope 2015).  Within the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, social 
partners are directly involved in the approval of the Pla de desenvolupament de 
polítiques d’ocupació de Catalunya or the Development Plans for the Employment Policy 
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of Catalonia (PCPO), revised bi-annually, through a regional PES board of directors (SOC 
2017).  These plans  provide detailed information regarding training programs and more 
generally ALMPs regarded as ‘common’ or state oriented and ‘individual’ or regionally 
oriented (Ibid).   
Vocational training for the unemployed or formación ocupacional has historically 
involved classroom training provided through certified training centers that provide 
professional training certificates included in the National Catalogue of Professional 
Qualifications9, a catalogue designed by social partners to respond to identified labor 
market need and accredit professional training certificates.   While work experience has 
always been a component of these courses, historically this has only been provided 
through short-term (approximately three months) work experience near the end of the 
training (Aivazova 2013).10  However, the 2012 Spanish Labor reform shifted the options 
available to autonomous communities enabling them to more fully integrate classroom 
training with work experience through a dual professional training model.   
Within the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, dual training took two forms: dual 
training in vocational education courses through the Ministry of Enterprise and Labor 
and dual training in initial vocational education course through the Ministry of 
Education and Training.  The first is found within the Spanish subsystem of professional 
training for the unemployed, ALMP training, while the second is found within the 
Education system and is primarily directed at initial vocational training for young 
people. Given this section is interested in ALMP training, the first dual model will be the 
focus.  In this dual model, unemployed individuals can select a dual vocational 
education course track which combines classroom training and training in firms 
integrated throughout the course. In addition, firms can approach the vocational 
                                                          
9
 Within Spain, one of the main instruments for certifying professional training certificates is through the 
National Catalogue of Professional Qualifications, developed by the national government in consultation 
with social partners at the national level. In this National Catalogue of Professional Qualifications 26 
Professional exist with professional qualifications allocated according to different skill levels (Ministerio 
de Educacion Cultura y Deporte 2017).   
 
10
 The labor market reform law 3/2012 established a new legal framework for vocational training 
programs in Spain based on the dual system model.  Instead of establishing the practical training at the 
end of the course, it is now integrated throughout and also includes a contract determining working 
conditions between employee and the trainee (Real Decreto 1529/2012). 
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education training centers to adapt training content curriculum to firm needs.  
However, while this represents a positive shift in ALMP training in Catalonia to more 
fully integrate firms into formal training, expert interviews and the existing literature 
reveal that wider problems exist with the recognition and content of these courses in 
Catalonia and nationally.   
While these professional training courses are regulated by the Ministry of Enterprise 
and Labor and according to the National Catalogue of Professional Qualifications, these 
professional training courses are not generally valued by firms, with firms preferring 
technical degrees or third level degrees regulated by the Department of Education 
(Expert 3, Employment Research, 2015).  Secondly, training areas are argued to be 
concentrated disproportionately in a few specific areas (Lope 2015).  According to Lope 
(2015), in 2012 72.9% of the courses offered nationally were concentrated within seven 
of the 26 professional families of the National Catalogue of Professional Qualifications 
(Catálogo Nacional de Cualificaciones Profesionales):  Administration and Management, 
Socio-cultural and Community Services, Informatics and Communications, Hospitality, 
Transportation and maintenance of vehicles, Health and Trade and Marketing.  Within 
the Autonomous Community of Catalonia in 2013, courses were concentrated in six of 
the seven national level professional family areas with only Health excluded.  Lope 
(2015) argues that while this may reflect the structural characteristics of the Spanish 
labor market, it also may indicate disconnection between the local employment services 
and the diverse needs of emerging industries.  Thus, it may be questioned the extent to 
which Spain’s formal (ALMP) training actually meets the firm needs and consequently 
the extent to which firms use this training type and value it. Indeed a Catalan trade 
union official argued that the Catalogue of National Professional Qualifications lacks skill 
accreditations, particularly for informal training, and the process to add qualifications is 
complicated and thus not flexible to individual training experiences (Trade Union 
Representative 1, CCOO 2015).  In contrast, Spanish university qualifications are not 
restricted to a centrally decided National Catalogue of Professional Qualifications and 
thus are more easily adaptable. 
Internships or on-the-job training through work experience is not a new phenomenon in 
the Spanish labor market.  Since 1998, internship contracts targeted at youth have been 
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regulated under the Workers Statute (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2015) 
and primarily aimed at providing work experience relevant to individuals with post-
secondary educational qualifications.  This first internship contract in 1998 aimed to 
provide youth between 15-30 years old in possession of a diploma or university degree 
a six month to two year period of on-the-job training in an area related to the person’s 
educational qualification. Since 1998, successive revisions to the internship contract or 
contrato en práctica (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2017a) have changed the 
regulatory features of the contract (i.e. age, education requirements, duration), as well 
as linked it to different types of employment subsidies (i.e. hiring subsidies for the 
unemployed and hiring individuals from a non-work internship). The linking of the 
internship contract to employment incentives is where it can be considered an ALMP as 
unemployed individuals must be registered with their regional PES for firms to avail of 
these government employment incentives.  
Current legislation stipulates that the internship contract is available to individuals who 
have a post-secondary qualification for a period of 6 months to two years in the same 
firm (or as defined in the collective agreement).  All interns are included in the social 
security regime and employers receive a 50% reduction in social security contributions 
for hiring  someone under 30 years old (35 for those with disabilities) onto an internship 
contract or individuals who were previously on a non-labor contraction.  Firms using the 
internship contracts are required to pay 60% for the first year and 75% the second year 
of the salary of a worker undertaking the same task (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad 
Social 2017a).  Under the Youth Guarantee additional firm subsidies are also available 
for any firm that takes on a young person (under 25 or under 30 if unemployment for 
group is 20% or more) for six months (SOC 2017a).  Within the Autonomous Community 
of Catalonia the internship contract has increased drastically over the last five years, 
from 7, 836 in 2011 to 17,868 in 2016, an increase of 10,032 (SOC 2016). This represents 
the second largest increase in the use of temporary contracts over the past five years. 
The non-labor internship contract in companies (prácticas no laborales en empresas) 
was developed in 2011 by the socialist government, at a time when unemployment was 
high.  This was an effort by the central government to regulate open-market internships 
and convince individual and groups of companies to offer paid internships to qualified 
 
 
75 
 
unemployed individuals who due to a lack of work experience found themselves 
unemployed (Mella 2014).  The main objective of this non-labor internship agreement 
was to aid young qualified participants’ labor market integration. Participants in the 
non-labor internship scheme cannot have any previous work experience in the area of 
the prospective internship that is more than three months in duration, must be 
between 18-25 years old, and must have a university degree, vocational (at 
intermediate or upper level), professional sports/arts training certificate or a 
professional certificate (Prácticas no Laborales en Empresas 1543/2011). Thus, this 
initiative assumes that all participants have finished some type of formal theoretical 
training beyond post-secondary level and aims to complement this training, as opposed 
to act as a substitute for it.   
Similar to other ALMPs within Spain, non-labor internships in companies are linked to 
numerous financial incentives to encourage employees to hire young workers. For firms 
that select a non-labor internship contract with the commitment to hire after, firms can 
receive an employment subsidy to cover the training expenses of the tutor and 
evaluations of the intern.  If a host company hires an individual onto an internship 
contract, they receive a 75% reduction in social security contributions, while if the 
young person is registered on the Youth Guarantee, the company receives an additional 
25% reduction- in other words they pay nothing (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad 
Social 2016).   
The introduction of the non-labor internship contract represented a shift in training 
through work experience given that non-labor internships in companies do not consist 
of any type of labor contract, thus excluding them from the framework of collective 
bargaining and ultimately inclusion in collective agreements.  Given that non-labor 
internships in companies are based on work experience and not linked to the Catalogue 
of Professional Qualifications, social partners also do not play a role in determining any 
type of accreditation for this training.  Thus, while social partners can impact the 
administration of and management of the non-labor internship through the Catalan PES 
Board of directors11 and through social dialogue on the inclusion of non-labor 
                                                          
11
 According to Law 17 2002 DOGC 3676 of the government of the Catalonia the Board of Directors of the 
Catalan PES (SOC) includes, the president of the Department responsible for employment, five 
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internships in the Youth Guarantee, the non-labor internship by default- since it legally 
is not an employment relationship- cannot be negotiated through the system of 
collective bargaining and collective agreements. Thus the participation of social partners 
is more limited for this particular ALMP program. However, when compared to Ireland it 
can still be said that the participation of social partners in the ALMP system as a whole 
is far greater than in the case of Irish ALMP system. 
 
Employment Incentives 
Historically, Ireland and Spain have differed greatly in their spending on employment 
incentives, with Ireland spending very little and Spain overspending.   While spending 
levels have fallen recently in Spain, ALMP employment incentives have historically been 
overrepresented, with expenditure often approaching close to 50% of ALMP spending 
(Kluve 2005). Given Spain’s highly segmented labor market, with young workers tending 
to be concentrated in temporary work contracts (Bentolila et al. 2011), excessive 
spending on ALMP employment incentives has generally been concentrated on 
incentivizing employers to convert temporary contracts to permanent, hire individuals 
onto permanent contracts, as well as provide incentives to hire particular vulnerable 
groups onto training contracts or consecutive internship contracts (i.e. incentives to hire 
a non-labor intern onto an internship contract) (Garcia Serrano and Malo 2013). The 
recent decrease in the uptake of employment incentives within Spain coincides with the 
new model of employment activation which only guarantees funding to program areas 
that result in employment.  Given the overall decrease in employment offer, the 
amount of funds available through the Autonomous Communities has actually 
decreased (Lope 2016). In contrast, Ireland continues to have a highly flexible labor 
market, with some of the lowest numbers of temporary contracts in the EU (Gash 
2005).  While historically Irish ALMPs did include employment financial incentive 
schemes through the Employment Incentive Scheme (1977-1994) and the Employment 
                                                                                                                                                                            
representatives of SOC, five members of the most representative trade unions and 5 members of the 
most representative employer federations in Catalonia. They are responsible for approving Employment 
Plans of Catalonia, approving the Development Plan for Employment Policy, and more generally plans, 
budget proposals, EU program proposals related to the PES, and evaluations of PES policies, as well as 
discuss other issues through social dialogue as they arise (SOC 2017b). 
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Subsidy Scheme (1992-1993), over the last eight years spending, as well as participation 
in ALMP employment financial incentives has been relatively low when compared to 
other ALMP types (4% 2007 compared to 5% in 2015).    
Within Ireland few ALMP training contracts provide employment incentives directly to 
employers, but rather tend to subsidize firms indirectly by providing subsidized wages 
for interns through the receipt of individual social welfare payments and/or an 
additional ‘top-up’ (i.e. former Work Placement Program and JobBridge).   Any direct 
employment incentives to the firm tend to not be combined with training and take the 
form of employment subsidies or tax exemptions.  Since 1998 Ireland has offered 
subsidized employment opportunities through its Revenue Job Assist and in 2010 its 
Employer Job (PRSI) Exemption Scheme.12  However, both schemes suffered from low 
uptake largely due to a lack of knowledge of the schemes and complications 
surrounding access (Employer Federation Representative, IBEC 2015).  Through 
feedback from employers due to increase efforts by the central PES to engage 
employers (i.e. the ‘Employer Roadshows’), in 2013 a new simplified employment 
incentive, JobsPlus (Youth), was developed to replace the previous schemes.  JobsPlus 
and JobsPlus Youth, simplified Ireland’s ALMP employment incentives schemes so that 
firms received a direct subsidy for long term unemployed (1 year+ or 2 year+) and youth 
(under 25 and 4 months unemployed) through a monthly cash payment, with larger 
cash incentives available depending on the length of unemployment.   While the uptake 
of the current JobsPlus scheme has been steadily improving (from only 1,114 
participants in May 2014 to 5,738 in May 2017), participation still only represents 6.1% 
or 5, 738 of  Ireland’s main ALMP schemes for which participant data is available.  
 
Table 5:  ALMPs by Number of Participants 
  N % 
Back to work enterprise allowance scheme - self-employed strand 10754 11.5% 
Short-term enterprise allowance 394 .4% 
                                                          
12
 The first ALMP employment incentive offered social security deductions and tax savings for hiring a 
long-term unemployed individual (12 month or more) and the second offered social security exemptions 
for hiring someone who was unemployed for six months or more (INOU 2011).   
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Other activation programmes - DSP part-time job incentive 468 .5% 
Other activation programmes - TUS - community work placement initiative 7262 7.7% 
Other activation programmes – JobBridge* 976 1% 
Other activation programmes – Gateway 385 .4% 
Community employment (CE) schemes (excluding supervisors) 22121 23.6% 
FAS/Solas full time training for unemployed people 6452 6.9% 
Back to education courses - back to education allowance (BTEA) 13569 14.5% 
JobsPlus 5738 6.1% 
JobPath 20700 22.1% 
Wage Subsidy Scheme (private sector, incentives to hire individuals 
w/disabilities) 
2356 2.5% 
Rural Social Scheme (farmers/fisher(wo)men) 2632 2.8% 
TOTAL 93807 100% 
 
Source: CSO 2017; Houses of Oireachtas 2017 
 
In addition, while Irish labor market legislation enables firms to combine an employer 
led training scheme (i.e. JobBridge) with an employment incentive contract (i.e. 
JobsPlus), firms do not frequently take advantage of this option (Government official 2, 
DSP 2017).  Indeed, the evaluation report on the training scheme JobBridge noted that 
only 2.5% of participants who completed an internship less than one month ago were 
recruited onto a JobsPlus contract, with this figure rising to 4.2% after five to six months 
completion and falling thereafter (Indecon 2016).   Therefore, while efforts by the 
government to improve information channels and simplify the design of the ALMP 
employment incentive have led to a gradual increase in uptake, uptake still remains low 
compared to other ALMP types, particularly direct job creation in the public sector.   
In comparison, within Spain, firms have used employment incentives since the mid-80s, 
with employment incentives being a consequence of efforts by social partners and the 
government to mitigate the segmentation between temporary and permanent 
contracts (Garcia-Serrano and Malo 2013).  Given that this segmentation has been 
pronounced among particular groups of workers (i.e. young people and women), given 
they were newcomers to the labor market when temporary contracts were first 
introduced in 1984, employment incentives have been consistently targeted primarily at 
these groups. Many ALMPs training programs (see Appendix C) have also been directly 
linked to employment incentives (either via the specific program, by age, or by contract 
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type- converting a temporary contract to a permanent one) to encourage employees to 
hire young people.    
One of main reasons for the strong segmentation and consequential increases 
historically in ALMP employment incentives was the sharp divisions between 
employment protections related to the two contract types.  The 2012 labor market 
reforms attempted to narrow this gap by reducing severance costs for permanent 
contracts (from 45 to 20 wage days per seniority year) and maintaining temporary 
contracts at twelve wage days per seniority year, thus reducing the gap from thirty-
three to eight days for unfair dismissal.  It also made it easier for employers to dismiss 
workers on objective or fair grounds as long as it was for economical, technical, 
organizational or productive reasons and eliminated the need for approval for collective 
dismissals.  However, despite these reforms after almost four decades of firms using 
temporary contracts (of all forms), this segmentation was well established in  
production processes, with two work forces existing, those in low-paid, high rotation 
jobs, hired through temporary contracts and those with open-ended contracts for high 
paid low-rotation jobs (Garcia-Serrano and Malo 2013).   
Thus, following the 2012 labor market reforms, most preliminary studies agree that the 
reform did not succeed in diminishing the duality of the labor market, but rather 
deteriorated working conditions overall (see Corral 2015 for an overview).  Indeed, 
Garcia-Serrano and Malo (2013) argue that changing the organization of work is costly 
and consequently not easy, particularly for large firms where allocation of tasks to jobs 
is far more defined than small firms.  Thus, while spending has resulted in a decrease in 
the participation in ALMP employment incentives13 this is largely related to fewer funds 
being available as opposed to an actual change in the behavior of firms’ production 
strategies. Instead as will be illustrated in the firm case studies, firms continue to rely on 
highly flexible entry tournaments, particularly large MNC subsidiary firms. 
 
                                                          
13
 Participation by program type is unfortunately not available for Spain at the national level and I was 
unable to access this information at the level of the Autonomous Community.  Indeed, the lack of 
available data also impedes the ability to evaluate ALMPs within Spain (Lope 2015).  
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Table 6: Participants by ALMPs, Ireland and Spain (% of share of total 
ALMPs) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat 2017 
 
Direct Job Creation through Public Employment 
Ireland has historically invested heavily in public employment schemes, and in 2015 
invested three times as much when compared to Spain, 20% compared to 10%.  Within 
Ireland, the Community Employment Scheme (CE), which subsidizes temporary 
employment in the public or voluntary sector for the long term unemployed, is 
notoriously known for having the highest participation rate among ALMP schemes 
(23.6%).  Despite a low progression rate of individuals into employment (NESC 2011), as 
well as the scheme being expensive and lengthy (three years), the CE Scheme remained 
relatively unaltered during the crisis years.  Indeed, since its replacement of the Social 
Employment Scheme in 1994, the CE Scheme gradually became the backbone for the 
local community and voluntary sector, as well as offered other key social integration 
outcomes for individuals with lower education levels at the local level.  In contrast, 
other more recent and much smaller work placement schemes more integrated with 
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firms, such as JobBridge, and with more favorable evaluations in terms of employment 
outcomes (Indecon 2016) were discontinued.  This is largely related to the politics 
surrounding the two schemes.  While CE was transferred under the auspice of the DSP 
with the reconfiguration of the PES institutions, it was historically linked to the more 
autonomous and regional training authority FÁS with strong connections to key 
politicians, thus the CE developed strong ties and relationships with local level voluntary 
and public organizations.  In contrast JobBridge was a relatively new scheme (2011) 
developed by the head of the Labor Party, Joan Burton, one which received a great deal 
of negative media attention given its potential for displacement and substitution 
effects. Thus, when Labor lost seats in the general 2016 elections, the JobBridge scheme 
was discontinued.  In contrast, the new Minister for Social Protection has recently 
reasserted his commitment to securing social benefits, improving and expanding the CE 
scheme (Department of Social Protection 2017).  
Within Spain, direct employment through public sector programs does not play a large 
role in the overall ALMP system.  Historically, the main direct employment schemes 
used nationally have been the Escuela Talleres and Casa de Oficios or Workshop Schools 
and Craft Centers launched in the 1980s which carried out public or social utility 
through communities and public administrations targeted at 25 years or younger who 
were unemployed for six month or more.  However, many Autonomous Communities 
have gradually stopped using them due to the inability of organizations outside 
communities and public administrations to participate and the more general lack of 
employer integration (Employer Federation Representative 1, PIMEC 2015).  Within the 
Autonomous Community of Catalonia for instance, neither these direct employment 
schemes, nor other types of direct employment schemes are used.  Nationally, some 
other Autonomous Communities such as Extremadura and Andalucía have job creation 
schemes for agricultural employment.  However, in general these schemes do not play a 
large role in the Spanish ALMP system.  
 
In conclusion, it can be said that firms within Ireland and Spain have limited interaction 
with the PES and ALMP training programs with many ALMP certifications being 
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undervalued by firms.  Within Spain, despite a decrease in financing employment 
incentives by the central government and recent labor reforms to permanent contracts, 
firm behavior has been conditioned over time to adapt to changing labor market 
conditions by flexiblizing working conditions of certain segments of the workforce.  
Employment incentives have been a consequence of this organization of labor and thus 
Spanish firms that do participate in ALMP training will tend to do so through direct 
employment incentives.  Within Ireland historically, ALMPs have concentrated on direct 
job creation through the public and voluntary sector, with programs such as the CE 
Scheme continuing to be immune to veto points by the previous and current 
government.  Opportunities for firm participation in ALMP training appear to be highly 
prone to veto points and changing economic conditions, with existing programs (i.e. 
apprenticeships and traineeships) being partially abandoned and reformed  and newer 
programs (i.e. JobBridge) being discontinued.  This lack of ALMP training program 
continuity would thus be expected to discourage firm participation. When firms do 
participate in ALMP training, employment incentives are generally targeted at the 
unemployed job seeker as opposed to the firm in the form of social welfare payments 
and top-ups.  Unlike Spain, employment incentives directed at the firms are not a 
consequence of a highly segmented labor market reliant on numerical forms of 
flexibility for a segmented workforce but rather an effort to incentivize firms to hire 
more vulnerable groups of unemployed jobseekers (i.e. long-term unemployed and 
young workers).  The historically low (but growing) uptake of employment incentives 
such as JobsPlus, means that firms also would not be expected to be conditioned to use 
employment incentives as a strategy to flexibly organize labor among certain segments 
of the workforce.   
Firms within Ireland and Spain also appear to not value the quality of training 
certificates derived through ALMP schemes, nor trust the efficacy of the job monitoring 
services provided by the PES in Ireland and Spain.  Instead, any training generally occurs 
at the point of entry (i.e. on-the-job training/company sponsored internships) and/or 
through the recruitment of individuals with post-secondary qualifications at university 
or technical level.    When faced with skill deficits, both the Irish and Spanish 
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government would more heavily rely on immigration as opposed to re-skilling hard to 
reach groups. 
One clear difference between Ireland and Spain is how strongly institutionalized social 
partners are within each ALMP system.  Within Ireland, social partners were loosely 
incorporated into the Irish ALMP structure, through the former FÁS board of directors, 
as well as through the negotiation of terms and conditions of specific ALMP training 
programs (i.e. apprenticeships/traineeships).  However, since the restructuration of the 
PES institutions and disbandment of FÁS, trade unions specifically, have been 
increasingly excluded from the negotiation and governance processes to influence 
ALMPs.  This is in a context where the collapse of social partnership has reduced bi-
partite and tri-partite negotiating capabilities and collective bargaining is restricted to 
pay bargaining in the public sector and private sector collective bargaining is 
decentralized to enterprise level in Ireland. Thus, opportunities for the negotiation of 
training issues through bi-partite and tri-partite negotiation are extremely limited.  
Existing and new institutions to discuss skill strategies and need through social dialogue 
also appear to be weak, with mechanisms for effective implementation lacking.   
In contrast, social partners within Spain are strongly institutionalized into the ALMP 
system, meaning that, in theory, trade unions and employers alike should be able to 
extensively influence legislative processes concerning ALMPs type.  However, the strong 
institutionalization of social partners does not appear to strengthen the link between 
ALMP training or increase new and innovative training types.  This can partly be 
attributed to more overarching structural issues of the Spanish ALMP and wider IR 
system where the state consistently plays a pervasive and coordinating role and social 
partners remain weak.  Thus opportunities for social dialogue surrounding specific 
ALMP issues may fall short as social partners struggle to influence the political arena 
and gain legitimacy from the state (Molina 2014). However, ALMPs are also embedded 
in Ireland and Spain’s wider training and education systems, both which present specific 
features that may enable or hinder firm level decisions surrounding hiring, training and 
job quality outcomes. Thus in the following section, ALMPs will be situated in the 
context of Ireland and Spain’s training and education systems. 
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Education and Training Systems:  The Role of the State, Social Partners 
and the Firm 
 
Training for Employment in Spain: CVT and ALMPs 
In Spain, professional training consists of: training for employment (CVT and ALMPs) 
and initial training for employment (primary, secondary and post-secondary including 
IVET).  The first is controlled by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 
whereas the second is controlled by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports.  
Training for employment is divided into two parts: the demand side and the supply side.  
The demand side consists of firms who solicit continuous training to fulfill specific 
company skill needs or employees who solicit training through the firm to enhance their 
own individual professional skill needs, whereas the supply side consists of lifelong 
training provisions for the employed and unemployed.  The governance structure of the 
demand and the supply side of professional training for employment differs with the 
demand side relying on firms or groups of firms to solicit funding for training provision 
and the supply side managed by the State Foundation for Employment Training 
(Fundacion Estatal para la Formacion en el Empleo) or FUNDAE (formerly Tripartite 
Foundation for Training and Employment) which through consultation with social 
partners, contracts out training provision for the employed to public and private 
entities.  The FUNDAE also provides offers of ALMP training to the unemployed through 
the national and regional PES and Public Administrators. 
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Table 7:  Professional Training for Employment in Spain 
 
 Demand (Public and 
Private Funds) 
Supply(Public Funds) 
Firm 
Training 
Actions 
Individuals Employed Unemployed 
Firms (CVT) X X   
Trade Unions and 
Employer’s Associations 
(CVT) 
  X X 
Public Employment Service 
and Public Administrators 
(ALMPs) 
   X 
 
Professional Training for Employment is primarily funded through firm tax levies, with 
funding also originating from European Structural Funds.  Within Spain, all firms pay the 
firm levy tax (.7%- .6% from the firm and .1% from the employee), with the training levy 
equally distributed between training for the unemployed and employed (.35%) to each 
side (Escardíbul and Llinas-Audet 2010).  From 1993-2015, these training credits were 
run by the Tripartite Foundation for Training and Employment, but the disbandment of 
this organization now means these responsibilities fall under the auspice of the new 
institution FUNDAE.  The training credits are used to support general and specific 
training activities managed by firms, either in isolation or in groups, and to provide 
proportional social security reduction subsidies, with firm size determining the amount 
allocated and micro firms receiving a capped annual amount. 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 8:  Firm Training Credits by Firm Size 
 
Firm Size Subsidy Private 
250+ 50% 50% 
50-249 60% 40% 
10-49 75% 25% 
1-9 100% 0% 
1-5 Annual Credit of €420 
   
Source: FUNDAE (Fundación Estatal para la Formación en el Empleo), 2017 
 
Accordingly, small firms receive full subsidies for their workers, with those with 1-5 
employees receiving a maximum of €420 annually and larger firms expected to partially 
privately fund their training.  Firms can use the training credits for any type of internal 
or external training and can collaborate for training offers with other firms. In addition, 
individual employees are entitled to permisos individuales de formación or individual 
training leave which is not included in the training credit calculation.  This grant is 
provided for individual employees to take leave from work to undertake vocational 
training of any kind with firms receiving compensation for wages losses (OECD 2017).  
While the individual training leave and grants are allocated to individual employees, 
firms must solicit the specific training to obtain the wage compensation grants. 
Despite the possible benefits of Spain’s demand driven and highly flexible training credit 
scheme, three factors emerge as impeding the potential benefits of demand side 
training for firms:  the resources required to navigate red tape to access training credits, 
the flexibility employers are given to choose training type, and more generally the lack 
of information on appropriate skill needs for small and micro firms.   According to the 
2016 Annual Report on Training (Fundación Estatal Para la Formación en el Empleo 
2016), the participation of firms in accessing training credits continues to be skewed 
towards medium and large companies, with micro-firms least likely to participate. 
Proportionally, only 18.5% of all micro firms participate, 51.2% of all small companies, 
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81.2% of all medium companies and 93% of all large companies (FUNDAE 2017).  
According to interviews with the SME Catalan employers’ organization, PIMEC, this 
participation is largely related to resources and the extent to which larger firms are 
more able to access training credits because they have more resources to navigate the 
red tape.  The Spanish employer’s association PIMEC argued that training credits are not 
feasible for micro companies because you need additional resources to manage the 
funding and negotiate the bureaucracy.   
For a company that is one to five workers you get 420 euros per year. To have 
420 euros per year you do this once a year. However, the process is lengthy. You 
have the same process, if you are a MNC, a large company, or if you are a 
company with two workers. Managing the system is the same. What happens? 
[You] have too much paperwork, and for what? For 420 euros you go two 
mornings to understand what you have to do, I don’t know what else, send the 
documents, etc. or the company itself can pay [for the training]. 
Employer Federation Representative 1, PIMEC, 2015 
 
Therefore, this would suggest that firm size matters in terms of access to continuous 
training credits.  For knowledge intensive sectors such as ICT, this means small firms are 
disadvantaged and consequently may rely more heavily on upskilling at the point of 
entry through more flexible ‘training’ options (i.e. ALMPs or other flexible ‘training’ 
contracts) or if able, choose to privately fund continuous training.   
Another issue with Spain’s demand side of professional training system is the type of 
training firms invest in.  One drawback of the firm training credits is that firms have 
complete flexibility to choose the type of training investment.  While this provides 
flexibility for firms to rapidly address production and training needs, the literature 
argues that unless firms are required regularly by national government driven training 
strategies to analyze and evaluate long-terms skill need, firms tend to invest in most 
immediate, short-term and specific skill needs (Crouch et al. 1999).  This is particularly 
relevant to small and micro firms, where these types of incentives are needed due to 
the tendency for short-term planning, limited HR resources for training at the firm level, 
and more generally limited knowledge of training options (OECD 2017).   The ability of 
the firm to choose training type by using training credits can also pose problematic 
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when individuals are trained in more firm specific skills, as opposed to generic skills, 
which are more adaptable during crisis (OECD 2014).  While skill forecast reports are 
provided sporadically by the European agency CEDEFOP (European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training) and tri-partite social dialogue agreements have 
historically aided the government to detect skill need and determine the allocation of 
training contracts on the supply side of professional training, the demand side of 
professional training has not been required to analyze and assess long-term skill need.  
This is apparent when examining firm uptake of long-term and more general skills in the 
2015 Annual Labor Market Survey or Encuesta Anual Laboral with Spanish firms 
investing more in mandatory training (i.e. hygiene and health) than other skill areas (see 
Table 8).14  Spanish firms also appear to invest more in job specific technical skills, as 
well as have low investment in IT skills, increasingly key to improving firm productivity 
and competition.  The Spanish economy is structured by few large firms and dominated 
by micro and small firms.  Given that micro and small firms tend to rely on short-term, 
informal HRM strategies and have limited resources in terms of not only financial 
resources, but also staff, mandatory training would understandably be the first line of 
action when training is considered.  
 
Table 9:  Share of Training in Spanish Firms by Training Type, 2015 
Type of Training  Share of Training Firms 
Mandatory Workplace Training (Health, 
Hygiene, Safety) 
60.2% 
Job Specific Technical Skills  43.2% 
Other 24.4% 
Customer Service 20.9% 
Team Work 14.4% 
Office Administration 13.3% 
                                                          
14
 Unfortunately, Ireland does not provide data to Eurostat in terms of enterprises offering any other type 
of training.  Therefore, this data is used to make within country comparisons as opposed to between the 
two countries. 
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Management 11.6% 
Foreign Language Training 11.4% 
General Information Technology 10.3% 
Problem-Solving 8.3% 
Specialized Information technology 5.0% 
Basic Literacy and Numeracy 2.0% 
 
Source: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Encuesta Anual Laboral 2015 
 
In addition, interviews suggest that many micro companies also may lack the 
appropriate information to access different types of training and do not have sufficient 
staff numbers to free up time for training.   
The size of the firm is always complicated when it comes to training because 
even within companies they can have their own training centers. They also have 
the possibility to organize their staff so that someone can cover when someone 
leaves for training. However, with a small firm, particularly a micro firm, many 
times they don’t even have knowledge of the training tools needed to directly 
train. Sometimes they do not know who to turn to and then the second issue is 
the staff numbers are small and the two, three or four people they have are the 
ones who have to take all of the shifts and schedules. 
Employer Federation Representative 1, Foment del Treball-Patronal Catalana, 
2015 
 
Therefore, knowledge asymmetries are problematic for micro and small firms, 
particularly when planning more innovative training strategies and accessing courses 
that require more resources.   
The other side of the coin for the Spanish professional training system is the supply side 
which consists of continuous training courses for the employed (60%) and unemployed 
(40%) in specific sectors, as well as any type of training for the unemployed.  While the 
institutional actors have recently changed, historically the main difference with 
continuous training on the supply side for the employed and unemployed was that 
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trade unions and employer’s associations managed the training funds and contracted 
and supplied training courses at the sectoral and inter-sectoral level.  In contrast, 
training for the unemployed, or ALMPs, is managed through the regional Public 
Employment Services and Public-Private training administrators.   
While firms and individuals on the demand side historically could request specific types 
of training by consulting trade unions and employers’ associations to subsidize specific 
training courses, ultimately the decision to offer training courses for specific sectors was 
decided by the trade unions and employer’s associations.  Though this did not 
guarantee training courses necessarily reflected firm need, training courses could 
potentially be oriented towards perceived long-term training needs, particularly for 
micro and small firms in specific sectors (Rigby 2004).  However, since March 2015 (RD 
4/2015, 22 March), the governance model for the supply side of continuous training for 
the employed and unemployed has been reformed, largely in response to cases of fraud 
in managing training funds that emerged following the crisis, as well as some overlaps in 
training provision.  
Previously, the Tripartite Foundation for Training in Employment was the central 
institution for trade unions, employer’s associations and government representatives to 
detect training needs and design training courses.  Through this negotiation process and 
joint funding from the national and regional governments, trade unions and employer’s 
associations could issue tenders at the regional level, often linked to social partners, to 
subcontract supply side subsidized training courses to be administered by private 
training centers and consultancies.  However, the recent reforms of the professional 
training system have meant that the Spanish government has shifted the governance 
model of supply side sectoral training for the employed and unemployed towards a 
privatized system of competition for training funds and one that largely excludes social 
partners. 
Since the 2015 Vocational Training Reform, social partners no longer manage the 
training funds. Instead, they act as consultants to assist other bodies, such as regional 
governments, to detect training needs and are consulted on the development of the 
Multiannual Strategic Plan (Sanz 2015).  The main determinant of training courses is the 
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National Catalogue for Professional Qualifications and all public and private training 
centers officially recognized by the central PES are eligible to compete for training 
courses.  The Tri-partite Foundation has also been replaced by the State Foundation for 
Employment and Training, which gives majority veto power to civil servants (Ibid).  
Therefore, the role of social partners in training supply and design for supply side 
sectoral training for the employed and unemployed has been reduced since 2015, thus 
recentralizing supply side funding and training program allocation and limiting social 
partners’ role in training provision.  This is a clear divergence for Spain’s professional 
training system, given that social partners have historically played an important role at 
the national level in developing tripartite agreements on continuous training (see Rigby 
2004 for a review of Continuous Training Agreements) and regionally through  the 
administration of funding to training suppliers.  
The other side of the supply side consists of training solely for the unemployed and is 
where the classic ALMP is found.  It aims to activate the unemployed and is coordinated 
through the national and regional PES, at the level of the Autonomous Communities, 
and with other local Public administrators (i.e. municipalities, private/public providers, 
etc.).  Funding originates centrally but is matched regionally and locally.  Within the 
Autonomous Community of Catalonia, these public administrators include municipal 
actors which play an important role in administering ALMPs, with funding administered 
by the regional Catalan Employment Service according to population and economic 
importance.   
The governance of ALMP training for the unemployed differs from the sectoral training 
courses since at the national level social partners do not have any legal competencies to 
manage ALMP programs or funding (Perez del Prado 2013).  Indeed, any social partner 
participation in the management of ALMP programs and funding allocations is decided 
at the level of the Autonomous Community.  The Autonomous Community of Catalonia 
has a long tradition of regional institutions (i.e. the Labor Market Council, the Council 
for Continuous Vocational Training and the Employment, Economic and Social Council of 
Catalonia) facilitating social dialogue on labor market and training issues, including a 
Catalonia PES Board of Directors comprised of many social partners (i.e. regional 
administration, most representative employers’ associations and trade unions, and local 
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representatives from the municipalities).  In addition, annual Regional Employment 
Plans and the recent Youth Employment Program of Cataluña (part of the Spanish Youth 
Guarantee 2014-2020) have also consistently involved social dialogue among key social 
partners.  However, negotiations can be lengthy and may focus more on the process of 
negotiation at the expense of the actual types of training being negotiated.  
Imagine if our collective bargaining is so complex, it is really hard to go any 
further in collective agreements on aspects of training, traineeships or 
apprenticeships.  In a project with Comisiones Obreros (CCOO trade union) we 
are trying to find a model for dual training and of course both organizations 
believe that collective bargaining has to be more developed. It is really difficult, 
very difficult. For example we had a social dialogue exercise in the Catalan Labor 
Market Council to decide on recommendations for the collective bargaining of 
vocational education and training.  These were only recommendations and we 
were negotiating for nine months. 
Employer Federation Representative 1, PIMEC, 2015 
 
In addition, regional activation plans are often undermined by pervasive state 
interference and thus social partners lack the coordination to collaborate on a detailed 
and coherent training strategy. 
There is no unified vision [of active labor market policy]. Although there is an 
Activation Policy Plan in Catalonia it's like, let's say a general framework. The 
details that matter, how it effects the day to day lives of the people; we do not 
have the opportunity to discuss these things because if you really think about it, 
the Royal Decree, is used by the Spanish government a lot to justify that there is 
an urgent need to regulate without discussing the details with anyone. When 
there is a Royal Decree, there is no agreement with the social agents. This is the 
issue in the background. 
 
Trade Union Representative 1, CCOO, 2015 
 
Even when ALMP ‘packages’ are negotiated  through state driven, social dialogue, such 
as the EU Youth Guarantee, the programs negotiated for are mostly based on existing 
ALMP programs, with few actual new ALMPs incorporated.  Indeed, national legislation 
frequently is at odds with the diverse types and management of ALMPs at the level of 
the Autonomous Community and consequently poor design nationally can refract from 
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the effective negotiation of ALMP implementation.  Indeed, in the case of the Youth 
Guarantee, national level legislation restricted participation in Youth Guarantee 
programs to young people (under 25) who are registered in a specific data base for the 
Youth Guarantee with regional PES.  This has created conflict with the regional PES, 
given that they could not directly take advantage of Youth Guarantee funding. 
Spain [the central government] made it so in order to access the Youth 
Guarantee programs, one has to be registered in a database [for the Youth 
Guarantee]. Since no young people are registered, there is no obligation to 
actually do something, the wonderful Ministry of Employment. It’s a serious 
problem because it will stall the participation of young people in the Youth 
Guarantee and the budget cannot be spent. So from the beginning this database 
is very, very, very poorly designed and today there are very few young people 
registered. In Catalonia’s case we have more young people registered, 10 
thousand, but 100,000 young people that are not working-10,000 or 10% [are 
registered]. This is Madrid’s responsibility. We cannot do anything here. 
Expert 4, Training and Employment, 2015 
 
Thus, the pervasive influence of the state undermines and limits the terms of conditions 
of negotiating ALMPs, with any efforts by social partners concentrated on influencing 
the alteration of funding arrangements centrally.  
In addition, to implementation deficits resulting from centrally designed ALMPs, ALMP 
funding has also recently been recentralized. Under the new activation model 
developed through the Planes Annuales de Política de Empleo (PAPE) and the Estrategía 
Española de Activación para el Empleo 2014-2016, ALMP funding is allocated to 
Autonomous Communities according to adherence to general ALMP categories and 
overall employment within Autonomous Communities.  This new activation model 
includes strategies to strengthen the PES personalized services for the unemployed, 
retrain older and less skilled workers, and increase public-private collaboration in 
administering public employment services.  Under the new ALMP funding system, 60% 
of Autonomous Communities’ funding is based on the number of unemployed who 
obtain employment and 40% on the adherence of each region’s ALMP programs to six 
central objectives (for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) :  1) Orientation, 2) training, 3) 
opportunities for employment, 4) equal access to opportunities for employment,5)  
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entrepreneurship, and 6) improving the institutional framework of the national 
employment services (Lope 2013). Each objective is weighted differently and if an 
Autonomous Community receives a good ‘evaluation mark,’ funding is increased 
progressively (i.e. from 60% in 2015 to 70% in 2016).  However, this evaluation mark is 
not related to evaluating specific ALMP programs but rather how well Autonomous 
Communities’ ALMP programs ‘fit’ the specific objectives.  In addition, no clear link is 
made between specific ALMP programs and employment outcomes.  Therefore, in a 
context where the recentralization of ALMP funding refocuses Autonomous 
Communities’ ALMP efforts to ‘fit’ specific objectives, as opposed to evaluating the 
success of ALMP programs in terms of labor market outcomes, possibilities for social 
dialogue on ALMPs, even in Autonomous Communities such as Catalonia, remain 
limited to struggles over how to maintain state funding.   
 
Regulated or Initial Training:  Spanish IVET 
Regulated or initial training is the second part of the Spanish professional training 
system and is coordinated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport and similar to 
CVT for the employed and unemployed, is integrated into the National Catalogue of 
Professional Qualifications. Within Spain, obligatory education ends within Spain at the 
age of sixteen.  Following this, individuals with the compulsory secondary education 
certificate can elect to 1) enter a Bachillerato, two preparatory years for the exam to 
enter university, 2) enter pre-vocational studies students or IVET, or 3) enter the labor 
market.  The IVET is delivered in vocational schools and has two levels intermediate 
(upper secondary) and higher (tertiary), both linked to intermediate and higher 
technical diplomas through the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport. The successful 
completion of the intermediate technical degree and subject to an entrance exam 
enables graduates to then enter the higher IVET programs. 
While IVET provides an alternative pathway towards recognized qualifications for upper 
secondary students, Spain’s upper secondary vocational education system still remains 
relatively weak (Wolf 2013).   Graduation rates from IVET are relatively low and IVET 
systems lack strong links to the labor market with primarily classroom based training 
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followed by a short period of work experience during the last year.  While the most 
representative employers’ can make recommendations on qualifications and their 
evolution through the national tripartite advisory body the General Council of 
Vocational Education,   their influence at the local level remains limited to the provision 
of workplace training.   In addition, most individuals who complete obligatory secondary 
education successfully do not value the IVET route and continue on to obtain the 
Bachillerato to provide entrance into university.  On the other hand, a large proportion 
of the population also leave secondary education early in Spain, and consequently are 
not eligible for the IVET or Bachillerato route.  Indeed, the reality of the Spanish initial 
training system can be compared to an hourglass, with 42.4% of the working population 
with up to or less than a lower secondary education, 23.1% upper-secondary and post –
secondary non-tertiary education and 34.5% tertiary education.   
Figure 2:  Working Population by Education Level (25- 64 years), EU-27 
and Spain 
 
 
The upper part of the hourglass represents the dramatic increase in the proportion of 
third level graduates, with those in the age group 25-29 almost twice as likely to hold a 
third level degree compared to those in the 35-64 age range.  The middle represents the 
underuse and lack of graduation rate in the (initial) vocational education system, with 
most of these individuals only reaching intermediary level.  The bottom represents the 
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percentage of individuals with secondary or less and provides evidence of the high 
dropout rates from education and training, with 23.5 percent of 18-24 year olds in this 
category in 2013, compared to Ireland’s dropout rate of 8.4 percent in 2013 (Eurostat 
2013).  This high dropout rate means that young labor market entrants have a higher 
probability of lacking recognized skill qualifications and consequently a higher 
propensity towards unemployment. This low-skill level among a large portion of Spanish 
population creates a situation where firms struggle to engage individuals in training 
with many individuals lacking basic reading and math skills (Employer Federation 
Representative 1, PIMEC, 2015).  Thus, firms in this situation may not be incentivized to 
negotiate the red tape to access to access firm training funds. Thus, despite the 
alternative route provided through IVET, Spain high secondary school dropout rate and 
a preference for university education means that IVET remains underused and 
undervalued.  
 
Training for Employment in Ireland: CVT and ALMPs 
Unlike Spain, Ireland’s system of professional training for employment is not as clearly 
divided between IVET and CVT and ALMPs.  IVET policies and programs are not 
implemented through one government department, but rather different government 
departments and intermediary organizations. Ireland also lacks a system of sectoral 
training funds managed by social partners to finance CVT.  Instead Irish law establishes 
that all firms must contribute to the National Training Fund through a levy on firms (.7% 
on employee earnings), with only low-paid employees excluded from this contribution 
(ReferNet Ireland SOLAS 2014).  While the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs 
(consisting of representatives from both employer’s associations and trade unions) and 
the newly formed National Skills Council (composed of private and public sector 
representatives) advice the government on the allocation of funding, no formal process 
of social dialogue has existed since Ireland’s social partnership ended in 2009.  Instead, 
the Department of Education and Skills by law has the power to allocate funding to the 
various government departments, agencies, and specific programs, which supports both 
training for the unemployed and continuous training for the employed.  Thus firms can 
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solicit funding directly from the National Training Fund or from any of the specific 
programs offered through government departments, agencies and specific programs.   
 
Table 10:  Professional Training for Ireland 
 
 Demand (Public and 
Private Funds) 
Supply(Public Funds) 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
Individual Firms X    
Employer’s Association-
Firm Networks  
X X   
Public, Private and Non-
Profit Employment 
Services 
  X X 
 
While many government agencies and programs support training for micro-companies 
and SMEs, stipulations for demand side CVT training vary widely and according to 
specific restrictions of funding bodies or programs.  Given that the National Training 
Fund also supplements ALMP expenditure within Ireland, when unemployment levels 
increase, less funding is available from voted public expenditure funds, thus resulting in 
less money being available for upskilling the employed (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform 2017).  This has been argued to be an ineffective strategy to 
promote firm upskilling and growth (IBEC 2017).  Given the large increase in individuals 
who pursued upper level training and third level education during the recession, the 
National Training Fund was heavily used to supplement the public expenditure funds.  
As a result the Irish government has proposed to increase the firm training levy, thus 
sparking debates related to transparency on funding allocation (McGee 2017), as well as 
more generally the lack of social partner involvement in the management of training 
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funds (OECD 2014b).  Thus, unlike Spain, firms do not have an allocated amount to 
supplement training needs, but instead access is dependent on stipulations for CVT 
established by state agencies with public training funds fluctuating according to national 
economic cycles and increases in ALMP and third level education participation. 
For the demand side, the main top-down state agencies are Enterprise Ireland, the 
Industry Development Authority (IDA), and the Department of Employment and 
Enterprise, while the bottom-up Skillsnet scheme is developed and coordinated by the 
main employers’ association IBEC.  Through the Department of Employment and 
Enterprise, individual firms can solicit training grants, whereas Enterprise Ireland and 
the IDA provide training and development support for new enterprises, with the latter 
being one of the oldest in Ireland, specifically concentrating on attracting foreign 
investment.  Skillsnet is slightly different because it enables groups of firms to set up 
training networks and is a public private scheme with private funds matched through 
the state National Training Fund. For SMEs, this scheme has been argued to be 
particularly useful given that it relies on local networks that are adaptable to skill 
demand and provide easy access to skill development resources (OECD 2014b).  
Skillsnet also provides some training for the unemployed through the same scheme, 
with programs on offer based on employer demand.  
On the supply side training schemes through ALMPs are mostly provided for the 
unemployed, but also for some low-skilled employees in SME firms (i.e. Skills for Work), 
as well as employees within specific sectors who wish to upskill or change careers (i.e. 
Springboard).  However, similar to the training schemes for the unemployed, training 
courses for the employed are solicited by the individual and not by the firm.  ALMP 
schemes are the largest side of supply side training.  Generally, these training schemes 
are financed through central taxation and the National Training Fund by the 
Department of Education and Skills and the Department of Social Protection with many 
ALMP training schemes financed and contracted through autonomous state agencies, 
national voluntary organizations, and local government and voluntary organizations.   
While the DSP funds and coordinates some ALMP schemes directly (i.e. JobBridge 
Internship scheme), access to other schemes is primarily through the DSP Intreo centres 
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(a one-stop- shop for employment services and income supports) and (Local) 
Employment Service Offices.  The Department of Education and Skills only provides 
funding for the state agency SOLAS, the Irish Further Education and Training Agency, 
that then coordinates the sixteen regional Education and Training Boards (ETBs).  These 
ETBs are responsible for delivering primary, post primary and further education and 
training programs through public, private and non-profit organizations.  Therefore, 
despite a highly centralized funding system, many ALMP schemes are developed 
autonomously and implemented at the local level by many different institutions and 
actors. Therefore, large variation exists in terms of ALMP implementation.  While 
employer involvement in ALMP training programs and content has improved since the 
reform of Ireland’s activation and training system, firms still rely heavily on private in 
house training and private recruiters to seek out required skill levels (OECD 2014b).   
 
Irish Vocational Training 
The Irish educational system does not have strong vocational streams in upper 
secondary education.  Instead most young people undertake a general academic route 
until the age of nineteen and then either take the post-secondary leaving certificate 
exam to enter third level education or alternatively enter the labor market directly 
(ICTU 2011).  Though students are given the option to undertake a more practical 
learning certificate program, such as the Leaving Certificate Applied Program, that 
enables entrance into an Initial Vocational Education and Training (IVET) program, very 
few actually pursue this route (Barry 2007).  Over 90% of students complete the leaving 
certificate exam (Ibid), enabling them to pursue further education through higher 
education institutions (Institutes of Technology, National Institutions and Colleges of 
Education) and third level education institutions.  Because of the high completion rate 
for secondary level education, little distinction is made between IVET and other types of 
vocational training with the main distinction made according to program type.  Thus, 
IVET and other forms of vocational training for the unemployed or ALMPs are divided 
into school based vocational education and training programs and courses in further 
education and training centers.   These types of vocational training fall under the 
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auspice of the DSP and SOLAS, with other initial entry-level VET for various sectors 
provided through publicly funded state agencies and foundations. Qualifications are 
accredited and recognized through IVET and VET through the recently consolidated 
Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) agency, an independent state agency with 
board members appointed by the Minister of Education and Skills.  However, unlike 
Spain, board members are primarily comprised of representatives from the education 
sector and not employers’ associations and trade unions.  Thus, Ireland’s IVET and VET 
system appears to be more fragmented when compared to the Spanish system of IVET 
and VET and lacks the institutionalization of the participation of social partners to 
ensure the link between training and skill need.   
 
Conclusions 
Spain appears to have a more unified system of education and training with historically 
higher levels of institutionalized spaces for social partners to negotiate and coordinate 
training.  However, trade unions and other social partners have historically depended 
on heavy state intervention to set labor market conditions and legitimize their 
institutions. Thus, opportunities to innovate CVT and ALMP training are often 
undermined by social partners who are concerned with influencing the political arena 
and maintaining political veto powers. The production structure of Spanish economy, 
dominated by micro and small firms, also create difficulties for firms to integrate 
training into production strategies.  These difficulties arise from micro and small firm’s 
limited resources which hinder access to firm training levies given the difficulties 
navigating Spain’s ‘red tape,’ as well as more generally the limited tools these firms 
have to provide training and the limited knowledge of long-term skill need.  The weak 
IVET system and consequently low graduation rates from IVET programs combined with 
below secondary education levels among some segments of the Spanish work force also 
creates a lack of trust in the state to deliver quality secondary education and post-
secondary training outcomes. 
Within Ireland despite recent reforms to unify the Training and Education System, the 
Irish IVET/CVT and ALMP system appears more fragmented with institutionalized spaces 
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for social partners to coordinate and negotiate training largely absent.  In addition, 
firms’ ability to access funding for CVT appears largely dependent on firm and individual 
employee motivation, but in a context of a less bureaucratic and less regulated and 
centralized system of CVT funding.  However, the lack of transparency of the 
distribution of the CVT training fund creates other challenges where firm training levies 
can fluctuate according to increases in unemployment and increased participation in 
third level and ALMP training.  
While a highly structured training and education system with highly institutionalized 
forms of social dialogue should facilitate the development of links between firms and 
ALMPs within Spain, a lack of coordination and pervasive state influence may 
undermine this potentiality.  In contrast, Ireland has had a more fragmented system of 
training and education, one permeated by low levels of institutionalized social dialogue 
and sporadic participation of social partners in training with weak links between firms 
and ALMPs.  Despite these differing systems of training and education and levels of 
social dialogue, firms in Ireland and Spain both exhibit low trust in the ability of the 
state to deliver high quality ALMP training outcomes (i.e. place low value in ALMP 
training certificates).  Within Spain, this low trust of the state to deliver high quality 
training outcomes can be extended to its secondary school education system and IVET 
system’s low graduation rates, which creates further firm distrust in the state’s ability to 
deliver high quality outcomes.  
Lastly, both countries suffer from under resourced PES institutions which have 
historically been weak in their capacity to provide job monitoring services to firms.   
Within Spain the PES is considered to offer services for firms advertising mostly low-skill 
jobs with the ALMP menu historically dominated by ALMP employment incentives.  In 
addition, the Spanish PES institutions suffer from extensive administrative burdens, thus 
discouraging, firms from consistent participation in ALMP training.  Within Ireland, the 
PES has historically suffered from a lack of institutional coordination and an ALMP menu 
dominated by direct job creation through public employment schemes.  In addition, its 
ALMP training programs are highly politicized and are prone to veto points, such that 
ALMP training programs can lack continuity and consequently discourage firms to 
consistently participate.  As a consequence of the weak capacity of the PES in both 
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countries, when firms do train they generally train at the point of entry (i.e. on-the-job 
training/company sponsored internships) and/or through the recruitment of individuals 
with post-secondary qualifications at university or technical level.  Both countries also 
divert resources towards relying more heavily on immigration to fill skills deficits, as 
opposed to re-skilling hard to reach groups through the PES.  
In summary, the interaction of the firm with three national and regional level factors 
could be concluded to potentially impact how firms develop particular ALMP training 
and hiring strategies and ultimately quality of jobs: 1) the level of institutionalization of 
social dialogue, 2) the capacity of the Public Employment Service, and 3) the level of 
trust in state institutions to deliver high quality training outcomes.  Indeed, the 
literature would suggest that social dialogue at the firm level through work councils and 
collective bargaining is particularly important for increasing firm investments in training 
and facilitating other types of skill development (Streeck 1992). The susceptibility of PES 
institutions to political veto points may also contribute to the stalled or reversed 
implementation of ALMPs (Murphy 2012), with excessive administrative burdens and 
poor ALMP coordination further weakening the trust firms have in the PES institutional 
capacity.  Risk associated with the recruitment of disadvantaged groups (i.e. long-term 
unemployed, lower education levels, disability, etc.) has also been linked with employer 
recruitment through ALMPs, with mixed results as to its importance for firm 
recruitment strategies (Ingold and Valizade 2016; Quinto Romani and Albrekt Larsen 
2010).  Therefore, the following section aims to examine the interface between firms 
and the macro and meso institutions of Ireland and Spain’s education and training 
systems to assess the extent to which these factors play a role in influencing how and 
why firms recruit and train through ALMPs.  
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Chapter 5: Spanish and Irish ICT Firms 
and ALMP Engagement 
 
The Irish and Spanish ICT sectoral structures and activities are diverse and vary greatly.  
Within Ireland ICT firms are generally concentrated and clustered within and around its 
three largest cities, Dublin, Galway and Cork.  Ireland’s ICT sector has historically been 
known for its direct financial incentives, most notably its low corporate tax structure, to 
attract large MNC firms, including Apple which is based in Cork, Intel in Leixlip, and 
Google in Dublin.  While an initial divide existed between the activities of Irish 
indigenous firms (software) and MNCs (hardware), this is no longer the case with new 
investments being made in software by many MNCs.  The structure of the Irish ICT 
activities can be divided into three groups:  hardware, software and internet.   
Within Spain, the majority of ICT firms are concentrated within the Autonomous 
Communities of Madrid and Catalonia.  Catalonia receives 36% of all FDI in Spain and 
90% is concentrated in the Barcelona area (Barcelona City Council 2012).  Spain is not 
able to offer the same structure of financial incentives, such as a low corporate tax 
structure, but it does offer reduced corporate tax rates for small firms.  Despite this, half 
of all ICT employees continue to be employed in firms with over 250 employees, many 
which are MNCs (van Klaveren et al. 2013).  The ICT activities within Spain are slightly 
varied when compared to Ireland, with most activities concentrated in IT services, 
software and telecommunications. 
Within Ireland and Spain, a total of five ICT company case studies were conducted.  
These firms were chosen because they all participated in the ALMP internship program 
and subsequently hired young workers.  The cases studies included Spanish and Irish 
small firms (12 and 10 employees), one urban and one rural, medium Spanish and Irish 
firms (120 and 200 employees) and one large Spanish firm (800 employees). The 
medium and large firms were based in Dublin and Barcelona city or the suburbs.  To 
protect anonymity, these firms have all been given pseudonyms.  For Spain, these are 
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the SPS (Spanish small) firm, SPM (Spanish medium) firm, and SPL (Spanish large) firm. 
For Ireland, these are the IRS (Irish small) firm and the IRM (Irish medium) firm.   
The SPS firm was based in a rural small town in the Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia Spain and specialized in software development and IT support services for 
travel agencies, whereas the IRS firm was based within Dublin city and specialized in 
web design and property cloud systems for the real estate industry.  Both firms were 
hard hit following the economic crisis, given the direct impact of the crisis on the 
tourism and the housing sectors.  This was particularly the case for the IRS firm, where 
the property bubble resulted in a very difficult economic situation for the firm, with it 
only employing two employees at one point.  In contrast, while the SPS firm did 
struggle, it was not forced to make any of its employees redundant or reduce wages. 
The firm also undertook the crisis to reinforce its relationship with clients by developing 
new services and products, thus using it as a period of innovation. 
The SPL firm is specialized in software and IT consulting for the finance sector, more 
specifically retail and investment banking, private asset management and the insurance 
industry and is based in a suburb of Barcelona. This firm is different from the others in 
that it is a subsidiary MNC, with the mother company based in Germany and a total of 
4,870 employees worldwide in 11 countries, half of those based in Spain.  While the SPL 
firm expanded rapidly throughout the economic crisis, it did cut some labor costs to 
facilitate this expansion, particularly in the non-technical departments, through the use 
of flexible contracts for young, new entrants.   
The SPM firm specialized in online journalism and advertisement through social media 
platforms and is based in Barcelona city.  Given its reliance on a large share of its 
revenue from advertisements to support its online journalism websites and the 
decrease in advertisement campaigns during the crisis, the SPM firm was also forced to 
reduce its labor costs through involuntary redundancies.  The last firm, the IRM firm, 
was based in Dublin city and specialized in software for the airline and hospitality 
sectors. This firm, similar to the SPM firm, is a subsidiary of an American MNC firm that 
operates in 180 countries and has 3, 700 employees.  It was originally an independently 
owned company and thus continues to use the same brand name and maintain its small 
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London office, as well as has 100 off-shore based third party contractors.  Similar to the 
SPL firm, the IRM firm continued to rapidly expand throughout the crisis and asserted 
this was primarily due to its export orientation and customer base, who continued to 
innovate through mobile software products so as to increase revenue.  Thus, the IRM 
firm did not use redundancies as a strategy to cut costs during the crisis.   
Common to all of these ICT firms was the decision to participate in an ALMP internship 
scheme to recruit young labor market entrants. This is despite the three factors 
presented in Chapter 4 that could potentially hinder and discourage firm participation in 
ALMP internships.  In the following section, these three factors will be examined for 
their variation between national and regional level institutional arrangements and the 
influence they have on how the Spanish and Irish ICT firms engaged with ALMP 
internships. 
 
Levels of Institutionalized Social Dialogue 
Within Chapter 4, Spain was argued to have high levels of institutionalized spaces for 
social partners to negotiate and coordinate training, whereas Ireland was argued to 
have low levels.  Spain’s social partners’ dependency on heavy state intervention to set 
labor market conditions and legitimate their institutions has meant social partners are 
often concerned with influencing the political arena and maintaining political veto 
powers as opposed to innovating CVT and ALMP training. Within Ireland a more 
fragmented system of training and education is permeated by low levels of 
institutionalized social dialogue and sporadic participation of social partners in training.  
However, neither national system appears to facilitate strong ties between firms and 
ALMPs.  Therefore, how different levels of the institutionalization of social dialogue play 
out at the firm level is of interest, particularly within firms that do decide to diverge and 
participate in ALMPs. 
Within Spain, the direct impact of social dialogue at the firm level in terms of training is 
generally through the collective bargaining system.  Any issues of training would 
generally be negotiated and enforced through collective agreements and discussed 
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through firm level work councils with the Spanish Workers’ Statute (Ministerio de 
Empleo y Seguridad Social. 2015b) establishing the legislation for minimum working 
conditions, including minimal training rights.  Under the Spanish Workers’ Statute 
(Estatuto de los Trabajadores 2015) (Ibid) training is  regulated in terms of Promotion 
and Professional training in Work, and gives permission for workers to have flexible 
work schedules for accredited academic and professional training and examinations, as 
well as provides for firms to fund training when firms upgrade the responsibilities and 
tasks of an occupation.  In addition, all firms must provide 20 hours annual paid leave 
for continuous professional training for their employees linked to the occupation tasks 
provided for through a training plan developed by the firm or through collective 
bargaining.15  All of these minimal rights to training are explicitly stated by the Workers’ 
Statute to be provided for through collective bargaining and/or a firm level training 
plan, thus illustrating the extent to which the Spanish state encourages the 
institutionalization of training through collective bargaining.  While trade union density 
is low, collective agreements are automatically extended to workers within the scope of 
the agreement regardless of whether or not they are affiliated to the unions that 
concluded the bargaining with sectoral collective agreements at the national, regional 
or district level.  However, sectoral collective agreements are often ‘mute’ on CVT 
training (Ibsen and Mailand 2010) and reproduce the individual rights of the ET minimal 
legal framework, such as training leave and the adaptation of working time to attend 
training courses. 
Within the ICT sector, one national level ICT sectoral agreement regulates working 
conditions.  However, despite that all firms within the Spanish case study fall within the 
ICT sector, only one of the firms within the Spanish case study was part of the ICT 
collective agreement, the SPL firm.   The other two firms, the SPS and SPM, adhered to 
other collective agreements, respectively a district retail collective agreement and a 
non-daily press collective agreement.  The reasons for this are mainly due to 
technological changes in the firms that resulted in gradual changes in technology and 
products.  The SPS firm considered shifting to the ICT collective agreement but found 
the retail collective agreement to offer more favorable conditions in terms of paid leave 
                                                          
15
 This training credit is a new addition, part of the 2012 Spanish Labor Market reforms.  
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for employers and employees, whereas the shift to another collective agreement was 
still being discussed in the SPM firm.  However, legislation dictates that the ICT 
employer’s association AMETIC (Asociación de Empresas de Electronica, Tecnologías de 
la Información, Telecomunicaciones y Contenidos Digitales)  which largely represents 
the interest of ICT MNCs, only has to negotiate with the CCOO trade union, thus 
excluding the other largest trade union, UGT, as well as the interests of smaller trade 
unions and employers associations.  Consequently, the ICT collective agreement lacks 
proximity to information on firm and employee needs at lower levels, particularly small 
firms.  Therefore, the adherence of SPL to this collective agreement would on the 
surface to more closely adhere to its needs as a large MNC firm. 
Since 2009, the Spanish ICT sectoral collective agreement has been frozen with the 
collective agreement being extended and negotiations for a new agreement ongoing.  
However, it continues to remain in ‘ultra-activity’ or valid until a new collective 
agreement is signed. 16  Within the ICT sectoral collective agreement very little 
reference is made to address training, with clauses reproducing the existing training 
required by the ET (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) for work councils (work committees or 
delegates), providing for an additional annual training fund of € 218.10 for workers to 
access CVT and integrating individuals on an internship contract into annual pay bonus 
scales or the Plus Convenio.   
The district Retail Collective agreement of the SPS firm addresses minimal health and 
safety requirements established by law.  It also limits the internship and training 
contract duration and raises the required intern and training wages.  The SPM firm Non-
daily Press collective agreement improves internship minimum wages, while also asserts 
that all employees are entitled to take ‘new technology’ courses for up to 6 months 
during work hours or through paid leave. Interestingly, the Non-daily Press collective 
agreement extends protections to student interns, training agreements established 
between universities and firms that fall outside the legal realm of an employment 
                                                          
16
 While the 2012 labor market established that the ‘ultra-activity’ of a collective agreement could not be 
enforced one year from the time of expiration, the Supreme Court ratified a court decision in the Baleares 
Islands 264/214 on December 22, where the USO, Workers Trade Union, won a case against the company 
‘Antención y Servicios, S.L’.(ATESE)  for the decision to decrease worker’s wages once the collective 
bargaining agreement had expired.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s ratification of this decision has since 
reinstated the right of ultra-activity in collective bargaining. 
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relationship.  It limits the number of interns (up to 10% of the workforce), the duration 
(maximum of 5 months) and requires firms to pay an accommodation, food and 
transportation subsidy to cover student intern’s minimum living costs.  Therefore while 
social partners negotiating the SPS district retail and the SPM non-daily Press collective 
agreement have improved working conditions surrounding some training 
contracts/agreements, eligibility for these contract types is limited by age (less than 25 
and less than 30), education levels ( vocational/university , professional sports/arts 
training certificate or a professional certificate) and duration (up to 3 years).  Thus, 
these training contracts/agreements provide opportunities for firms to hire and train 
young workers at subsidized rates at the point of entry as opposed to train existing 
employees.  However, despite the inclusion of some initial training 
contracts/agreements at the point of entry in collective agreements, ALMP training was 
not included in any of the firm collective agreements.  Furthermore, sparse reference 
was made to CVT training in all collective agreements, beyond annual training funds and 
training leave.  Therefore, collective agreement clauses for training in ICT firms scan still 
be considered sparse for the firms within this case study, with little articulation by social 
partners to more clearly define training or facilitate more innovative training strategies 
in firms. 
Another area of direct participation of social partners on training in firms is through 
work councils (comités de empresa) who by law are obligated to be consulted for firm 
training plans.  However, the existence and actual power of employee representative 
delegates (fewer than 50 employees) and work council committee members (greater 
than 50 employees) within firms is highly dependent on firm size.  Those firms with ten 
or less employees are not legally obliged17 to have an employee representative delegate 
and consequently most negotiation in terms of training is done on an individual basis.  
When firms have more than ten employees (or six in case of voluntary elections) the 
number of delegates and committee members that can be elected gradually increases 
(i.e. 10-30=1, 31-49=3, 50-100= 5, 101-250= 9, 251-500 = 13, etc.).   
                                                          
17
 Firms with between 6-10 employees can elect to have one delegate if the majority of employees agree. 
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Because trade unions receive particular economic resources and privileged access to 
statutory involvement in particular institutions (i.e. training, social security) according to 
their ‘representativeness’ in work council elections, trade unions tend to focus their 
energy on proposing elected delegates in larger companies.  Therefore, work council 
elections are a battle for legitimacy and survival with other trade unions.  For trade 
unions to be ‘most representative’ they must cover a minimum of 10% of workers 
delegates and working committee members nationally or 15% at the regional level.  
‘Representative’ trade unions in a specific sector are those that cover a minimum of 
10% of workers delegates and working committee members of the sector at the 
national level or 15% of workers delegates and working committee members in the 
sector at the regional level (Eurofound 2015).  In practice this means smaller company 
employee delegates’ views are underrepresented and they often adopt the agreements 
negotiated by representatives from larger companies.  This weak position of work 
council delegates in smaller firms also means that efforts to divert firm training plans 
from specific and short-term firms needs are limited (Rigby 2006).  Even within the large 
firms, which would have more veto points due to the high participation of trade union 
members as work council working committee members, trade union members remain 
weak in their ability to articulate training needs. 
In the case studies, the SPS and SPM firms were particularly disadvantaged because 
despite legal requirements to have delegates or working committees, neither firm had a 
workers’ committee or delegates.  The reasons for this are because elections must be 
instigated by the employees or directly by the trade union.  Given that trade union 
member tend to be most interested in instigating working committees in larger firms; 
employees themselves are responsible for taking initiative.  Indeed, in the SPM firm, the 
Finance/HR director argued that while legally the firm must have work committee 
representatives, the workers themselves still had yet to organize one. 
We hope that they form one [a workers committee] sometime in 2017 because 
they have to form one, but at any rate this is something that has to be organized 
by the employees and it has not been formed yet. We hope they organize one 
soon, but up until now they haven’t. 
Finance/HR Director, SPM firm, 2016 
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Therefore, the possibility for social partners to negotiate training issues at the firm level 
was completely absent in the SPM and SPS Spanish firms. This observation of the lack of 
worker delegates and working committees was further supported by interviews with a 
trade union representative who argued that while individuals in smaller companies may 
nominate themselves for elections to a work council, they must do this openly and may 
risk being made redundant.  The trade union representative emphasized that while 
being fired due to participating in work council elections is illegal, the legal process is 
often delayed for up to a year, during which time the individual may remain 
unemployed and may lack access to adequate unemployment insurance (Trade Union 
Representative 2, Youth Division CCOO, 2016).   Another trade union representative 
(Trade Union Representative 1, Service Federation CCOO, 2016) also argued that even 
when the union does approach a small firm for nominations for delegate elections, the 
informal relationships among employees in such a firm means that employees do not 
value union representation. They prefer to resolve conflict through other informal 
means with the net result that many firms will lack delegate representatives.  Therefore, 
for many employees in smaller firms, no incentive exists to present themselves as 
delegates for work council elections.   This is compounded by the reality that trade 
unions have more power resources to gain in large firms and consequently have little 
interest in instigating elections in medium and small firms.   
Indeed, the SPL firm had a work council with committee members represented by the 
largest trade unions, UGT and CCOO, with elections every four years. However, despite 
this well-established work council, (ALMP) training was not articulated through the 
workers committee. The SPL firm maintained that the workers committee mainly 
existed to inform employees of vacations, to convince the firm to agree to the 
negotiation of the new ICT collective agreement and to organize charity activities.  
Consequently, training with the SPL firm was based on a firm training structure and plan 
developed and customized at the individual level.   
With the absence of strong support by social partners for training through collective 
agreements and firm level work committees/delegates and given the constant demand 
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for high-skilled technical workers and upskilling in the ICT sector, the Spanish ICT firms 
in this case study developed their own, firm level training strategies to address 
production needs.   Thus, the collective bargaining institutions do not appear to provide 
a mechanism for consistent relational engagement to improve training within the ICT 
firm case studies.  
Within Ireland, work councils are not part of the structure of the industrial relation’s (IR) 
system and trade union density is very low in the ICT sector, a sector dominated by 
MNCs that tends to not favor collective bargaining.  Thus, not surprisingly training was 
not something that could be incorporated through collective bargaining institutions 
within the IRM or the IRS firms, given that neither firm was unionized nor had any 
desire to become unionized.  Indeed, the lack of interest in a trade union presence was 
readily confirmed, not just by the medium Irish firm but also by the small Irish firm.  
Collective agreements, I mean it’s actually irrelevant because it is very much 
dependent on hand-to-mouth style that we are in, in terms of trying to as I call it 
road kill. Trying to make big sales, and produce, budget and make a profit then 
at the end of it. And sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t, in regards to 
you lose on some projects and you gain on other projects. So having a collective 
agreement where they get what they get irrespective… you know if we were 
increasing our profits 10% every year well then we would have discussion of 
increases that would be very simple you know, but we’re not so… those kinds of 
discussions are based around when there is money in the bank and when there is 
something more to shed. And you know this is not the case at the moment.  
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
 
While Ireland’s social partners were institutionalized through the apprenticeship 
program and FÁS traineeships, neither of these options provided training content 
closely linked to the ICT sector.  Furthermore, no evidence was found within the IRM 
and IRS firms for any direct influence of social partners through more voluntary 
institutional structures such as the Irish Labor Market Council, the Expert Group on 
Future Skills Needs (EGFSN) and the National Skills Council on firm training strategies, 
thus illustrating the lack of clear implementation mechanisms for these skills strategies 
to impact firm level training decisions.  Therefore, the lack of well-established collective 
bargaining institutions to upgrade firm training within the Irish ICT sector meant that 
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the presence and integration of training is heavily dependent on the individual 
employers within Ireland.  Indeed, within the IRM and IRS firms, training varied greatly 
and was primarily developed according to available resources, production needs and 
market conditions of the firms.  Variation in training type, including the use of ALMPs, 
among the IRM and IRS firms was also common and particularly dependent on specific 
firm level HR practices and organizational practices. 
In conclusion, despite the presence of collective bargaining institutions within Spain and 
the lack of collective bargaining institutions within Ireland, institutionalized spaces for 
improving training content and strategies for firms appears to be lacking among all of 
the Irish and Spanish ICT firm case studies.  In Ireland, this is clearly related to the lack 
of hard regulatory collective bargaining institutions and dependency on more voluntary 
systems of social partner engagement through advisory boards and groups which lack 
clear implementation mechanisms to influence firm level training.  In contrast, Spain 
clearly has the hard regulatory features of collective bargaining institutions to facilitate 
social dialogue that could potentially improve training among Spanish ICT firms.  
However, as argued through the three ICT case studies, Spanish sectoral agreements 
remain highly fragmented within the ICT sector and can suffer from upper level 
centralized social partner negotiations primarily by large firms, thus lacking proximity to 
smaller firm training issues.  The national level ICT collective agreement also has 
remained frozen since 2009 and consequently any efforts to improve training remain 
stalled as social partners continue to attempt to negotiate a new collective agreement.  
All of the Spanish ICT firm collective agreements also appear to lack specific clauses to 
address training content and strategies, with only minimal improvements on existing 
training legislation.   
Finally, firm level work council committees/delegates do not exist in the smaller SPS and 
SPM firms, thus reflecting the complexity of the Spanish collective bargaining system 
which actually is a disincentive to firms and social partners from taking advantage of 
these institutions in small and medium firms.  Even when work council committees are 
present in large firms, such as the SPL, the actual role of the work council committee is 
restricted to more administrative issues such as ensuring that individuals take vacation 
or convincing firms to actively support the national level ICT sectoral agreement 
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negotiations, as opposed to addressing training issues. Thus, institutionalized spaces for 
social dialogue appear to have a minimal effect on firm level training decisions both 
within Ireland and Spain. 
 
The Capacity of the Public Employment Service 
Spain and Ireland’s PES institutions were argued to be under resourced and weak in 
their capacity to deliver job monitoring services to firms.  Within Spain, the ICT firms 
were argued to perceive the PES as providing mostly low-skill jobs with the ALMP menu 
historically dominated by ALMP employment incentives.  Extensive administrative 
burdens also were asserted to discourage firm participation in ALMP training.  Within 
Ireland, the PES has historically suffered from a lack of institutional coordination and an 
ALMP menu dominated by direct job creation through public employment schemes.  In 
addition, its ALMP training programs are highly politicized and are prone to veto points, 
such that ALMP training programs can lack continuity and consequently discourage 
firms to consistently participate.  All of these factors were argued to result in low 
confidence in the role and function of the PES institutions in Ireland and Spain. 
However, in spite of these challenges some firms such as in this case study chose to 
navigate the PES institutions and participate in ALMP training.  Therefore, how these 
firms navigated these ALMP training programs in spite of the weak capacity of the PES is 
an interesting paradox. 
Within Spain, all three ICT firms used the ALMP internship program, non-labor 
Internships, as hiring strategies to mitigate costs associated with hiring and firing, 
prolong the probation period and ultimately for purposes of expansion.  For all of the 
Spanish ICT firms it was their first time using the PES to coordinate ALMP training and 
none of the firms were approached or informed by the PES of the existence of this 
ALMP internship program.  Indeed, the SPS firm discovered the ALMP internship 
scheme due to a motivated managing director who was seeking alternative and 
innovative hiring and training options, whereas the SPM and SPL firms discovered the 
program through personal contacts within other firms that used the program.  All firms 
acknowledged the extensive information deficits surrounding the ALMP internship 
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program.  However, while the SPM and SPL firms were able to inform and manage the 
ALMP internship program through external and internal HRM resources, the lack of a 
formal HRM department in the SPS firm meant that bureaucracy and information 
deficits had to be resolved by the managing director and directly with the PES, without 
resources to access any intermediary resources.   Furthermore, the centralized PES (in 
Barcelona) did not accommodate the needs of the rural geographical location of the SPS 
firm, thus requiring its Managing Director to frequently travel to Barcelona to leave 
papers and attend meetings.  
I mean, I did not handle this [ALMP internship program] through my manager. I 
dealt with it independently, that is, I went to look for it.  Of course you have to 
prepare everything that you are going to teach since a person is not coming just 
to work. You have to prepare the tutoring. You have to prepare all of the subject 
areas that you are going to impart during it. Of course this is additional work and 
you could see they [the PES] did not know very well how everything worked.  If 
there was a subsidy expected, we didn’t know if it was going to arrive or not.  To 
receive the subsidy there was also a lot of administrative bureaucracy; we had to 
present a lot of things. This works in a company that can take the time to commit 
to complete the process.  The program is very good but it is not easy…. it is not 
easy. When you've done it once it is possible, but the process is not clear. I went 
to Barcelona and had to leave some documents. Then I had to return to 
Barcelona because there is no office here to validate the paperwork. I had to 
travel to the Barcelona SOC. The meetings were in the Barcelona SOC because 
there was no one here, so it was not easy. Now that I have done it once I 
understand the process very clearly, how to do it and it is more feasible. 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016 
 
The weak capacity of the Spanish PES and the implementation deficits and resource 
costs (i.e. time, financial, and personnel) associated with the ALMP internship program 
resulted in the SPS firm’s decision to only use the ALMP internship program once and 
hire future young interns through less resource intensive university internships and 
internship contracts. In comparison, the SPM and SPL firms were not hindered by the 
bureaucracy surrounding the ALMP internship program due to their combined extra 
firm resources as well as their close geographical proximity to the Barcelona PES.  This 
lack of administration and geographic barriers partially explains why the SPM and SPL 
firms continued to use the scheme for recruitment and training.  Indeed, while the 
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Finance/HR Director of the SPM firm asserted the bureaucracy made the ALMP 
internship program ‘a little slow,’ the HR specialists of the SPL firm asserted it made no 
difference to them the type of internship a young person was hired onto (i.e. a student 
internship or an ALMP internship) because, ‘the financial costs, hours and working 
conditions are the same.’  Thus, geographical location and firm resources, specifically 
the lack of human and financial resources in small firms, are key factors in a firm’s 
ability to negotiate ALMPs within the context of a weak PES institution.  The Catalan PES 
acknowledged that they were aware of information asymmetries surrounding the ALMP 
internship program and the additional bureaucratic difficulties that small firms had to 
manage. 
We do not know how firms are informed [of the ALMP internship scheme]. What 
we do know is that we have agreements with some firms and we let all of them 
know. ‘Hey, we have a new scheme with a commitment to hire after with, so 
come and participate.’ We have even offered to help firms with the paperwork to 
participate.  One thing is that there is lots of paperwork to request the 
employment incentive [for ALMP internship program with the commitment to 
hire].  The problem with many small businesses is that when you tell them all 
about the paperwork they must do…they don’t seem to realize how much is 
involved.  
Government Official, SOC, 2015 
 
While the Catalan PES attempted to remedy some of the struggles small firms have by 
assisting them to manage ‘the red tape,’ the rural location of the SPS firm resulted in an 
additional meeting at the central Barcelona office.  This had the unintended 
consequence of creating additional administrative burdens.  
Similar to Spain, all of the Irish ICT firms also used the ALMP internship program, the 
JobBridge National Internship scheme, as a low-risk recruitment strategy during a time 
period of firm expansion as well as to prolong the probation period. None of the firms 
had participated in any ALMP type through the Irish PES previously, thus confirming the 
historic lack of engagement of firms with the PES.  However, unlike previous ALMP 
training programs which often were uncoordinated and suffered from institutional 
overlap, the JobBridge National Internship scheme was centrally coordinated through 
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the Dublin PES, the DSP, and relatively clear information channels were used to disperse 
the ALMP internship scheme information to firms.   
Unlike Spain, the ALMP internship program was designed to be ‘simplified’ and ‘under-
regulated’ as much as possible to eliminate any potential administrative burdens that 
would discourage firm participation (Government Official 3, DSP, 2016).  While 
administrative burdens were not completely eliminated and some delays were apparent 
in the starting dates for ALMP trainee participants in both the IRS and IRM firms, neither 
the IRS nor IRM firms perceived the administrative process to be cumbersome.  Indeed, 
this adheres to the most recent evaluation of the Irish ALMP internship program, where 
over 88.9% of firms surveyed were (very) satisfied with the quality of scheme 
information and 88.2% were (very) satisfied with the overall administration of the 
scheme used by the DSP or Irish PES (Indecon 2016). It is also relevant to note that this 
occurred in a context where 67.8% of the participants were in relatively small host firms 
with between 0-49 employees. Therefore, unlike Spain, firm size and resources were 
not as important factors in the ability of firms to access the ALMP internship program 
information and navigate the bureaucracy.  However, firm size and available resources 
do matter for a firm’s willingness to invest in particular training types, with smaller firms 
less likely to invest in external and internal formal training activities unless a recoup on 
investments is likely (O’Connell and Byrne 2010).  Indeed, resource constraints 
surrounding training were one of the reasons the IRS firm decided to consistently 
participate in the ALMP internship program, whereas the IRM firm did not face such 
resource constraints and engaged on a one time basis due to a personal contact within 
the firm.   
Given that the Irish ALMP internship program fully subsidized participants by providing 
for social welfare payments and top-ups, the SPS firm could easily recoup training costs.  
Indeed, in the highly competitive and skilled ICT sector, the IRS firm was acutely aware 
of its difficulties to attract more experienced workers given its limitations to pay higher 
rates to its employees.  Thus, the ALMP internship program enabled the IRS firm to train 
at a slower pace without the pressures of firm financial costs associated with hiring and 
training.  Ultimately, it also provided the IRS firm with an alternative training and hiring 
strategy, one which was adopted as its primary recruitment strategy. 
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… when I go to hire I try to do it through JobBridge because it gives me 
opportunity to actually see what they are like before they actually come on. If I 
want to expand or actually see if there is a kind of a… like if it was the case where 
we were making loads of money and could hire somebody and make more 
money you’d hire someone without JobBridge because then you would be able to 
select someone with the experience to be able to do the job…I haven’t hired 
anyone direct in years.  
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
 
Given the IRS firm’s limited resources for training combined with its difficulty to attract 
skilled workers and the ease of access and limited bureaucracy surrounding the Irish 
ALMP internship program, the SPS firm perceived the Irish ALMP internship program as 
a feasible training and recruitment strategy for the future.   
However, similar to past ALMP training programs, the JobBridge ALMP internship 
scheme was equally prone to changing economic and political climates, and was highly 
susceptible to veto points.  The ALMP internship scheme was new, developed in 2011 in 
the midst of the economic crisis by Joan Burton who was then leader of the Labor Party.  
The scheme was highly controversial due to its potential for displacement and 
substitution effects. Thus, when the Labor party lost seats in the general 2016 elections, 
the JobBridge ALMP internship scheme was discontinued.   
When the new Minister came in, he had this idea of JobBridge…it’s always in the 
press, on Prime Time, on Joe Duffy and always under pressure in the Dáil. He 
decided we have to stop it and we have to do something to make a new scheme 
and make it better and he took that decision. That’s fine. When he went around 
and met our case officers, he went around and said I think I made a mistake 
because what our case officers told him was in terms of getting people into work 
and dealing with employers, it was the best thing they had. 
 Government Official 2, DSP, 2017 
 
Thus, while it appears that the reforms surrounding the restructuration of the Irish PES 
institutions have improved its capacity to coordinate and obtain some level of firm 
commitment, particularly among small firms, the PES continues to remain weak in its 
ability to guarantee the continuation of its ALMP training programs for firms.  This 
 
 
118 
 
uncertainty can discourage the formation of strong PES-firm alliances and any long-term 
commitment for firms to engage in ALMP training. 
In summary, while historically the Irish PES institutions have been weak in their capacity 
to coordinate ALMPs, it appears that the (re-)centralization and the centrally driven 
overhaul of the ALMP institutional structure has improved coordination and issues of 
information asymmetries for this Irish ALMP internship program.  In addition, it has 
encouraged new employer engagement strategies through this relatively ‘simplified’ 
ALMP internship model.  While public policy and ALMPs in Europe were moving towards 
decentralization over the last decades, this idea that smaller units are more adaptable 
to local program circumstances to provide better services (Mosley 2009), did not 
foresee that localized services were prone to fragmentation and poor coordination (van 
Berkel and Borghi 2008; Bergmark and Minas 2010).  Recent research suggests that 
European countries have gradually shifted towards more re-centralized activation and 
social assistance schemes, towards a work first or workfare activation approach, one 
connected with stricter central controls and more direct monitoring of social assistance 
recipients (Pérez del Prado 2013; Minas et al. 2012).  Thus, Ireland appears to sit within 
a wider trend among European countries, which is moving social assistance recipients 
closer to the labor market, consequently demanding clearer PES-employer links.  For the 
Irish IRS firm the link of ALMP internships to employment incentives was found to be 
particularly beneficial for small firms who could easily recoup training investments.  
However, the Irish PES institution continues to remain weak in its ability to guarantee 
ALMP training program continuity to firms, given the continued high susceptibility to 
changing political climates.   Consequently, this does not encourage long-term firm 
commitment.   
Within Spain, few improvements were found in the capacity of the Spanish ALMP PES 
institutions to improve administrative burdens for the Spanish ALMP internship.  Unlike 
Ireland, information asymmetries and more general administrative burdens were found 
for all ICT firms.  Significant HRM resources continue to be needed to access ALMP 
internship information and manage ALMP internship programs which cause significant 
administrative burdens and discourage the long-term commitment of small firms, 
particularly ones in rural geographical locations.  While the PES did attempt to provide 
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additional ‘HR like’ services to small firms to coordinate the ALMP internship program, 
its centralized administration meant that this service created an additional 
administrative burden for the SPS firm.  Therefore, the weak capacity of the PES in Spain 
to deliver the ALMP internship program within firms is directly related to administrative 
burdens.  Within Ireland, issues remain regarding the politicization of the ALMP 
internship program and its susceptibility to veto points which discourages systematic 
firm participation and engagement. 
 
Trust in State Educational and ALMP Program Outcomes 
The third factor at the national institutional level that can be concluded to potentially 
impact firm level ALMP training and hiring strategies is related to the trust firms have in 
educational and ALMP program outcomes.  Within Ireland and Spain, firms were argued 
to lack trust in the ability of the state to deliver high quality ALMP training outcomes. 
Within Spain this low trust in the state to deliver high quality education and ALMP 
training outcomes was reflected in the high percentage of the population with only 
secondary school education qualifications and the firm perception that ALMPs attracted 
individuals with lower education levels.  The low graduation rates in Spain’s IVET system 
further deterred firm confidence in the ability of the IVET system to produce high skilled 
graduates.  This lack of trust and negative perception surrounding ALMP training 
programs and IVET qualifications (in the cases of Spain) was in stark opposition to the 
rapid expansion of university education in Ireland and Spain and the high trust the firms 
had in university qualifications.    
The ICT sector within Ireland and Spain is generally considered a high skilled sector, one 
that is continuously evolving and expanding due to constant advances in technology. 
Consequently, firm survival depends on the continuous training among employees, as 
well as a steady supply of skilled worker for recruitment.  All of the ICT firms within the 
Irish and Spanish case studies preferred to recruit high skilled individuals with technical 
or university qualifications, with only one individual recruited by the IRM firm through 
the ALMP internship program lacking a technical or university qualification.  The 
prevalence of industry-academia collaborative internship agreements to attract 
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technical or university graduates within all of the ICT firms further reflects the 
confidence firms had in university level qualifications.  However, variation existed in 
how the ICT firms integrated the ALMP internships into their production strategies and 
organization of labor. 
Issues of high turn-over and poaching were restricted to the two large MNC 
subsidiaries, the IRM and SPL, with firm resources not only diverted towards training 
but also towards retention strategies.  Within both firms, retention issues were dealt 
with on an individual basis with training, shifts in projects and technology, and wage 
increases the main strategies the IRM and SPL used to retain employees.  To further 
attract high-skilled ICT employees, the IRM and SPL firms also recruited internationally.  
In comparison, the IRS, SPS and SPM firms were not exposed to these same pressures, 
with very low-turn over and more informal recruitment strategies relying on the 
domestic labor market.  In addition, none of these firms recruited internationally. 
Specific to the Spanish ALMP internships program was that the firms received 
candidates proposed by the PES, but they equally had the option to propose their own 
candidates.  In comparison, the Irish ALMP internship program facilitated firms to 
directly recruit candidates through its PES ALMP internship website.  A central argument 
in the previous chapter was that Spanish firms have low trust in the quality of 
jobseekers registered with the PES, with the perception that many have secondary or 
below secondary qualification levels.  Indeed, the main Catalan employers association 
asserted that Spanish firms do not trust the PES supply of candidates given that the 
individuals who register with the PES tend to lack post-secondary qualifications, 
whereas individuals with technical or university tend to conduct their job search 
through personal contacts or other channels of recruitment (i.e. info jobs, recruitment 
agencies, firm websites, etc.)  (Employer Federation Representative 1, Foment del 
Treball-Patronal Catalana, 2015).  Evidence for this distrust in the supply of PES 
candidates was found within all of the Spanish ICT firms, with firms perceiving their own 
supply of candidates as more trustworthy and selecting their own ALMP participants 
from existing recruitment channels. 
He was here doing an internship through the Technical Institute. At the time I 
asked SOC [the PES] about a way of hiring him and they proposed this [non-labor 
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internship] and of course SOC sent me one more candidate but I already had him 
here and we took advantage of the opportunity to continue with this type of non-
labor internship, but yes SOC sends you some other profiles to look at but ... look 
at the company level, if I have you from the beginning, it is easier, right? 
SPS firm Managing Director, 2016  
 
Thus, for the SPS firm hiring someone through the PES was perceived as riskier than 
continuing with the firm selected candidate.  However, while this distrust in the PES 
selection of candidates was evident in all firms, variation was found in terms of the 
types of occupations firms selected for ALMP internships, with the SPL firm preferring to 
recruit for non-technical mid-level occupations and the SPS and SPM using the ALMP 
internships to recruit for all occupations.   
The SPL firm only valued the ALMP internship, in spite of having the ability to select its 
own candidates, for recruitment into non-technical mid-level occupations (i.e. HR, 
Administration, etc.).  Within the SPL firm, the occupational divisions were clearly 
defined through occupational families.  ALMP internships were readily recruited from 
one occupational family that primarily dealt with support services, including HR and 
administration occupations.  In contrast, the occupations with IT specific skills were not 
recruited through ALMP internships or any other type of flexible (training) contract.  
However, this is explained less by the trust in educational and ALMP internship 
outcomes and more by structural features of the labor market, including the supply of 
high skilled technical IT workers and the exposure to international competition which 
consequently resulted in high turnover of IT employees in the SPL firm. Thus, the 
Spanish ICT firm could not afford to use any type of (ALMP) internship for this group of 
workers for fear of losing IT candidates to other large MNC firms with better 
employment offers.   
In the IT sector, the majority of the profiles that finish their degree have prior to 
finishing their degree already been placed [in firms]. It is a market that moves a 
lot. There is a lot of demand and this is what it does. In our case, we directly 
contract them with a permanent contract because if we offer them a contract or 
agreement through SOC [Public Employment Service] or the university, 5 more 
companies will offer them a permanent contract. 
HR Director, SPL firm, 2016  
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In comparison, the SPM firm did not face the same levels of competition and high 
turnover due to its focus on the domestic market and more generally its focus on the 
communication sector using technology as a medium to diffuse it.  Consequently, the 
SPM firm did not find the supply of candidates in the open market to be lacking and the 
ALMP internship was an opportunity to test candidates for more soft skills, such as 
working strategies and ability to adapt to the firm culture.  Similarly, the SPS firm did 
not face international competition and high turnover.  However, it did face difficulties 
recruiting skilled workers given its rural geographical location and its limited resources 
as a small firm.  As a small firm the SPS firm also placed more value on a broad and less 
technically specific skill set, someone with not only technical skills, but also knowledge 
related to the tourism industry.  
It is complicated because maybe they have the knowledge but later they 
lack…maybe they have part of the skills or maybe they don’t have any [work] 
experience. It is very specific.  You have to understand how a travel agency works 
to be able to explain administrative software. It implies knowing the taxation 
system and how it works and being able to explain it [to the customer]…when 
ones studies tourism, they teach you about the sector, the responsibilities and 
fees, but you do not enter into the administrative tasks.  
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016 
 
As mentioned previously, within Ireland, the PES did not provide candidates from its 
database of the jobseekers but rather unemployed jobseekers could directly apply to 
the ALMP internship offers on a PES JobBridge website that closely mirrored that of a 
normal recruitment website.  Similar to the SPS firm, the IRS firm managing director 
asserted that while technical skills are important, other broader skills were valued such 
as problem solving, personality and fitting in the team when considering hiring 
decisions.  While the individuals hired through the ALMP internship in the IRS firm all 
had university qualifications, some had university qualifications and work experience 
unrelated to the ALMP internship offers.   
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When they lacked technical skills; that’s ok. But you know if they have the 
aptitude to learn quickly and figure stuff out.  That’s how we make up for it. You 
know not having the experience but then not having the aptitude for it is 
probably something that’s as bad because then you, you kind of, they’re in their 
honeymoon period, scraping by, but then they don’t perform later on. Other 
times it was people were they didn’t fit in terms of just low-esteem, one in 
particular. I thought you know he was disruptive and was talking all the time and 
created a problem within the team because it was a distraction so you know 
there is different personalities, different aptitudes, some people aptitudes 
worked out and it wouldn’t be the same if it was an employee or not so it doesn’t 
really matter whether it is an intern or they are full-time. They either fit in the 
team or they don’t fit in the team. 
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
 
While the IRS firm adopted the ALMP scheme as one of its main hiring strategies for 
individuals with university qualifications, it valued a broader skill set when recruiting 
through ALMP internships, one that extended beyond the technical skills required for 
the occupation.   
The IRM firm found the ALMP internship candidates to lack suitable technical skill levels 
and the right mix of skills (i.e. language skills) for its skill needs as a competitive MNC 
subsidiary dependent on the international market.  Consequently, the IRM firm only 
utilized and recruited through the ALMP internship scheme once and this was for a 
lower-level administration role.   
So we only ever had one person and largely it was because that person’s brother 
urged us to take them and that they would support them through so it was in the 
IT support area so it wasn’t as technical as probably some of the coding stuff we 
do so it was probably more general IT support, you know for the office support as 
such so the experience I suppose was a bit different. For that person right 
through for the two years and they support them through. Umm, would we do it 
again? I am not quite sure without quite having that level of commitment. We 
find that we would certainly see a big difference in the internships coming 
through JobBridge versus the other internships through the third level colleges. 
We would be more veering towards… we take three to four interns every year 
but we take them from the third level colleges. 
HR Director, IRM firm, 2016 
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Thus, the IRM firm preferred to utilize its collaborative academia-industry internship 
programs within the universities and technical institutes for individuals with computer 
science oriented degrees, as opposed to through ALMP internship programs.  Indeed, 
training with university interns varied greatly from the ALMP intern, with university 
interns fully integrated into a project led by a team of software developers and given 
collaborative tasks.  In contrast, the ALMP intern was largely socially excluded from a 
collaborative learning process, with training primarily consisting of job shadowing 
guided by a mentor and outside a team based environment.  This suggests stronger 
linkages with universities and trust in the quality of the candidates, as well as a negative 
perception of the ALMP scheme as one oriented towards individuals with lower skill 
sets.  Indeed, though Ireland still lags behind the rest of the EU in terms of R & D,  since 
2012 growing collaboration has existed between firms and academia with firms 
increasingly signing contracts to fund industry specific R&D (Science Foundation Ireland 
2016).  Thus, firm- academic collaboration provides a more trustworthy alternative, one 
that involves higher qualification levels and an opportunity to train individuals on the 
job without production or financial constraints.  
Within Ireland, the IRM firm did not perceive the ALMP internship program as a viable 
long-term training and recruitment strategy for the production needs of its firm due to 
the lack of suitable candidates.  The lack of suitable candidates was related to the 
concentration of highly technical occupations in the firm, as well as the need for 
individuals with additional language skills given their high exposure to the international 
market.  In contrast, the ALMP internship program was an enabling mechanism for the 
IRS firm, one which provided suitable candidates and skill mixes relevant not only to the 
occupational need but also to the demands of a small firm operating in a domestic 
market.   
Overall, the Spanish firms all lacked trust in the capacity of the PES to deliver a steady 
supply of highly qualified individuals for ALMP internships.  This lack of trust was rooted 
in both historical perceptions of the PES as an institution that provided employment 
support to individuals with lower education levels, as well as wider structural problems 
with a large portion of the population with secondary level or below qualifications and 
consequently these being the individuals most likely to be unemployed and registered 
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as unemployed with the PES.   This led to all Spanish ICT firms choosing to select their 
own ALMP internship candidates through other recruitment channels.   
Some similar patterns can be observed between the trust Irish and Spanish domestic 
and MNC subsidiaries have in the ALMP internship programs as viable training and 
recruitment strategies. The domestic IRS, SPS, and SPM firm all had labor processes that 
involved lower levels of occupational specialization and involved the acquisition of a 
broader set of skills beyond the niche of occupations that required primarily high-tech 
software qualifications. For the SPS firm, as a small firm located in a rural geographic 
location in the tourism industry, it operated in a context of a limited supply of qualified 
candidates, limited resources, and production needs dependent on employees having a 
broad knowledge of the tourism industry.  Similarly, the IRS firm also operated in a 
context of limited resources and limited access to qualified and experienced candidates 
due to competition with larger ICT firms who could provide higher salaries to more 
experienced and highly qualified workers. The Irish ALMP scheme provided a strategy 
for the IRS firm to informally test candidates for more soft skills not captured readily 
through the interview process.  Likewise, the SPM firm also valued the ALMP internship 
scheme to test candidates for more soft skills, but in the context of a firm operating 
within the communication sector, a sector saturated with a steady supply of 
communication graduates and a long tradition of internships.  The dependency of all of 
these ICT firms on the domestic market also meant they were not exposed to the same 
levels of international market competition and subsequently did not have the same 
hierarchical structure of occupations that required the same occupational 
specializations and skill mix (i.e. foreign language requirements, etc.).   
The MNC subsidiaries, the SPL and IRM firms, depended more heavily on individuals 
with high-level technical software qualifications and only trusted the ALMP internship 
program as a mechanism to hire individuals for mid to lower-level administrative 
occupations. This is clearly related to the rapidly changing pace of the international 
market which increasingly demands high-level technical software employees in a 
context where both firms struggle to retain their employees due to poaching from other 
ICT firms that offer higher market wages. Consequently, both the SPL and IRM firms 
attempted to recruit individuals with high level technical skills either through graduate 
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internships or directly upon receiving graduate qualifications.  The lack of a steady 
domestic supply of individuals with the required skills for these jobs in the  domestic 
market within Ireland and Spain, further reduced any incentive to recruit individuals and 
upskill them for these occupations through ALMP internship programs.  In other words, 
the ALMP internship programs are not perceived as a viable training and hiring pathway 
for highly-skilled technical occupations for the SPL and IRM firms due to this lack of 
supply.   Therefore, the lack of a supply of high qualified and experienced technical 
software candidates, access to alternative hiring strategies and the ease with which 
highly-skilled technical employees can take their skills elsewhere, plays an important 
role in how these firms choose to use ALMP internship programs and the frequency in 
which they use them.   
All of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms clearly have high levels of trust in upper level 
university qualifications.  However, in a context of an insufficient supply of highly-skilled 
technical qualifications, large MNC subsidiaries such as SPL and IRM firms, would 
logically not expect an ALMP internship programs to provide such skilled workers given 
the lack of propensity for these individuals to become unemployed due to the high 
demand for this skill set.  Thus, ALMP internships are only used for lower level 
administrative and IT support occupations.  The IRS, SPS, and SPM firms value a 
different skill set, one based on soft skills and high levels of internal flexibility, and less 
on specialized technical qualifications.  Thus, ALMP internships provide a more viable 
and trustworthy training and hiring strategy for the IRS, SPS and SPM firms. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted that within the ICT sector similar firm practices may coexist 
within different national settings.  Despite the existence of high levels of 
institutionalized spaces for social partners to negotiate and coordinate training through 
collective bargaining within Spain, collective agreements remained relatively mute on 
training issues and work council institutions are either absent or weak in addressing 
training issue within ICT firms.  This supports existing research which suggests the 
persistency of coordination failures and the weak organization of social partners to 
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articulate ‘specific or co-specific assets’ (Molina and Rhodes 2007) such as the 
regulation of training, and more specifically ALMP training, within Spanish firms.  Thus, 
this would be expected to result in greater variation in training strategies at the firm 
level and alternative explanations for this variation.  Similarly, Ireland’s low levels of 
spaces for social partners to negotiate and coordinate training through collective 
bargaining, and more generally, its reliance on voluntary advisory institutions of social 
partner engagement on training issues would also be expected to reflect a greater 
tendency towards diverse firm training practices and other environmental explanations 
for this diversity. Indeed, this observation also supports existing research which argues 
that the Irish model of voluntary workplace collective bargaining, particularly in the 
private sector, closely models other Anglo countries and has resulted in highly diverse 
and individualized forms of workplace practices, including though not limited to training 
(Roche and Geary 2000; Dobbins 2010). 
In terms of administrative burdens and information deficits, the Spanish PES continues 
to be relatively weak in providing effective supports to firms.  While this impacted all of 
the Spanish ICT firms, it was particularly problematic for the small, rural IRS firm, and 
resulted in its inability to systematically engage with the ALMP internship program.  
Within Ireland, the capacity of the PES had actually improved, such that coordination 
deficits and administrative burdens did not hinder the Irish ICT firms’ participation, 
regardless of size and location, in engaging with the ALMP training program.  However, 
the Irish PES still continued to remain weak in its preponderance towards political shifts 
and veto points.  Thus, the consistency of the Irish ALMP internship program could not 
be guaranteed which could potentially discourage the future participation of ICT firms.  
Indeed, in a context where none of the ICT firms had ever participated in ALMP training 
previously, this continuity remains important to develop strong relationships of 
engagement with firms.  Thus, in the case of Spain, the weak capacity of the PES to 
effectively deliver the ALMP internship scheme may be considered an explanatory 
variable as to why firms may or may not engage, whereas within Ireland the continuity 
of an ALMP internship scheme was an important variable to explain why firms may 
consistently engage.  
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The issue of trust in educational and ALMP program outcomes begins to unravel why 
and how ALMP internships are incorporated into particular production strategies.  The 
Spanish firms were found to all lack trust in the capacity of the PES to deliver a steady 
supply of highly qualified individuals through ALMP internships.  However, this was 
found to be related less to the PES capacity and more related to the reality that the PES 
has historically been perceived as offering employment services to individuals with 
lower educational qualifications.  With a large portion of the Spanish population with 
secondary level or below educational qualifications, this lack of trust in the capacity of 
the PES to deliver highly qualified candidates is reinforced. Therefore, all Spanish ICT 
firms selected their own ALMP internship candidates through other recruitment 
channels.  Within Ireland, the ALMP internship program enabled firms to directly select 
and interview candidates through an ALMP internship program website that closely 
mirrored private online recruitment websites, thus firms did not choose between the 
Irish PES candidates and their own.  However, while Spanish firms clearly did not trust 
the PES’s supply of candidates, ICT firm trust in the ALMP internship program and how 
they used it is more related to particular production strategies in the context of a deficit 
of highly skilled technical applicants.   
Similarities were found among the MNC subsidiary firms and the IRS, SPS and SPM 
firms, in terms of how the firms selected ALMP participants from the labor market and 
the particular occupations for which the ICT firms used ALMPs.  Within the MNC 
subsidiaries, the occupational structure which was highly dependent on high-skilled 
technical occupations combined with issues of high-turnover, retention and a lack of 
candidates with these skills  meant that ALMP internship programs were perceived as a 
mechanism to train and hire individuals for mid to low-level administrative occupations. 
Thus, the ALMP internship program was not valued as a mechanism to fill these 
occupations and consequently the MNC subsidiaries depended more on recruitment 
through university (internships) and internationally.  In comparison, the IRS, SPS and 
SPM firms had a different occupational structure one that valued a different skill set, 
one based more on soft skills and high levels of internal flexibility, and less on 
specialized technical qualifications.  Recruitment was limited to the domestic labor 
market for all three firms with geographical location and resources (i.e. wages) playing 
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important roles in the type of candidates firms could access.  Therefore, the ICT firms’ 
occupational and production structures, in addition to firm access to particular 
resources to hire from the labor market, clearly impacts how ICT firms choose to use the 
ALMP internship programs.  This poses further questions as to how the choices of these 
ICT firms are embedded in particular production strategies which facilitate either 
medium road or high road strategies for particular segments of workers within the 
firms.  
This chapter underscores the important role particular features of the firm and sector 
may play in the actual production paradigms adopted.  While the weak capacity of the 
PES plays a clear role in explaining why ICT firms may systematically engage or not with 
ALMP internship programs in Ireland and Spain, it provides less explanation for how 
firms utilize ALMP training programs in practice in the context of different production 
strategies.  The levels of institutionalized spaces for social dialogue such as collective 
bargaining played very little role in explaining why firms used ALMP internships in 
different production strategies and how they engaged in these different context, 
whereas the trust in ALMP internship outcomes was more related to trust in the overall 
supply produced through the tertiary education system of highly technical applicants 
and the specific labor market processes and production strategies of the ICT subsidiary 
firms.  This last factor begins to uncover some of the nuances of how ICT firms may 
engage with ALMP internships in the context of particular production strategies, with 
the other factors offering very limited explanations as to how the ICT firms recruited 
and trained through ALMP internships.   
Two distinct groups of ICT firms emerged within Ireland and Spain through the analysis 
of the last factor, trust in state educational and ALMP training outcomes.  Specifically, 
they are: 1) the IRM and SPL MNC subsidiary firms, and 2) the IRS, SPS and SPM 
domestic firms. These two groups of firms varied in their occupational structures, their 
exposure to the international market, and their available resources to access particular 
candidates through ALMPs, which in turn influenced how they used ALMPs.  However, it 
remains unclear how these firms vary in terms of ALMP internship job quality outcomes.  
Therefore, Chapter 6 will analyse these nuances among the Spanish and Irish ICT firms.  
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The extent to which the distinctiveness is still apparent in terms of job quality outcomes 
and initial entry pathways towards these jobs is also a key issue that will be considered.  
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Chapter 6:  Flexible and Secure Jobs 
through ALMPs?  
 
Within Chapter 5, two groups of firms emerged within the ICT sector in Ireland and 
Spain: 1) the IRM and SPL MNC subsidiary firms, and 2) the IRS, SPS and SPM domestic 
firms.  This division was explained by specific features of the ICT firm’s occupational and 
production structures which influenced how the two groups of firms used ALMPs.  For 
the first group of ICT firms, the saturation of high-skilled specialized ICT jobs within the 
firms that demanded experienced, high-skilled ICT professionals combined with issues 
of high-turnover and retention among these professionals were important factors in 
shaping how the firms structured their recruitment and training strategies among 
lower-level non-specialized ICT jobs.  For the second group of ICT firms, the lower levels 
of occupational specialization, lack of high-turnover and retention problems combined 
with limited cost-effective alternatives for expansion and product markets were 
important explanatory factors in the distinctive hiring and training strategies.   
This section aims to further examine to what extent the ALMP internship schemes 
within the Irish and Spanish ICT firms facilitated particular job quality outcomes in terms 
of earnings, working time, skills and discretion, and prospects and internal progression. 
First, Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009; 2011) flexicurity framework is explained and an 
argument is made for its applicability to analyze job quality dimensions in the Irish and 
Spanish ICT firms.   The conceptualization of different possible combinations of 
flexicurity balances are also presented in relation to the four different job quality 
dimensions.  The last section examines the ICT case studies in the context of their 
national, sectoral and firm regulatory features to assess what job quality dimensions 
through ALMP internships exist in practice at the firm level, as well as how national 
legislation and collective bargaining agreement influence these outcomes, if at all.  
Finally, the job quality outcomes are examined more fully across the Irish and Spanish 
ICT sectors and any emergent patterns are considered. 
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Job Quality in ICT firms  
This section aims to explore the four dimensions of job quality, earnings, prospects and 
progression, working time quality, and skills and discretion, among the five Irish and 
Spanish ICT firms while using an analytical framework which assesses firm’s ability to 
balance flexibility and security for ‘good’ quality jobs.  These job quality aspects were 
chosen because they were themes that consistently emerged in the data, prominent in 
the literature (see Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011) and ones that more closely link with 
employer practices in the firm itself.   
Given the qualitative nature of this study and indeed the wider objective to examine the 
underlying dynamics that contribute to job quality dimensions for individuals hired 
through ALMPs, the flexicurity framework provides a useful heuristic tool.  The 
flexicurity concept is derived from different forms of labor market flexibility and 
security.  Most commonly known is Wilthagen (1998) and Wilthagen and Tros’ (2004) 
flexicurity matrix, which establishes four forms of flexibility and four forms of security.  
The linking of job quality dimensions to the various forms of flexicurity was done using 
an adaptation of Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009; 2011) analytical framework.   This research 
chose to modify some of the job quality dimensions, as well as extend the analysis to 
the firm level, thus enabling the inclusion of a further regulatory feature HR-policies 
with a single employer.  While potential combinations of flexicurity and non-flexicurity 
are conceptualized for each job quality dimension, the various forms of flexibility and 
security are not elaborated here, as they have already been in Chapter 2, along with an 
extensive review of the flexicurity literature and its debates.  However, a further review 
of Ibsen and Mailand’s (Ibid) flexicurity analytical framework is elaborated here to 
examine job quality outcomes through ALMPs within Ireland and Spain. 
 
‘Flexible and Secure’ Job Quality Outcomes 
Flexicurity strategies are generally conceived of as policy measures and strategies 
developed, designed and implemented at various levels through the involvement of a 
multitude of actors. Most studies tend to consider the flexicurity concept at the national 
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regulatory level, thus neglecting the various forms it may take at other subnational 
levels.  Indeed, flexicurity can take on different forms in EU member countries 
depending on the relationship between flexibility and security and the design of labour 
market policies and institutions at the macro, meso, and micro level (Schmid 2009).  
Ultimately, the firm is where these labor market policies are implemented and 
consequently firms have a direct impact on whether a balance between flexibility and 
security is achieved in a job.  While national labor market regulation and collective 
bargaining provide key incentives for firms to implement flexicurity strategies, many 
firms, often implicitly, develop their own policies which may also contribute to flexible 
and secure jobs.  Ultimately, the firm is ultimately where the employment relationship 
is located.  An examination of firm level outcomes enables this thesis to understand 
what combinations of flexibility and security exist in practice and what facilitates these 
combinations and the extent to which this reflects national employment legislation, 
sectoral collective bargaining arrangements and/or more nuanced outcomes related to 
sector and firm specific policies.  Within this research the Irish ICT sector was also 
included, a sector lacking collective agreements.  This provides for an examination of 
whether job quality outcomes through flexicurity can indeed be found in the absence of 
sectoral collective bargaining arrangements. Thus, firm level policies, both formal and 
informal, are considered alongside national and collective bargaining types of regulatory 
features as providing for balanced types of ‘flexicurity’ on each job quality dimension.  
The flexicurity concept generally considers employers to benefit from high levels of 
flexibility and employees high levels of security, such that flexicurity is argued to be a 
‘win-win situation’ (Keune and Jepsen 2007), which attempts to balance the trade-off 
between labor market flexibility (capacity of firms to adapt labor to business needs) and 
security (the minimization of social risks) (Auer 2010).  While debates exist (Schmid 
2009), this thesis assumes that employers will seek flexibility and employees security.  
The flexicurity matrix is set up so that each intersection of security and flexibility 
represents a possible balanced form of flexicurity.  However, the flexicurity matrix is 
argued to provide a guide for researchers as opposed to theoretically defining what 
constitutes a balance (Ibsen and Mailand 2009; 2011). Therefore, one important aspect 
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of operationalizing flexicurity is to define what combinations of flexibility and security 
may be considered balanced. 
This thesis adopts Ibsen and Mailand (2009; 2011) conceptualizations of flexicurity 
balances which provide for four types of flexicurity and two types of non-flexicurity, 
with slight adaptations made given the inclusion of both formal and informal policies at 
the firm level.  
 
Flexicurity 1: Flexicurity exists in regulatory or informal arrangements that trade-off 
flexibility and security (and vice versa) and where losses of either flexibility or security 
are compensated with endowments of flexibility or security. 
Flexicurity 2: Flexicurity exists in regulatory or informal arrangements that combine 
flexibility and security in win/win pay-offs thus creating advantages for employers and 
employees alike. 
Non-flexicurity 1: Regulatory or informal arrangements where trade-offs between 
flexibility and security (and vice versa) are not compensated with endowments of 
flexibility and security and thus represent pure zero-sum games. 
Non-flexicurity 2: Lose/lose pay-offs in which regulatory and informal arrangements 
simultaneously decrease flexibility and security. 
(Ibsen and Mailand 2009; 2011) 
 
Trade-offs are understood as zero-sum, where one party benefits at the others loss.  
However, through compensation for a trade-off some regulatory and informal 
arrangements may be balanced. An example of this is an increase in wage flexibility 
which reduces income security which is compensated by job/employment security. 
Importantly, compensation must be interpreted in terms of the flexicurity matrix and 
consequently pecuniary compensation such as for the loss of combination security for 
flexible working time is not considered flexicurity.  Flexicurity 2 involves win/win pay-
offs where regulatory or informal arrangements mutually benefit both employers and 
employees. An example is in flexible working time arrangements where length, 
scheduling and distribution of working time benefit both the employer and its 
employees, thus creating increased working time flexibility and increased security.  In 
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line with Ibsen and Mailand’s (2011) analytical framework, the analysis does not 
attempt to precisely measure an even balance of flexibility and security but rather 
assesses the firms for evidence of moving in the direction of flexicurity in each of the job 
quality dimensions.  In addition, the flexicurity framework captures two points in time 
of the job quality dimension: the current job of former ALMP interns and the initial job 
following the ALMP internship.  The reason for this decision is the observation that in 
four of the five firms, the current job dimensions vary from the initial job dimensions, 
particularly in relation to contract quality (i.e. permanent vs. temporary), an aspect that 
may have implications for job quality outcomes.  Indeed, contract quality is something 
that has been argued to require different balances of flexicurity (Ibsen and Mailand 
2009).  While these two snap shots of the job do not claim to fully capture internal labor 
market transitions at every stage, it can provides an idea of how job quality dimensions 
may shift at two points in time between flexicurity and non-flexicurity balances.   
Ibsen and Mailand (2009; 2010) suggest flexicurity may be studied at four different 
levels and through different regulatory features.  This research is particularly interested 
in the actual outcomes of job quality dimensions recruited for through ALMPs, or to 
account for movement towards flexicurity in practice at the firm level.  Therefore, the 
empirical analysis mainly focuses on outcomes within the firm, while taking into account 
the macro, meso and micro regulatory levels as possible contributory features moving 
firms towards flexicurity. In Figure 3, the boxes that are not truncated are the levels 
considered.  
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Figure 3:  Formal and Informal Regulatory Levels of Flexicurity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ibsen and Mailand 2009 
 
Similar to Ibsen and Mailand (2009), formal regulation related to external flexicurity is 
treated as context.  However, different in terms of the regulatory levels, is the exclusion 
of collective agreements with a single employer (which are not relevant to the selected 
firm case studies) as well as the inclusion of informal and formal firm level policies and 
practices, thus recognizing that good job quality outcomes often manifest in the firm 
informally (i.e. through training, etc.), particularly in small firms, as will be illustrated 
through the firm case studies.  
Given the focus on the firm and job quality outcomes after ALMP internships, job 
quality dimensions in terms of flexicurity outcomes will primarily concentrate on 
internal flexicurity as opposed to external flexibility as indicated in the second model.  
According to Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009), this model includes internal flexibility (i.e. 
working-time flexibility, functional flexibility) and internal security (i.e. job security, 
employment security, income security and combination security) which can be achieved 
through statutory rights, sector level agreements and/or firm level policies and 
practices. The first model concentrates on high external numerical flexibility balanced 
Directives at the EU 
level  
National Policies National Tri-partite 
Agreements 
Collective Agreements 
at the Sectoral Level 
HR Policy with single 
employer 
Collective Agreements 
with Single Employers 
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by employment and income security through public schemes such as that provided for 
through active and passive policies, thus more closely representing the classic Danish 
‘golden triangle.’  However, this study is interested in examining how Irish and Spanish 
ALMPs facilitate job quality outcomes at the sectoral and firm level.  Therefore the first 
model was not considered appropriate for the research objective.   
 
Table 11:  External and Internal Flexicurity Models 
 
 External Security 
Provided by Solely 
Public Schemes 
Internal Security by statutory rights, sector 
collective agreements and/or firm policies and 
practices 
Employment 
Security 
Income 
Security 
Job 
Security 
Employment 
Security 
Income 
Security 
Combination 
Security 
External 
Flexibility 
Numerical 
Flexibility 
Model 1  
Internal 
Flexibility 
Working-
time 
flexibility 
 Model 2 
Functional 
flexibility 
Wage 
flexibility 
 
Source: Ibsen and Mailand 2009 
 
Therefore, internal flexicurity is the main focus for the analysis of job quality outcomes 
for individuals hired through ALMPs.  To further understand how balances of flexicurity 
may manifest in practice, some brief examples are presented below, while also taking 
into account the different implications this may have depending on contract quality.  
While adhering to the analytical framework established above, it should be 
remembered that flexicurity for a job may be achieved through either compensated 
trade-offs or win/win pay-offs. Therefore, examples of both possible contributions to 
 
 
138 
 
flexicurity job outcomes are outlined below. While flexicurity examples may extend 
beyond those listed below, this provides a departure point to begin the firm level 
analyses for job quality outcomes for individuals hired through ALMPs.  The following 
section will present the analysis of the central research findings. 
 
Table 12:  Analytical Categories and Examples of Contributions to 
Flexicurity 
 
Job Quality 
dimensions 
Anticipated Flexibility dimension 
 
Anticipated Security Dimension 
Permanent 
Workers 
 
Atypical Workers 
(i.e. temporary/ 
TAW) 
Permanent 
Workers 
Atypical Workers (i.e. 
temporary) 
Earnings  Wage 
Flexibility (i.e. 
variable pay) 
Wage 
flexibility/External 
numerical flexibility 
(i.e. equal access to 
variable pay, can 
easily be made 
redundant) 
Income security 
(i.e. basis wage 
which limits 
downward 
pressure on 
earnings) 
Income Security (i.e. 
right to equal wage for 
similar work) 
Working 
Time 
Quality  
Working Time 
Flexibility (i.e. 
variable 
working time) 
Working time 
flexibility (i.e. part-
time work) 
Combination 
Security(i.e. 
certainty/right to 
opportunities to 
combine work and 
private life) 
Combination Security 
(i.e. equal rights to 
standard forms of paid 
leave, social benefits, & 
right to permanent 
contract after period of 
renewals) 
Skills & 
Discretion  
Functional 
Flexibility (i.e. 
transferability 
between 
positions) 
Numerical 
Flexibility (i.e. can 
easily be made 
redundant) 
Job 
Security/Employme
nt security 
(i.e. transferability 
between positions) 
Employment Security 
(i.e. right to training 
and skill development) 
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Prospects & 
Internal 
Progression  
Functional 
Flexibility (i.e. 
transferability 
between 
positions) 
Numerical 
Flexibility (i.e. can 
easily be made 
redundant) 
Job 
Security/Employme
nt Security 
(i.e. career 
prospects, ability 
to stay in same job) 
Employment Security 
(i.e. clear rules on 
responsibility for 
contract, right to 
permanent contract 
after period of 
renewals, career 
prospects) 
 
Source:  Adapted from Ibsen and Mailand 2011 
 
Earnings 
Irish ICT firms 
Within the Irish ICT firms, earnings are largely dictated by the market given the absence 
of trade unions in the sector.  Therefore, any movements towards flexicurity balances 
would be expected to result from firm level policy and practice or statutory regulation.  
The statutory regulation establishes the minimum wage in Ireland at €9.25 per hour. 
However, the ICT sector is generally considered to have high job quality in terms of 
earnings with average pay at €32.75 per hour, with those under 30 receiving on average 
€23.43 (Eurostat 2014a).  After age 30, the wage per hour jumps to €30.94 per hour 
(Ibid).  Average monthly earnings are €5,388, with those under-30 receiving €3, 855 
compared to those 30-39 years of age receiving €5,094 (Eurostat 2014b).  In short, a 
small age penalty exists for earnings in the ICT sector with earnings set at 72% of the 
average wage and with increases for those over 30 years of age.  This age penalty for 
earnings may be expected due to the higher probability of recent entry into the labor 
market by this cohort and more generally the lack of work experience.  However, the 
wages are still well above the minimum wage, even for those under 30.   
For the current jobs recruited for through ALMP internships, all permanent positions, a 
different image emerged with earnings well below the monthly ICT sector average.  
Within the IRM’s current system’s administrator job recruited through ALMP 
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internships, earnings were set at €2500 per month, whereas within the IRS firm’s web 
designer and sales, marketing and technical and web designer jobs18 recruited through 
ALMP internships, earnings were €2426 per month, both below the ICT sector averages.  
However, a recent study of job quality (Wickham and Bobek 2016) in the ICT sector 
found that the largest bracket of earnings are between €400-€800, thus suggesting the 
concentration of extremely high wages may be skewing the Eurostat averages.  Indeed, 
the range of earnings within the IRM firm was from €25,000 per year (administrators) to 
over €100,000 (senior management), with the average earnings at €70,000 per year.  
Interestingly, the current earning’s level of the IRM’s system administrator job was also 
not that much higher than the salaries of the IRS firm jobs, thus perhaps suggesting a 
more hierarchical management and wage structure within the IRM firm.  Indeed, the IRS 
firm’s flatter managerial structure was conducive to a flatter and less disparate earnings 
structure with job earnings ranging from €20,000- €30,000.  Thus, while both jobs 
recruited through ALMP internships fell within the range of earnings of most ICT 
professionals within Ireland, at the firm level, large wage variation existed within the 
larger IRM firm. While this is not directly relevant to defining job quality in terms of 
flexicurity, it matters in terms of how firms organize labor and earnings. 
The earning levels found within the web designer and sales, marketing and technical 
and web designer jobs and current system’s administrator jobs, cannot be considered a 
type of income security given the emphasis both the IRM and the IRS firms place on the 
market conditions to set wages.  Consequently this means that the national statutory 
minimum wage is the only limit on downward wage pressures in the Irish ICT sector. 
They [wages] are set by the market really. We would try to conduct market data 
and the market moves a couple times a year for technical salaries. Not as much 
for the commercial side but it’s all very market driven. 
HR Director, IRM firm, 2016 
 
Similarly, for the IRS firm, earnings are set by the market and the production needs of 
the firm. 
                                                          
18
 The IRS firm was the only ICT firm to not recruit via an initial temporary contract through the ALMP 
internship scheme. 
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We are spending a lot on R and D and the lines of revenue that we have demand 
that sort of level of wages at the moment and that’s what’s available for the 
company to spend and the labor isn’t there yet.   
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
 
Therefore, while monthly earnings are clearly above the minimum wage and fall within 
the range of ICT earnings for the jobs recruited for through ALMPs, earnings can easily 
be adapted according to production needs and market demands. This mitigates 
possibilities for contributions to income security for the current jobs recruited through 
ALMPS in the IRS and IRM firms.  
In terms of contribution to wage flexibility, variable pay through bonuses and wage 
supplements may also be used by employers to improve performance and overall firm 
productivity.  Within the Irish ICT sector, this is an area primarily regulated by firm level 
policy.  While variable pay schemes are particularly common within the ICT sector, firm 
size is also a relevant factor for the presence of variable pay schemes. The European 
Company Survey found that 59% of small firms, 77% of medium firms and 83% of large 
firms have variable pay schemes (Eurofound 2016).  Indeed, for the Irish ICT firm case 
studies, only the IRM firm had a policy that incorporated variable pay through annual 
bonus increases for its employees.   
Within the IRM firm, annual 5%-20% bonuses reflected performance and occupational 
levels with the current entry-level system’s administrator job recruited for through the 
ALMP internship being offered a 5% bonus annually.  While contributing positively to 
enhancing wage flexibility for the firm, it cannot be considered as a form of income 
security, given that it is variable and thus not a guaranteed type of income security.  
Indeed, as has already been argued, the IRM firm relies largely on the market to 
establish its wage structure and thus the only income security is the minimum wage.   
Therefore, the absence of income security to balance this variable pay scheme means 
that a flexicurity balance for earnings is unfounded in the current system’s administrator 
job recruited through ALMP internships within the IRM firm. 
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In terms of temporary contracts, only the IRM firm initially recruited via the ALMP 
internship for its system’s administrator job (then titled IT Support Administrator) via a 
temporary contract.  Given that Ireland has some of the lowest percentages of 
temporary contracts (8.2%) in the EU-28 (14.2%), this initial recruitment strategy 
represents an anomaly in the wider Irish context.  Indeed, while employers bear a 
relatively high cost of the unemployment benefit, 70% (Esser et. al 2013), severance 
costs between temporary and permanent contracts do not vary significantly. Thus, the 
link between temporary contracts and severance costs does not generally steer Irish 
employers in the direction of temporary contracts. Therefore within the IRM firm high 
levels of external numerical flexibility can be concluded to exist for both temporary and 
permanent contracts.  In addition, the IRM firm also extended its wage flexibility 
scheme through bonuses for the initial system’s administrator job, thus as already 
argued skewing the flexicurity balance in favor of the IRM firm.    
In terms of income security, temporary workers are protected by (The Protection of 
Employee (Fixed Term) Work Act 2003)19 for fair treatment in terms of equal wages for 
an employee performing similar tasks.  Indeed, earnings for the initial system’s 
administrator job were €2,083 per month, well above the average ICT income bracket 
and above the minimum wage.  However, as already argued earnings fluctuate 
according to market demand within the IRM and IRS firms with the IRM firm still 
maintaining the power to negotiate wages on an individual basis.  Therefore, while Irish 
legislation provides for equal rights for temporary workers in terms of earnings, it still 
does not provide a base for income security in the initial system’s administrator job in 
the IRM firm.   
Overall, despite equal access to wages similar to permanent workers, the system’s 
administrator job still has a high degree of flexibility and can more easily be made 
redundant as production needs and market demands fluctuate.  Consequently, similar 
to the current job high levels of wage flexiblization counteract any limits for downward 
pressures on wages.  Thus, income security is not a feature of the earnings dimension of 
                                                          
19
 Temporary Agency Workers are excluded from the Act and instead are included under the Protection of 
Employees (Temporary Agency) Work Act 2012, disposed transposing the EU directive on Temporary 
Agency Work 2008/104/EC  into Irish legislation. 
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the initial or current system’s administrator job recruited for through ALMPs in the IRM 
firm. Overall, within the IRM and IRS firm, it is difficult to capture any flexicurity 
balances in terms of compensated trade-offs or win-win payoffs for both the initial (for 
the IRM firm) and current job recruited for through ALMPs. 
Spanish ICT firms 
Within the Spanish ICT firms, the main regulatory feature for earnings within firms is 
through collective agreements, with statutory regulations setting a universal minimum 
for all workers.  However, as was observed in Chapter 5, the Spanish ICT firms are all 
regulated by different collective agreements, thus enabling the possibility for varying 
job quality (i.e. [ALMP]training) outcomes.  In addition, many collective agreements 
suffer from a lack of  clear articulation of some job quality aspects, with social partners 
often unable to agree on new collective agreements (Ibsen and Mailand 2010), such as 
in the case of the Spanish national ICT collective agreement.  Indeed, the pervasive 
influence of the Spanish state to remedy coordination failures in the industrial relations 
system has meant that social partners have strong incentives to invest in political 
power, as opposed to clearly articulating clauses in collective agreements to protect 
working conditions (Molina and Rhodes 2007).  This deficit has extended to issues such 
as wage bargaining, workplace regulation, training and the management of employment 
and social protection (Ibid). Therefore, opportunities for balancing flexicurity at the firm 
level, not only for earnings, but also for other job quality dimensions, may be equally 
driven by statutory regulations and firm policies and practice. 
Similar to Ireland, Spain has a national statutory minimum wage set at €825.65 
(Eurostat 2015) per month, which is characterized by being closely linked to welfare 
benefits set at 75% of the minimum wage, as well as by its low level compared to other 
EU countries (Ibsen and Mailand 2009).  Indeed, the national statutory minimum wage 
is a little over half that of Ireland.  In addition, the state legislates for firms to pay wages 
below the minimum wage through the use of internships and training contracts for 
young workers through the interprofessional minimum wage, currently €537.84 
(IPREM-Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples), which provides for 
subminimum rates for inter-professional training (IPREM 2015).  Thus, the statutory 
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minimum for earnings can be said to be very low in Spain, thus emphasizing the 
importance of collective agreements to set higher limits on earnings.   
The Spanish ICT sector has an average wage of €2,509 per month (€14.76 per hour), 
with those under age 30 earning €1,598 (€9.26 per hour) for full time permanent 
workers.  Therefore, workers under 30 have a wage penalty of 64% (62% per hour) of 
the average monthly wage (Eurostat 2014a, 2014b).  As argued above this age penalty 
would be expected given the cohorts recent entry into the labor market and lack of 
work experience.  However, Spain is notorious for its highly segmented labor market 
with a proliferation of temporary contracts among young worker.  Indeed, this wage 
penalty is approximately 10% higher than the Irish wage penalty for those under 30 in 
the ICT sector. Eurostat figures further confirm this with an almost identical hourly wage 
in the ICT sector for temporary workers, €9.01 per hour (Eurostat 2014b).  Thus, while 
the average wage in the Spanish ICT sector is well-above the minimum wage, a 
significant wage penalty occurs for individuals in the ICT sector who are young and on a 
temporary contract.  This will be particularly relevant when examining the initial forms 
of flexicurity for earnings in the ICT jobs recruited through ALMPs. 
Given the different collective agreements for each Spanish ICT firm, it is necessary to 
analyse each firm separately within the context of their collective agreement to 
distinguish moves towards flexicurity balances.  For the SPL firm, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the collective agreement has been stalled since 2009.  Consequently, while 
the ICT collective agreement is still binding, earnings are at the levels of 2009 and 
consequently remain low.  For the SPL firm, this means a relatively low floor exists in 
terms of entry- level earnings for the talent acquisition job recruited for through ALMPs. 
The current permanent talent acquisition job recruited through ALMPs was located in 
the HR department of the SPL firm. While earnings for the current job were €1,600 per 
month, well above the minimum monthly earnings in Spain, this was only 63% of 
average earnings in the ICT sector and only slightly above average earnings for young 
workers under 30 in the ICT sector.  While these earnings are slightly above the ICT 
collective agreement job classification category ‘personal titulado or qualified 
individuals’ set at €1,569.25, this floor has not been raised since 2009 and consequently 
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this has not guaranteed consistent wage increases for this category nor other 
employees within the SPL firm.  Interestingly, the earnings structure of the SPL firm, 
despite being a large MNC subsidiary, does not reflect the stark wage variation of the 
similar Irish IRM firm, with earnings ranging from €17,000 per year (entry-level 
administration) to €60,000 per year (senior project manager).  However, the ICT 
sectoral agreement has demarcated over 29 categories of specific occupations linked to 
earnings, with the range of earnings spanning from €664.44 per month (interview-
surveyor) to the highest salary of €1,569.25 per month (tertiary degree qualified 
workers).  Obviously, the lowest earnings category is no longer valid as the national 
monthly minimum wage has since been increased to €825.65 per month.  This reflects 
the lack of congruency between the ICT collective agreement earnings and occupations 
and the actual structure of earnings within the SPL firm.  Interviews with a trade union 
official expressed concern over the wage flexibility in ICT firms and argued that this new 
structure of earnings is becoming normalized, particularly among young labor market 
entrants. 
They are incorporating very young people, incorporating them at the lowest 
scale.  They [young people] are accustomed to this salary, that is, they did not 
come from 40,000 and suddenly have their salary drop to 25,000.  They maybe 
started out with an internship or a training contract of 9,000, and then they 
managed to work up to a contract of 12,000. 
Trade Union Representative 1, Service Federation CCOO, 2016 
 
Therefore, though the ICT collective agreement provides a clear wage floor to protect 
workers’ earnings, earnings remain low and stagnant.  Thus, the ICT sector collective 
agreement does not guarantee income security for the current talent acquisition job.  
Instead, it facilitates increased wage flexibility.  Therefore, the current talent acquisition 
job in the SPL firm is concluded to not have increased income security, with earnings 
instead determined largely by production and market demands. 
In terms of variable pay, the ICT collective agreement provides for annual wage 
supplements according to job category.  This represents additional income security 
since it is a guaranteed supplement linked to seniority in the firm as opposed to 
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performance.  Therefore, this entailed a small annual earnings increase in the SPL firm’s 
talent acquisition job of €1, 536.22.  However, given that negotiations have not raised 
these annual supplements since 2009, whether this represents a move in the direction 
of income security is questionable.  Aside from the guaranteed annual wage 
supplements through the ICT collective agreement, the SPL firm also provided 
additional variable pay to enhance wage flexibility through a firm bonus scheme linked 
to worker performance. This bonus scheme thus provided additional income for the 
talent acquisition job. However, it cannot be considered a type of income security given 
that this supplement is not guaranteed but rather can be used by the SPL firm to 
increase wage flexibility and adapt supplements according to performance and 
production cycles.  The ICT collective agreement supplements may be considered a form 
of income security given that these annual increases are guaranteed for the talent 
acquisition job.  However, the lack of a renewed ICT collective agreement has not 
provided for any recent changes in the supplements, and therefore it may question the 
extent this indeed represents a move towards increased income security for the SPL 
firm.   
For the initial working conditions of the talent acquisition job recruited for through 
ALMPs, the SPL firm further enhanced wage flexibility by initially hiring through an 
external Temporary Work Agency (TAW) contract.  This involved an initial 6 month 
internship contract, followed by three external successive short-term temporary 
contracts (el contrato eventual por circunstancias de la producción) via a TAW, with 
total earning of €10,000 per year.  While Spanish statutes incorporate the EU directive 
on TAW contracts (European Council and Parliament Directive 2008/104/EC) which 
establishes similar working conditions (i.e. remuneration, length of the working day, 
overtime, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holidays) for a TAW worker to a 
worker undertaking a similar task hired directly by the firm (Real Decreto Legislativo 
2/2015), national legislation establishes lower wages for some temporary  contracts 
such as the internship contract, regardless of the tasks undertaken. While collective 
agreements may improve earnings for internship contracts and more generally working 
conditions for temporary workers, within the ICT collective agreement, no clauses exist 
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to improve the statutory minimum earnings for temporary workers, including internship 
contracts, and short-term temporary contracts.   
Thus, according to the examples of income security for temporary workers, statutes 
should improve equal access to earnings for the initial talent acquisition job recruited 
for through ALMPs.  However, despite the guarantee of equal access to income security 
for TAW workers, national legislation still provides for lower earnings for some 
temporary contracts and the ICT collective agreement does not enhance these 
minimum earnings.  Consequently, a move towards improvements for income security 
is not found for the initial talent acquisition job in the SPL firm. 
As already mentioned in Ch. 4, Spanish statute also encourages the use of temporary 
employment within Spanish firms given that severance costs are highly dependent on 
contract type.  Therefore, the SPL firm’s decision to recruit initially via a temporary 
contract for the job is also concluded as a move towards increasing external numerical 
flexibility.  While the initial talent acquisition job was provided with the right to the 
same annual bonus scheme provided by the ICT collective agreement, as argued above, 
the stalled ICT collective agreement meant supplements were not increased annually, 
thus questioning the extent this can be considered a move in the direction of increased 
income security.  While the initial talent acquisition job was also included in the SPL 
firm’s variable pay scheme, as already argued above this does not represent a 
guaranteed form of income security for the initial talent acquisition job, but rather 
enhances wage flexiblity for the SPL firm. Overall, both the initial and current conditions 
of the talent acquisition job in the SPL firm did not represent a move in the direction of 
balanced flexicurity through a win-win pay off or a compensated trade-off, but rather 
increased overall flexibility of earnings for the talent acquisition job.  This finding 
suggests that the SPL firm has more opportunities, similar to the Irish firms, to adapt its 
earnings structures to market and production needs despite the presence of a national 
level ICT collective agreement.  This supports Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009; 2010) 
empirical findings on collective agreements in the Spanish print and electric sector 
which found that even when the Spanish state provided autonomy for social partners to 
negotiate a collective agreement, often there was  an inability to reach agreements and 
consequently an underdeveloped collective bargaining agenda.  As was argued in the 
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SPL firm for the job recruited through the ALMP internship program, this can have direct 
implications for earnings. 
Within the SPM firm, the current permanent jobs20 recruited for through ALMPs were 
mostly as video editors with earnings set at €1800 per month, or 71% of the average 
wages in the ICT sector, well above the wages for those under 30 (€1598 p/m) and the 
minimum wage (€825.65 per month).  Noticeably, the entry salary was slightly higher 
than the SPL firm’s current salary for the job recruited for through ALMPs.  Indeed, the 
national non-daily press collective agreement (2013-2015) provides six job 
demarcations with annual earnings ranging from €888.32 (assistant administrator, 
doorman, bus driver, etc.) per month to €1,890 per month (director).  Thus, the 
collective agreement is clearly superior to the ICT collective agreement in terms of the 
minimum floor set for earnings.   Indeed, the salary offered by the SPM firm for entry 
level jobs in video editing is slightly above the wage floor of €1,252.11 per month, set by 
the collective agreement for video editors.  While the SPM firm asserted it adheres to 
the non-daily press collective agreement, the SPM firm’s expansion and increased 
productivity also led to the decision to elevate the non-daily press collective agreement 
base earnings so as to remain competitive in the market and attract additional talent. 
Salaries are established by the market in the end… when I arrived there was a 
structure of salaries and we have reformed them some. You hear about how 
much they [other firms] are paying...’ How much is that position paid in another 
firm? ’ We are interested in creating talent.  We can afford to attract it. 
Director of Finance/HR, SPM firm, 2016 
 
Therefore, the SPM firm’s wage structure has evolved through a mix of institutional 
regulatory features in tandem with market demands and production needs, thus 
facilitating higher earnings overall for its employees. Therefore, within this context the 
video editing jobs recruited through ALMPs in the SPM firm provide opportunities for 
increased income security.  
                                                          
20
 Working conditions related to the current jobs in the IRM firm are based on an employer interview and 
an extensive review of the IRM firm collective agreement. Given that an interview with a former ALMP 
intern was not granted by the firm, the analysis is limited on certain details. 
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In addition, the non-labor daily press agreement also provides for a range of wage 
supplements (i.e. tertiary degree qualified video editors, material expenses, 
transportation, marriage/Christmas bonuses, and travel/food stipends, overtime), with 
some linked to education level and occupational category.  Indeed, for the video editing 
jobs recruited through ALMPs, these supplements provided for the opportunity to add 
various supplements to the already high base level wage.  The addition of wage 
supplements linked to education, as well as overtime also meant opportunities for 
various forms of wage flexibility (as well as working time flexibility) for the SPM firm.  
Therefore, overall for the current video editing jobs recruited for through ALMPs, a win-
win pay-off for earnings can be found given the balance between income security and 
wage flexibility.   
Similar to the SPL firm, initially the video editing jobs were recruited by the SPM firm 
using temporary contracts via six month internship contracts.  However, the SPM firm 
did not externalize the contract through TAW.  In addition, different from the SPL firm’s 
ICT collective agreement, was that the non-daily press collective agreement increased 
the statutory minimum for the internship salaries to 85% (compared to the minimum 
60%) of the wage of an employee undertaking the same tasks for the first year and 95% 
(compared to the minimum of 75%) for the second year.  Therefore, the SPM firm 
provided clauses to significantly improve the internship contract for the initial jobs 
recruited through ALMPs.  In addition, the initial video editing jobs also had the right to 
access the same wage supplements.  However, national legislation still facilitates for 
higher severance costs for temporary workers compared to permanent workers. Thus, 
this inevitably influenced the hiring trajectory of the SPM firm and increased the initial 
external numerical flexibility of the video editing jobs recruited for through ALMPs.  
Therefore, overall, despite the balanced flexicurity outcomes for earnings for the SPM 
firm’s current video editing jobs, this same conclusion cannot be asserted for the initial 
video editing job due to the high level of external numerical flexibility that accompany 
temporary contracts in Spain. 
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Unlike the other two Spanish ICT firms, the SPS firm was part of a district (as opposed to 
a national) retail collective agreement (2014-201521) in the Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia.  As stated in Chapter 5, the SPS firm’s adherence to a retail collective 
agreement is related to its history as a firm that was more closely tied to the retail 
sector in relation to its products and production processes.  The current permanent job 
recruited through ALMPs was for an IT support job in the e-commerce Department.  
Earnings for the job were €1, 025 per month, only 41% of the average monthly wage 
and well-below the average wage for those under 30 (€1,598 per month) in the ICT 
sector.  The IT support job fell under the category of ‘head of staff, purchases and sales, 
head of division and administration,’ an occupational category with a monthly salary of 
€1,023.39 per month, thus suggesting the SPS firm closely adheres to the demarcations 
for earnings established through its collective agreement. The salary structure of the 
regional retail collective agreement ranged from €832.16 (administrative assistant, 
telephone operator, etc.) to €1,263.76 (tertiary level qualified worker), over 10 
occupational categories.  Therefore, when compared to the ICT collective agreement, 
fewer divisions existed between workers and tasks, thus enabling higher levels of 
adjusting wages among occupations as well as enhanced functional flexibility between 
occupations and tasks.   Given the lack of congruency between the SPS firm ICT 
occupations and those provided for in the collective agreement oriented towards the 
retail sector; a greater degree of wage flexibility for the SPS firm was also facilitated. 
Indeed, the SPS firm managing director asserted that, while the SPS firm adheres to its 
collective agreement, it also adapts its earnings structure closely to employee 
performance, firm production strategies, and its remote geographical position.   
It is according to the demarcation, but even more so the tasks that you perform 
in the job. It could be that a person who does not have a diploma is receiving the 
salary of a manager. This happens. It depends on the responsibility you assume 
and the tasks you do. Academic accreditation is important, but in this 
geographical situation we have to adapt as a firm. 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016 
 
                                                          
21
 Due to the extension of collective agreements through ‘ultra-activity’ until a new one is negotiated, the 
2014-2015 collective agreement was still valid in the beginning of 2016, given a new collective agreement 
had not been agreed on. 
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The remote geographical position of the SPS firm is an important factor to take into 
consideration, as this illustrates the adaptability firms may assume to increase wages 
beyond the demarcation of their collective agreement so as to attract and retain labor.   
Indeed, while this is not a formal clause of the regional retail collective agreement, the 
SPS firm has adopted this practice to more flexibly structure wages within its firm.    
Therefore, it appears the district retail collective agreement provides a wage structure 
for the SPS firm while also enabling a relative amount of adaptability for the firm to 
adjust wages according to the supply of workers.  In addition, the district retail 
collective agreement also provides for supplements (i.e. dinner, lunch, lodging), three 
extra payments per year, and access to individual bonuses according to seniority.  These 
were all important additional features that added to the current salary of the IT support 
job.  Thus, overall the collective agreement provides for an earnings basis to resist 
downward pressures on earnings as well as provides for guaranteed supplements, thus 
further enhancing income security.  In addition, the SPS firm in practice has managed to 
adopt a policy that closely links wage flexibility to job tasks and responsibility given it 
rural geographical position. Therefore, though not intentional, a balance of flexicurity 
can be assumed in the form of a win-win pay-off in the overall structure of earnings for 
the IT support job recruited for through ALMPs. 
Similar to the SPL and SPM firms, the SPS firm initially recruited the IT support job via a 
temporary contract, specifically a one year internship contract.  However, like the SPM 
firm, the SPS firm did not choose to externalize the contract through TAW.  In addition, 
the SPS firm’s district retail collective agreement provided for a higher salary for the 
intern contract 80% (compared to 60%) for a worker undertaking the same tasks and 
limited the duration to one year.  The initial IT support job also had access to the same 
wage supplements provided by the district retail collective agreement.  Thus some 
enhancements on income security were found for the initial IT support job.  However, 
the actual earnings received through an internship contract were still below the 
national minimum wage and high degrees of external numerical flexibility existed due to 
the nature of the temporary contract.  Therefore, the initial IT support job is still tipped 
in favor of the SPS firm in terms of enhanced wage flexibility and external numerical 
 
 
152 
 
flexibility.  Consequently, a balanced outcome for earnings is not found for the initial IT 
official job. 
 
Working Time Quality 
 
Irish ICT firms 
According to Eurostat figures, the average working week in Ireland in 2016 was 40.5 
hours, slightly below the EU-28 average of 41.4 (Eurostat 2016).  Alongside this 
decrease in working hours, evidence also exists that working time has simultaneously 
become increasingly flexible through shift work and outsourcing through subcontracting 
(Dobbins 2009; Wickham and Bobek 2016), particularly in non-unionized sectors such as 
ICT.   
The Irish Organisation of Working Time Act (1997) places limits on the maximum 
working week, rest periods and breaks, night work and working time records.  However, 
while it defines the work week as 48 hours, it can be calculated as an average over a 4 
month period, 6 months for some industries subject to peak times (i.e. due to tourism) 
and 12 months when an agreement has been made between the employer and the 
employees approved by the Labor Court.  In addition, no statute applies for overtime 
pay and for Sunday work employers must give a ‘reasonable allowance, pay increase or 
reasonable paid time off work’ and sick leave is left up to the discretion of employers.  
Of course, flexible working time can also benefit the employee as well and be balanced 
with national statutes or firm policies that promote opportunities for combination 
security, such as through flexi-time, leave schemes, and childcare facilities.    
Within Ireland, some statutory minimums provide floors for balancing working life with 
private life.  This includes Parental Leave (Amendment) Act (2006) which provides for 
rights to (unpaid) parental leave, 14-18 weeks until a child is 8 years of age, the 
Maternity Protection Act (1994 & 2004) which also provides 26 weeks paid and 16 
weeks unpaid maternity leave and two weeks paternity leave, the Carer’s Leave Act 
(2001) and the Irish Organisation of Working Time Act (1997) which provides for rights 
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to annual leave.   Apart from these statutes, most opportunities to regulate working 
time are through collective agreements, or in the case of the majority of the Irish ICT 
sector and the Irish ICT firm case studies, through firm policies.  Therefore, within this 
regulatory context it would be expected that working time quality conditions, which 
includes working time flexibility and combination security, would be developed at the 
firm level for the jobs recruited for through ALMPs. 
Within the IRM firm, in addition to the minimum floors set by statutory regulation, the 
IRM HR policy officially sets the weekly work week at 37.5 hours, with flexible times for 
entering and leaving work and weekend overtime pay.  However, the HR director 
asserted that practice was quite different with most employees working 40 hours or 
more and lengthy overtime, particularly on the ‘non-technical, commercial side of the 
house.’  For the current system’s administrator job recruited through the ALMP 
internship, the job was contracted at 37.5 hours with access to flexible entry and 
departure times. Overtime was not a frequent feature during the work week.  However, 
being ‘voluntarily’ on-call during the weekend to resolve technical issues was a 
dominant feature of the job, even during the ALMP internship period. 
Under certain circumstance there would be times when I have to [work on the 
weekends], but that would only happen maybe four times per year, maybe once 
per quarter. That’s overtime but then voluntary kind of, I would see something 
pop up on my phone and I would just go online for a half hour and sort it out. 
That is more voluntary so you can’t really classify that as overtime. That would 
happen maybe once a week. 
Former ALMP Intern, System’s Administrator IRM firm, 2016 
 
This provides an example of the increased blurring between working time and non-
working time where boundaries are a less dominant feature of the knowledge economy 
(O’Carroll 2008).  In addition, it also illustrates the increasingly accepted norm of using 
technology to adapt the job to the production needs of the firm. For the current 
system’s administrator job, weekend hours were not formally compensated through 
flexi-time or overtime pay, but rather were subject to individual discretion, such as 
arriving an hour or two late on the following Monday.  Therefore, despite a firm policy 
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for weekend overtime pay, ‘voluntary’ weekend work appears to not be included as 
part of the overtime pay scheme of the current IT support job. 
The IRM firm asserted that overtime during the work week was compensated indirectly 
through the annual bonus scheme linked to employee performance. However, this 
bonus scheme was directly linked to level and occupation type, as opposed to the actual 
number of overtime hours. 
We have a bonus scheme, so most of our employees are on a bonus scheme 
reaching 5-20% and that [overtime] is probably reflected then so you have your 
very junior people on 5%, software developers, a few flex the hours here and 
there they would do over the year and then most managers receive between 10 
and 20% and that reflects that then as well. 
HR Director, IRM firm, 2016 
 
The frequency and unpredictability of overtime within the IRM firm to meet production 
demands represents an increase in working time flexibility.  Compensation for overtime 
pay or rest time is also not directly linked to overtime, thus the working time flexibility is 
not balanced with increased discretion to enhance combination security. Therefore, for 
the current system’s administrator job recruited through ALMPs, a balance of flexibility 
and security for working time quality was not found, given evidence for higher levels of 
working time flexibility compared to combination security.  In addition, while the initial 
temporary system’s administrator job had access to the same statutory rights as the 
current permanent job, the working time quality features of the job did not vary by 
contract type. Consequently a flexicurity balance in favor of quality working time was 
not found in either the current or the initial system’s administrator job. 
The IRS firm was found to be very similar to the IRM firm in terms of working time 
quality, with a firm policy of 40 hours per week, but frequent overtime in practice 
among the web designer and sales, marketing and technical support jobs recruited 
through ALMPs.  Similar to the IRM firm, flexible entry and exit times and the ability to 
informally adjust working hours to personal needs were also features of the web 
designer and sales, marketing and technical support jobs, thus providing some degree 
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of combination security.  However, for the web designer and sales, marketing and 
technical support jobs, working time flexibility was also prevalent with some degrees of 
variation according to the nature of the job.  For the web designer job, overtime during 
the work week was common given the direct link the job had with customer websites. 
Honestly I worked 40 hours on paper, off paper like 60. It was crazy.  Starting 
was always the same, but it’s just that there could be like website crashes that 
you have to fix it or you can’t leave customers unhappy but obviously there was 
no pressure, like to be exactly at 9 o’clock on time at work. There was never 
pressure like that so it’s like if you work later you can come in later. There was no 
pressure with that. 
Former ALMP Intern, IRS firm Web Designer, 2016 
 
Similar to the IRM firm, for the web designer job, overtime could be recuperated 
through flexible entry and exit time, but no formal policy existed to facilitate flexi-time 
accumulation for the job.  In addition, it appears in practice the web designer job’s 
weekly working hours were often above even the national statutory maximum hourly 
work week.  This reflects perhaps the difficulty to actually monitor working time 
arrangements within the firm, particularly informal working arrangements that may not 
be documented.  Overall, in the case of the web designer job, flexible working time is 
tipped in favor of the IRS firm given that the employee has relatively little control and 
discretion over the mechanism that determines when and how overtime will be 
compensated.  
For the sales, marketing and technical support job recruited through ALMPs, overtime 
was a less prominent feature, mainly because the job was not so closely tied to 
customer demand. Even the sales dimension of the job was not linked to the amount of 
commission (pay), thus deterring possible overtime to meet sales targets.  However, 
some overtime could be captured in the frequent travel required for trainings with 
clients through the job.  
I don’t do overtime. I travel a bit. I travel quite a lot doing training and stuff like 
that. I see that as a perk more than anything. I end up working less but I guess I 
get trains and stuff like that so I might be longer days I suppose but I am the ones 
who decides them anyway because I am the one you know who is going to be 
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training with a client or trying to do a sales pitch or something like that. It’s not 
like he send me out. 
 Former ALMP Intern, SPS firm sales, marketing and technical support, 2016 
 
Interestingly, the former ALMP intern regarded this as ‘voluntary’ overtime which he 
could exercise his own discretion over.  However, this overtime clearly provides 
possibilities for the firm to adjust working time according to production demands.  In 
addition, as already mentioned, the lack of a control over rest time compensation in the 
IRS firm meant overtime was not balanced with combination security.  In summary, a 
balance of working time quality through working time flexibility and combination 
security was not found given the extensive use of overtime in the web designer job and 
the lack of employer discretion over compensation for overtime in the web designer 
and sales, marketing and technical support job .    
Spanish ICT firms 
In Spain, working time is established through collective agreements within the 
framework of statutes on maximum working hours.  The Worker’s Statute (2015) 
establishes a 40 hour work week, but in 2016 on average individuals worked 41.2 hours 
per week, slightly below the EU-28 average (41.4) and above the Irish average (40.5) 
(Eurostat 2016).  Within Spain, the 40 hour work week average can be computed 
annually, with firms able to irregularly distribute hours throughout the year for 10% of 
the work day.  It also regulates a maximum nine hour work day (unless a collective 
agreement or agreement between the firm and worker’s representatives specifies 
otherwise), night work, shift work, and rest time.  Overtime is restricted to 80 hours per 
year, but excludes overtime compensated with rest time.   In addition, the Worker’s 
Statute establishes regulation which explicitly promotes opportunities for combination 
security, including family and holiday leave, sick leave, maternity/paternity leave and 
leave to care for a family member.  The Worker’s Statute encourages improvements 
through collective agreement on working time. However, Ibsen and Mailand (2009) 
argue that historically collective agreements have played a larger role in addressing 
issues of flexible working time, than in providing combination security clauses.  
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Therefore, balances of flexicurity among the Spanish ICT firm case studies may be 
expected to be provided through formal regulatory features of collective agreement 
and formal and informal firm policy and practice.  
The ICT collective agreement provides little improvement to the National Worker’s 
Statute on the quality of working time, with a great deal of the ICT collective agreement 
clauses on working time simply referring back to the statute.  Deviations from statute 
include regulation surrounding the number of working hours per year (1,808), 23 (as 
opposed to 22) vacation days per year, and compressed working weeks during some 
months to enable shorter work weeks during other periods of the year, particularly the 
summer months.  Overtime compensation through pay or rest time was not a feature of 
the collective agreement.  Indeed, the lack of clearly articulated clauses surrounding 
working time has been a frequent area of disagreement which has contributed to the 
inability of social partners to agree on a new collective agreement (Trade Union 
Representative 1, CCOO, 2015).  Therefore, within the SPL firm, working time was 
primarily regulated according to the Worker’s Statute and/or firm formal or informal 
policy. 
Within the SPL firm, the weekly work week is set at 40 hours, the fixed statutory 
maximum.    The SPL firm also had flexible working hours, provided for combination 
security for the jobs recruited for through ALMPs enabling flexible entry and exit times, 
as well as the ability to adjust schedules for personal needs to potentially maintain a 
better Work Life Balance (WLB).  In addition, SPL firm policy provided ‘intensive Fridays’ 
(i.e. a compressed working day) for all employees to depart early on Fridays.  However, 
in terms of working time flexibility overtime was a frequent feature in the job (primarily 
HR jobs) recruited for through ALMPs.  This was related to the nature of the job which 
required adapting working schedules to interview potential candidates.   
Officially, we work 40 hours [a week] but it is true that in our work we have to 
sacrifice a bit because we have to adapt a lot to people's hours for those who 
come to do an interview because the interviews often happen between 18:30 
and 19:00 in the evening, so that makes you have to stay until 20:00 or 20:30. 
Then you end up working more hours than normal.  The normal working day is to 
enter at 9 and leave at 18:30 because many times we leave at 20:30 which are 
two hours overtime.  It is also true that here it is very flexible in the sense that I 
can go for coffee, you know? We do not have to be working all the time.  There is 
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a great deal of flexibility, but well, we work more hours than what is required, 
except for the Fridays; those are sacred to me. I leave at 2 o'clock, but the rest of 
the days are normally late. 
Former ALMP Intern, Talent Acquisition, SPL firm, 2016 
 
Weekend work was the only financial compensation the SPL firm offered.  Given that 
overtime was only a feature of the current talent acquisition job during the working 
week; this firm policy was not as relevant.  Instead, similar to the Irish ICT firms, 
overtime was compensated through a rather informal system of rest time enabling 
employees to take ‘extended coffee breaks’ occasionally.  Given that no formal policy 
exists in the SPL firm to guarantee employee control over compensation for overtime, 
this cannot be considered a contribution to combination security.  Similarly, it appears 
in practice that the lack of a clear system of compensation for overtime within the 
current talent acquisition job also results in excessive hours beyond the 40 hour work 
week.  Therefore, a balance of working time quality through working time flexibility and 
combination security cannot be determined in the current talent acquisition job.   
While the working time did not vary for the initial talent acquisition job recruited, 
initially recruited via an internship contract and a series of short-term temporary 
contracts, Spanish legislation and the EU directive on TAW (European Council and 
Parliament Directive 2008), provides for the differentiated treatment of externalized 
workers (i.e. outsourced/contracted) within the statutory framework of collective 
agreements for working time.  Within Spain working time falls under the national TAW 
collective agreement, and not the sectoral agreement of the place of work. However, 
despite this discrepancy between collective agreements no variation in practice was 
found among the working time arrangement between the initial and permanent talent 
acquisition job. Therefore, the initial talent acquisition job was not found to have a 
balanced flexicurity outcome for working time quality.  
Compared to the SPL firm’s ICT collective agreement, the SPM firm’s Non-daily Press 
collective agreement was far more articulate in providing deviations from the Worker’s 
Statute on quality of working time.  Specifically, the working week was limited to 37 
hours, with only 35 hours per week allowed between June and September and firms 
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and worker representatives allowed to negotiate the distribution of the missing hours 
during the rest of the year.  It also guaranteed flexible entry and exit times and 24 
vacation days, in addition to three extra days paid leave for personal needs and two 
extra days paid leave prior to Christmas and New Year’s.  In addition, the collective 
agreement guaranteed overtime pay equal to the category established in the collective 
agreement or rest time of 1.25 hours for every overtime hour.  Therefore, overall the 
SPM firm collective agreement provided more opportunities for improving combination 
security than the SPL firm collective agreement.   
The non-daily press collective agreement’s broad number of topics concerning working 
time meant that the SPM firm was legally constrained to balance some types of flexible 
working time with combination security for the video editing jobs hired through ALMP 
internships.  In addition, the SPM firm also introduced some of its own policies to 
further facilitate a flexicurity balance through the organization of its employees.  Within 
the SPM firm, the work week was set according to the collective agreement fixed at 37 
hours, aside from June to September, which was set at 35 hours.  All workers were also 
provided with flexible entry and exit times, as well as overtime pay and/or rest time.  
Indeed, given these regulatory features, the SPM firm’s collective agreement 
discouraged overtime and instead chose to reorganize its employees to accommodate 
peak periods in productivity.  
Really little, the frequency of [the working day] does not change much. When we 
see that there is a team that has been putting in significant overtime, we try to 
reinforce that team with extra people, because otherwise, we could not do it. 
Finance/HR director SPM firm, 2016 
 
The SPM firm also established its own firm policies to facilitate combination security for 
the video editing jobs recruited through ALMP internships.  This included enabling 
individuals to change working days and work from home to enhance opportunities for 
WLB.   
Well, in [the SPM firm], for example in my department [video editing], and I think 
it is the same in other departments, I prefer that my, the members of my team if 
any day they want to stay to work at home, any day they have to leave early 
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because they need to pick up their child, for whatever reason, they do. For me, I 
think productivity depends a lot on happiness, right? In [the SPM firm] I think we 
count on that, the flexible time. Hey well look if ... you cannot work on a Friday 
and you want to change it for Saturday, or whatever, or ... there is no problem in 
the end.  For us what is important is that people are well, and that this is 
reflected in the productivity of the company. 
Finance/HR director, SPM firm, 2016 
 
Therefore, while some of the opportunities for combination security are clearly enabled 
through the SPM firm’s collective agreement, additional formal and informal firm 
policies also appear to be embedded within the organization of the SPM firm so as to 
enhance employer discretion over combination security.  In summary, a balanced 
outcome of working time quality was found for the video editing jobs hired through 
ALMP internships.  This was concluded given the opportunities for balanced win-win 
pay-offs where length, scheduling and distribution of working time benefited both the 
SPM firm, as well as the current video editing jobs, thus enhancing working time 
flexibility and combination security.  The SPM firm also relied more than the SPL and 
Irish ICT firms on organizing its workers around not only the working time restrictions of 
its collective agreement, but also its own combination security initiatives.  This suggests 
particular constraints can be beneficial for the SPM firm’s organization of its workers, as 
well as may provide justification for further firm level policies in this area.  
Similar to the ICT collective agreement, the SPS firm’s district retail collective agreement 
(2014-2015) makes limited reference to working time, with the collective agreement 
skewed towards repeating the Worker’s Statute.  Improvements include providing for 
31 vacation days, 15 of which must be taken between June and September. In addition, 
compensated overtime is provided through rest or pecuniary means, defined as 75% of 
hourly earnings, with Sundays, holidays or later night shifts (after 10pm) set at 150% of 
hourly earnings.  Despite the limited attention the SPS firm’s district collective 
agreement gives to working time quality, a potential balance could be provided through 
rest time and overtime or working time flexibility and combination security.  However, 
this may vary in actual practice. 
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For the current IT support job recruited through ALMP internships, as well as for other 
employees, the SPS firm had a 40 hour working week, the maximum established by the 
Worker’s Statute.  Combination security was provided through informal firm policy 
which permitted discretion when attending to personal needs, as well as provided for 
compensation through pay or rest time.  However, overtime was not a consistent 
feature of the current IT support job, with scarce weekly overtime and no weekend 
overtime.  While the current IT support job tasks provided customer support for specific 
software, work was rarely extended beyond the 9 hour work day.  Therefore, while the 
collective agreement facilitates opportunities for combination security and flexible 
working time for the current IT support job, in practice it does not appear that this 
combination is used by the SPS firm.  Therefore, a balanced outcome for flexible and 
secure jobs on the working time quality dimension is not founded for the current IT 
support job recruited through ALMP internships. 
Unlike the SPL firm, given that the initial IT support job was via an internal internship 
contract, the IT job fell under the same collective agreement as the SPS firm’s 
permanent employees.  However, the quality of working time did not change between 
the two contract types for the IT support job.  Consequently, the outcome for the initial 
IT support job in terms of working time quality and combination security was the same 
as the current IT support job. 
 
Skills and Discretion 
Skills and discretion refer to the skills required in a job and the level of autonomy 
afforded to the worker. Increased discretion is often found to be directly linked to high 
skilled occupations due to workers needing to have the capability to understand labor 
processes to make decisions related to their work tasks, thus the two are explicitly 
related (Eurofound 2012a).   One of the main ways firms can improve employee skills 
and discretion is through training and life-long learning which has direct implications for 
improvements in balancing employment security with functional flexibility.   
Irish ICT firms 
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The pervasiveness of technological change in the ICT sector and its growing importance 
within Ireland means that it increasingly depends on skilled workers. Unfortunately, 
limited data on training in Irish firms is available.  However, between 1999 and 2005 
Ireland had the highest increase among the EU-25 in its overall percent spent on labor 
costs, rising from 1.4% to 1.9% of GDP (CEDEFOP 2010).   While this suggests training 
increases, it says little about the distribution of this training by sector, firm size or 
training in practice within Irish firms.   As noted in Chapter 4, Ireland’s continuous 
vocational training  system remains relatively fragmented with funding for continuous 
training largely derived from  state funding bodies or the Irish Employer’s association 
public-private program Skillnets.  As noted in Chapter 5, Ireland’s ICT sector is also 
coupled by a skills shortage of high-skilled tech workers within some ICT firms.  Irish 
statutes on continuous training within firms is largely absent; even with issues such as 
the right to training leave left to employer’s discretion.  Thus, any opportunities for 
continuous training to enhance flexicurity balances for skills and discretion would be 
expected to largely result from firm policy and practice. 
Within the IRM firm, training policies to enhance skills and discretion were fairly limited 
for the current system’s administrator job recruited through the ALMP internship 
scheme.  While the ALMP internship scheme facilitated entry into a permanent job, 
formal training from the initialization of the ALMP internship to the time of the 
interview (almost three years) had consisted of only two short-term networking 
courses.  Indeed, the IRM firm asserted it did not have a great deal of time to invest in 
training given its position as a ‘busy, fast paced’ firm and consequently they expected 
individuals to ‘take ownership for their own learning as well.’ 
We set aside a certain amount of money for training. There is a certain amount 
of technology conferences, the guys will come here and request when they come 
up. There are other programs we would run for other groups of people who want 
to develop their competence across a group of people and beyond that it is more 
if the employee is interested in something and agrees with their manager, we’ll 
support it. 
 Human Resource Director, IRM firm, 2016 
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Despite this training fund, the system’s administrator job recruited through ALMP 
internships was entry-level and low-skilled with limited opportunity for collaborative 
learning and training primarily based on informal job shadowing guided by a mentor 
and outside a team based environment.  This lack of skill enhancement through formal 
and informal training opportunities had knock-on effects for discretion as well.  While 
the IRM firm permitted the management of day-to-day tasks, there appeared to be a 
lack of trust in the former ALMP intern’s decision making and problem solving 
capabilities. 
Prior to November I was basically the only person in my department. I was a one 
man team if you like and I mean a lot of the proposals I have put forward they 
didn’t really get taken on board and then we took on a new guy and whenever he 
came through he sort of reviewed the suggestions that I had made and the 
majority got put through on the recommendation of somebody else so I mean 
think that could be anything. That could be purely my performance or it could be 
the internship thing. Yeah I suppose as far as you know I would say my work 
carries more weight now after a couple of years. I think that is more that I have 
proven that I know the systems better than anyone else. At the same time, I think 
if it was just my word I don’t think you would get the full back of the parties I 
suppose.  
 Former ALMP intern, IRM firm System’s Administrator, 2016 
The lack of a high degree of training for the current system’s administrator job meant 
limited high level skill development which in turn inhibited the ability of the individual 
to take on a wide range of tasks and skills.  Therefore, opportunities for functional 
flexibility were absent. The ALMP intern also lacked a formal post-secondary level 
qualification.  Consequently, this lack of qualification combined with limited skill 
development meant employability was not significantly enhanced, particularly to access 
jobs in the high-skilled ICT sector.  Therefore, employment security was not a feature of 
the current system’s administrator job.  Indeed, the IRM firm asserted that individuals 
lacking a third level qualification would generally not be employable in the firm. 
I mean we would always look at experience but you would look at education. I 
mean even for commercial roles, you look at experience and as long as you went 
back as long as they had third level qualification they would make it through but 
if they didn’t have third level qualification, they would probably be put in the bin 
pile. 
 Human Resource Director, IRM firm, 2016 
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This supports the finding that graduate qualifications are valued more than work 
experience and thus the lack of a graduate qualification results in barriers for work-to-
work transitions.  While existing research has found that larger firms and firms with 
higher proportions of highly educated workers are more likely to provide training (Lynch 
and Black 1995; Castany 2008), it also has found that employer sponsored training is 
highly selective with those with higher skills and educational qualifications more likely 
to participate in training (Lynch 1994; OECD 1999; O’Connell 2002).  Therefore, despite 
evidence of high degrees of training among other jobs within the firm, the ALMP 
internship appears to be used to recruit for jobs that require lower levels of training.  
This questions the extent to which ALMPs are actually contributing to overall upskilling 
within the IRM firm.  Overall, the absence of employment security and functional 
flexibility within the system’s administrator job does not provide any opportunity for 
flexicurity balances so as to improve skills and discretion.   
In terms of the initial job, no large differences were found in the degree of initial versus 
current training offered through the job.  Given the high levels of external numerical 
flexibility provided for both permanent and temporary contracts in Ireland, severance 
costs and possibilities for redundancy did not vary by contract type.  The degree of 
training offered to improve skills and discretion did not change significantly between 
the initial and current system’s administrator job, therefore firm policies to consistently 
enhance employability were unfounded in the initial job.  As already argued the lack of 
a third level qualification further compromises the employability. Therefore, this leads 
to the conclusion that for the initial job, a high degree of numerical flexibility existed 
along with lower levels of employment security, thus not providing possibilities for a 
flexicurity balance for the skills and discretion job.   
Within the IRS firm, training policies to develop skills and discretion were a consistent 
feature of the current sales, marketing and technical support and web designer jobs 
recruited through ALMP internships.  As a small firm, the IRS firm placed more emphasis 
on training policies that consisted of on-the-job learning and self-directed-learning with 
extensive opportunities for collaborative learning, given the relatively flat structure and 
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the informal learning environment of the IRS firm.  This high degree of skill 
development was coupled with high levels of discretion. 
Both current marketing and technical support and web designer jobs involved high 
levels of autonomous decision making in their everyday tasks and required the ability to 
take on a wide range of tasks.  Indeed, the current sales, marketing and technical 
support job had a relatively high level of autonomy.   
Umm…9 out of 10 [for autonomy in my job]. Yeah. [Tim] is not the very 
autocratic kind of boss. He’s laissez-faire and the two of us have very similar 
personalities so I think he lets me get on with what I like most of the time. 
Former ALMP Intern 1, IRS firm Sales, Marketing and Technical support, 2016 
 
While all of the individuals recruited through ALMP internships had third level 
qualifications, the managing director asserted that while he valued third level 
qualifications, he also valued individuals that could manage a range of tasks and were 
not ‘pigeon holed’ into one area of expertise.  This reflects the high value the IRS firm 
placed on functional flexibility, not only within the current jobs recruited through 
ALMPs, all of the IRS firm’s jobs.  Overall, within the IRS firm, high degrees of functional 
flexibility can be observed, given that high levels of informal training enabled the IRS 
firm to more easily shift workers between functions and work areas.  Functional 
flexibility was balanced with enhancements in employment security for the jobs, with 
increased employability provided through the high degree of in-work training and skill 
development. Therefore, a win-win pay off that increases functional flexibility and 
employment security for a higher degree of skills and discretion within the current jobs 
recruited through ALMPs is found within the IRS firm.  
Spanish ICT firms 
Between 2005 and 2010, the percentage of Spanish firms participating in continuous 
vocational training rose significantly from 47% to 75% (Eurostat 2014d), well above the 
EU-28 average of 66%.  Interestingly, one of the largest increases was among small 
firms, increasing from 43% to 72% between 2005 and 2010, above the EU-28 average 
for small firms of 63% (Eurostat 2014e).     
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 However, as already observed in Chapter 4 and 5, Spanish firms tend to invest in 
mandatory workplace training and collective agreements tend to narrowly address 
training.  The pervasive influence of the Spanish state ‘crowds out’ training issues in the 
collective bargaining agenda.   Social partners also recognize other venues for 
involvement through the state supported continuous training and sectoral training 
funds (Ibsen and Mailand 2009).  This lack of strong institutions to support diverse types 
of firm training is further hindered by the bureaucracy to access state training funds and 
the particular courses on offer, which are often not fitting to firms production needs. 
Therefore, in the absence of strong institutional training supports, enhancements in 
skills and discretion within the Spanish ICT firms would be expected to be primarily 
developed through formal and informal firm training policy. 
To recap from Chapter 4, the Spanish Worker’s Statute gives permission for workers to 
adapt work schedules for accredited academic and professional training and 
examinations, as well as provides for firms to fund training when firms upgrade 
occupational responsibilities and tasks.  In addition, all firms must provide 20 hours 
annual paid leave for continuous professional training, which is linked to the 
occupational tasks developed through a firm or collective agreement training plan. All of 
these minimal rights to training are explicitly stated to be provided through collective 
bargaining and/or a firm level training plan, thus illustrating the extent to which the 
Spanish state encourages the institutionalization of training through collective 
bargaining.   
The SPL firm’s ICT collective agreement provided almost no training clauses to enhance 
skills and discretion for the current talent acquisition job recruited through ALMPs.   
Exceptions are clauses to for annual training fund (€218.10) for each employee and the 
work council’s ability to assess the quality of training centres and any internal training.  
While the SPL firm has a work council, as was already argued in Chapter 4, the work 
council plays a limited role in training.  This further illustrates the point that while 
institutional supports exist to enhance training in Spain they remain weak in their ability 
to articulate and influence job quality issues such as training at the firm level. 
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For the current talent acquisition job recruited through ALMPs, the SPL firm provided a 
number of professional and project development training workshops, as well as 
‘branding’ training.  While some training was restricted to particular professional 
‘families’ of occupations (i.e. Corporate, Data, etc.), training opportunities were 
consistently a feature of the current talent acquisition job.  In addition, to the annual 
training fund of €218.10 guaranteed through the ICT collective agreement, the SPL firm 
provided a co-financing scheme of 700 euros per year to voluntarily undertake certified 
training courses outside the working day related to the job (i.e. English, IT, etc.).  
Additional, training could also be requested by the SPL firm employees through their 
managers.  This high degree of diverse training was coupled with high degrees of 
discretion provided for in the current talent acquisition job’s day-to-day tasks. 
We are very autonomous in our work. They tell us the vacancies we have, and 
you organize your work, because you manage the whole cycle of the selection 
process. As a consequence we have a lot of responsibility for the decisions that 
we make. 
Former ALMP intern, SPL firm Talent Acquisition, 2016 
 
Overall, the ICT collective agreement and Worker’s Statute played little role in the 
development of training to enhance skills and discretion in the firm for the current 
talent acquisition job recruited through ALMPs.  Instead, in the absence of strong 
institutional supports, the SPL firm’s own training policies and organization of its 
workers play a more important role in explaining how the degree of skills and discretion 
are enhanced in practice.   Therefore, it can be concluded that within the SPL firm high 
degrees of functional flexibility exist which enable the firm to easily shift workers 
between functions with high levels of responsibility.  The high degree of in work training 
and formal training is also conducive to enhancing the employability for the current 
talent acquisition job given it guarantees the consistent acquisition of skills to improve 
job transitions and the certainty of remaining employed, even if not necessarily within 
the same firm.  Therefore, a win-win pay-off is found given the increases in functional 
flexibility and employment security for skills and discretion within the current talent 
acquisition job within the SPL firm.   
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For the initial talent acquisition job recruited through ALMPs, some training restrictions 
existed given the nature of the contract, temporary and externalized through TAW.  
Because the initial talent acquisition job was externalized it did not fall under the ICT 
collective agreement.  Therefore, access to the €218.10 annual training fund was 
prohibited.  In addition, the SPL firm did not give external workers the ability to request 
specific training from managers or use the annual €700 individual training fund.  
Therefore, the lack of access to training funds meant additional skill development for 
the job was limited, thus the job did not provide for as high levels to enhance 
employability for employment security.   The high level of external numerical flexibility 
through externalized temporary contracts also meant that hiring and firing was not as 
costly for the SPL firm during the initial talent acquisition job.  This limited training for 
the initial talent acquisition job supports existing research which asserts that firms tend 
to invest less in training temporary workers (Arulampam and Booth 1998).  However, 
ALMP internships are classified as a type of ALMP training which means they should 
provide access to more, not less training, particularly upon recruitment.  Therefore, this 
questions the extent to which ALMPs actually are providing a mechanism for upskilling 
within the firm, at least upon initial recruitment.  In summary, for the initial talent 
acquisition job recruited through ALMPs no flexicurity balance is found between 
numerical flexibility and employment security through the acquisition of increases in 
skills and discretion. 
The SPM firm’s national non-daily press collective agreement also provides few clauses 
on continuous training to enhance skills and discretion for the video editing jobs 
recruited through ALMPs.  Exceptions are paid courses to upskill a job in ‘new 
technology’ during or outside work and also a clause requiring a firm’s work council to 
be informed of firm training plans. Given the absence of a work council within the SPM 
firm, the last clause is not applicable.  Therefore, similar to the other Spanish ICT firms, 
training to enhance skills and discretion would be expected to originate from the SPM 
firm’s formal and informal training policies. 
For the current video editing jobs recruited through ALMP internships, the SPM firm 
adopted a mixture of on-the-job and formal training.  Training consisted of job 
shadowing with formal paid in-firm training courses (i.e. Microsoft Office, Office 
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Automation, English) and external (i.e. Master degrees) training opportunities.  Informal 
skill development was also achieved through the organization of the video editing jobs 
in teams which was conducive to a collaborative learning environment. The high level of 
skill development and collaborative learnings for the video editing jobs also was 
conducive to high degrees of discretion and autonomy in day to day tasks, including 
issues such as working schedules, more closely related to the quality of working time. 
These high degrees of training and discretion were not unique to just the video editing 
jobs, but were common features of all workers within the SPM firm.  Overall, a move in 
the direction of enhancing functional flexibility is found for the video editing jobs, given 
the high levels of informal and formal training embedded in collaborative learning 
environments which in turn are conducive to high levels of autonomy and skill 
development.  Employment security was also enhanced given the potential for the skills 
acquired in the video editing jobs to enhance future employability.  Therefore, a win-
win pay-off is found given the increases in functional flexibility and employment 
security for skills and discretion within the ALMP jobs within the SPM firm.   
The SPS firm’s district retail collective agreement does not provide any clauses on 
training.   Therefore, any training would be expected to be developed through SPS firm 
level policy and practice.  Similar to the IRS firm, as a small firm, the SPS firm relied 
primarily on informal training strategies derived through on-the-job learning and self-
directed-learning to enhance opportunities for skill development and increase 
discretion of work tasks.  Specifically, training for employees hired through ALMPs 
consisted primarily of job shadowing, with some external, formal training (i.e. customer 
services course).  The SPS firm’s relatively flat structure also promoted consistent 
collaborative learning processes among all occupations, thus resulting in new skills 
being acquired that could potentially be transferred between different work areas.   
Obviously working as a team is important in a small company because you also 
have to appreciate when someone has made a mistake, in a good and 
constructive way because if not, the person does not improve. If not, people do 
not grow. 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016  
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This method of training and learning was simultaneously linked to increased discretion 
in the IT support job, with the former ALMP intern having the autonomy to make 
decisions in day to day tasks.  Overall, the SPS firm is found to improve functional 
flexibility for the IT support job, given its high levels of training which enabled the SPS 
firm to more easily shift employees between functions and work areas.  Employment 
security was also enhanced for the IT support job given the potentiality for the skills 
acquired in the job in the SPS firm to enhance employability.  Therefore, a win-win pay-
off is found given the increases in functional flexibility and employment security for 
skills and discretion within the current IT support job.  For the initial IT support job, 
informal and formal training did not vary between the initial and current job.  However, 
similar to the SPL firm, the IT support job’s temporary contract meant it was exposed to 
high levels of external numerical flexibility, through the lower severance costs for 
temporary contracts.  Therefore, a balance for skills and discretion is not found in the 
initial IT support job.   
 
Prospects and Internal Progression 
Prospects and internal progression are defined as the probability the job will continue in 
future years and one can advance (Eurofound 2012a).  While national legislation and 
collective agreements may indirectly impact prospects and internal progression 
opportunities (i.e. through national training systems, collective agreement pay 
structures, etc.), the firm is generally where prospects and internal progression 
initiatives are developed and put into practice.  Prospects and internal progression are 
also closely related to the skills and discretion dimension of job quality given that skill 
development and increased discretion may simultaneously lead to increased 
responsibilities, productivity and promotion opportunities. Therefore, possibilities for 
flexicurity balances for prospects and progression are closely linked to the job quality 
dimension skills and discretion.  Prospects and internal progression include firm 
decisions surrounding job security (i.e. quality of contract type and opportunities for 
advancement) as well as functional flexibility (i.e. transferability between jobs and 
tasks) and external numerical flexibility (i.e. the ease of hiring and firing and external 
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job-turnover).  Job security and external numerical flexibility would be expected to be 
inversely related given that opportunities for advancement within the firm would be 
hindered by high degrees of external numerical flexibility.  
The ICT sector is often recognized for its clear progression pathways and advancement 
prospects (Eurofound 2014).  However, opportunities for progression often vary by firm 
size and contract type.  Indeed, internal progression opportunities tend to be less 
formalized and more dependent on the acquisition of new tasks and responsibilities, as 
opposed to upward mobility by way of new job titles and salary increases within smaller 
firms.  As was seen in the previous job quality dimensions, particularly in Spain, contract 
type (i.e. permanent or temporary) also matters, given that opportunities for internal 
progression may be limited for workers exposed to more flexible working arrangements 
(Kalleberg 2003).  Therefore, different prospects and internal progression opportunities 
would be expected according to firm size and contract type. 
Irish ICT firms 
For the IRM firm’s current system’s administrator job recruited through ALMP 
internships, primarily informal policies for internal progression were evident.  The 
primary type of internal progression was through salary increases and job title changes.  
Indeed, at the time of the interview the IRM firm was developing progression pathways 
for its software development occupation through ‘career mapping’ to establish a clearer 
link between progression opportunities and the acquisition of specific skills and 
competencies.   
We try to do it [progress employees] in a number of ways. It is professional in 
terms of title and salary which is one angle. We also try to encourage individuals 
to take on other projects and grow their broader skill sets. It is not always about 
moving upwards. It can be about moving laterally. So it is not always about more 
money but we do get the question in this market particularly where people come 
and go well I am now a software developer, how to I become a senior software 
developer, how do I get more money? And just by having a well-defined career 
path you can sit down with somebody and you can go well these are the skills 
and competencies you need. This is what you would need to do. There is where 
you are now. This is what you would need to do… so that kind of work helps to 
facilitate that discussion. 
Human Resource Director, IRM firm, 2016 
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 As argued for the skills and discretion job quality dimension, the current system’s 
administrator job was relatively isolated from a team based environment with 
opportunities for skill development limited to primarily job shadowing of the manager.  
This strategy of organizing work also extended to prospects and internal progression 
opportunities with promotion opportunities dependent on the manager’s discretion.  
Initially, increased responsibilities in the job were ‘flagged’ by the manager which led to 
a salary increase accompanied by a job title change. This could be seen as a 
compensated trade-off where increases in functional flexibility, such as increased 
responsibilities and tasks, led to increased job security, or internal progression.  
However, on-going reviews for internal promotion were limited at the time of the 
interview due to the manager leaving the firm and not being replaced.   
It [the wage increase] was really just my response to the workload and my 
responsibility had increased and it was flagged by my previous manage, but he 
left 12-13 months ago and since then the salary stuff has just taken a back seat.  
Before it would have been my previous manager saying we want this for him. 
What you are giving him is not the standard rate that people in his position 
would normally get. Whereas at the moment now I requested a salary review 
and was prepared for it and they just sort of tell you this is what you are getting.  
Former ALMP Intern, System’s Administrator, IRM firm, 2016 
 
This perhaps reflects the lower value the IRM firm had for system’s administrator job 
within the overall skill mix of workers, as well as how the absence of a formal promotion 
process in the IRM firm directly impacts lower-skilled jobs with little autonomy and less 
opportunities for skill development.  Therefore, while internal progression opportunities 
were evident prior to the breakdown of the management structure , the current 
system’s administrator job was not found to offer balances of increases in functional 
flexibility and job security so as to enhance opportunities for prospects and internal 
progression.  
In terms of the initial system’s administrator job recruited via a temporary contract in 
the IRM firm, internal progression and prospects did not vary significantly.  However, 
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the IRM firm’s initial decision to use a temporary contract for 2 years and 4 months 
lengthened the progression ladder for promotion opportunities (i.e. transition from a 
temporary to a permanent job).  Creating an additional step on the ladder, further 
reflects the lower value of the job in the firms overall production strategy, particularly 
when considering the lower percentage of temporary workers within Ireland.  Indeed, 
the IRM firm decided to use a temporary contract to assess whether the former 
system’s administrator was ‘capable enough’ to be hired onto a permanent contract.  
The high degree of external numerical flexibility afforded to the temporary contract was 
also not compensated with increases in job security given the limited access to internal 
progression opportunities. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that for the initial job 
a high degree of numerical flexibility existed along with low levels of employment and 
job security, thus not providing possibilities for a flexicurity balance for prospects and 
internal progression.  
For the current marketing and technical support and web designer jobs in the IRS firm, 
prospects and internal progression primarily consisted of responsibility and salary 
increases.  The flat structure of the IRS firm meant upward internal progression was 
limited and internal progression pathways were informal.  However, the flatter 
structure also meant consistent and daily interactions between the workers and the 
managing director with ongoing reviews for promotions.   
The guy in here we hired [the former ALMP intern] later on, when he was hired 
he was hired on 22 grand and now he is on 30 grand. Now it’s not a big increase 
but he has moved up and was given some additional commemoration and based 
upon his weight overall in the company. 
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
 
Therefore, the current marketing and technical support and web designer jobs were 
both found to offer increases in functional flexibility and job security, particularly given 
the increases in responsibilities and tasks which enhanced opportunities for career 
prospects. Overall, a win-win pay-off is found given that functional flexibility and job 
security created advantages for the IRS firm to increase the amount and variety of tasks 
and responsibilities of the current jobs while also providing for enhancements in 
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employability.  In short- evidence was found for a flexicurity balance for the skills and 
discretion of both of the current jobs recruited through ALMPs. 
Unlike the IRM firm, for the initial marketing and technical support and web designer 
jobs the IRS firm did not recruit via temporary contracts.  Therefore, this meant that the 
progression ladder for these jobs was shorter when compared to the other Irish and 
Spanish ICT firms, thus contributing to fewer divisions among workers and a flatter 
management structure within the firm.  Thus, the IRS firm clearly uses ALMPs as a 
strategy to mitigate firm recruitment risks, while also providing for balanced outcomes 
for internal progression and career prospects upon recruitment from ALMPs.  
Spanish ICT firms 
The Spanish Worker’s Statute provides limited regulation on internal promotion and 
prospects.  It establishes that merit, work experience and qualifications must be taken 
into account for promotion opportunities and protects workers from discrimination for 
promotion opportunities.  Accordingly, it would be expected that internal promotion 
and prospect would be more common through collective agreements and formal or 
informal firm policy.   
The ICT collective agreement only provided for the limited enhancement of internal 
promotion or prospects, with one clause that simply reproduced the Spanish Worker’s 
Statute (2015).  Therefore, within the SPL firm, prospects and internal progression are 
largely established at the firm level.  For the current talent acquisition job recruited 
through ALMPs, highly developed and formal internal progression pathways were 
evident.  Within the ten professional families of the firm (i.e. Corporate, Project 
Developers, Data, etc.) each job was allocated a certain occupational level, ranging from 
1-7, 1 for entry-level jobs and 7 for executive directors.  Employees were assessed 
annually for promotion opportunities, with promotion based on the achievement of 
goals, including training and performance goals, established the previous year. 
Every year an internal evaluation is done by different project managers.  We also 
have a mentor there because it is good for them to be there to advise resolve any 
concerns we have for professional development and training. This is where other 
evaluations are also done, and it is decided if that person will be promoted, yes 
or no. With the mentor we set the individual training each year, which are taken 
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into account when the person is assessed [for promotion], and we set goals and 
design the career plan and the training that must be done to achieve those goals. 
HR Specialist, SPL firm, 2016 
 
The current talent acquisition job had been promoted from level 1 to level 2.  A bonus 
was also awarded, but this was in initial stages of the talent acquisition job when it was 
temporary and externalized through a TAW, and as argued in the section on earnings 
was used to compensate already low earnings.  Promotion was largely dependent on 
meeting the objectives set annually, undertaking increased responsibilities and complex 
tasks, acquiring additional skills through training, soft skills (i.e. attitude, motivation) 
and seniority.  Therefore, the current talent acquisition job was found to provide 
increases in functional flexibility through increases in training, responsibility and tasks 
undertaken which in turn contributed positively to job and employment security.  A 
win-win pay-off is found given the flexibility provide for the SPL firm to increase the 
workload and responsibilities among the current talent acquisition job which is balanced 
with internal promotion opportunities and increased employability in the wider labor 
market. 
For the initial talent acquisition job, some opportunities for internal progression, such 
as the financial bonus were used.  However, as already argued in the earnings section, 
this was used to increase already low base earnings.  Indeed, the SPL firm’s use of 
temporary contracts through a Temporary Agency over the course of two years and 
seven months increased the ladder towards a secure job.  Indeed, as was already 
argued, this flexible pathway also inhibited access to some types of training, thus 
mitigating some opportunities for internal progression.  Thus, similar to other job 
quality dimensions for the talent acquisition job, the SPL firm is characterized by a hiring 
strategy which initially perpetuates job insecurity and increases the propensity towards 
external numerical flexibility with contract quality playing a key role.  Again, this 
precarious pathway towards a permanent job suggests the SPL firm, at least initially, 
uses ALMP internships as a recruitment strategy to provide a readily available flexible 
workforce which can be adjusted to changes in market demand, as opposed to a 
strategy for upskilling.  Overall, the initial talent acquisition job was found to not 
 
 
176 
 
contribute to job security given the high degree of numerical flexibility provided 
through externalized temporary contracts.  
The SPM firm’s non-daily press collective agreement is unique, particularly in the 
Spanish context, in that it addresses prospects and internal progression extensively.  
This also includes specific reference to ensure equal access for internal progression to 
vacancies for temporary workers.  Specifically, the non-daily press collective agreement 
specifies that worker’s representatives must be informed of any firm vacancies and 
contracting models. All vacancies must also be published internally and specify the 
terms, conditions and area of occupational section in the collective agreement.  In 
addition, the most senior worker on a temporary contract in each section must be given 
preference to any vacancies that arise.  Promotions into a new job or substitution also 
require individuals to undergo an aptitude test.  Therefore, the non-daily press 
collective agreement, similar to other job quality dimensions, appears to provide 
particular capacity for the SPM firm to develop clear pathways for internal progression 
and prospects.  Consequently, the SPM firm would be expected to integrate the ICT 
collective agreement clauses into any of its own firm policies on internal progression 
and prospects.   
Within the current video editing jobs recruited through ALMPs, informal pathways for 
internal progression and prospects were evident.  For the current video editing jobs, the 
main types of promotions were shifts in job titles and salary increases, mainly 
determined through increases in responsibility and training undertaken.  Similar to the 
IRM firm, the SPM firm was in the process of developing a formal internal promotion 
strategy, given the rapid expansion of the firm size from a small to medium firm.  
Indeed, the SPM firm asserted that it had plans to continue expanding significantly in 
the next two years, and wanted individuals to perceive the firm as a place where they 
could have a career, while also mould to the firm culture.   
Every new person has to be trained.  We have to mold them to the company 
culture and the way we work.  We believe that one of our most attractive aspects 
is for individuals to feel they can make a career in [the SPM firm]. 
Finance/HR Director, SPM firm, 2016 
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Therefore, for the current video editing jobs recruited through ALMP internships an 
increase in functional flexibility was found given the increases in training and tasks 
undertaken which contributed positively towards enhancing job and employment 
security.  Therefore, a win-win pay off exists given the increased degrees of functional 
flexibility and job security provided for both the firm and the video editing jobs 
recruited through ALMPs . 
One of the initial recruitment strategies for video editing jobs was via a temporary 
internship contract.  While the non-daily press collective agreement provided for 
temporary workers to have equal access to new jobs that arose, the high level of 
external numerical flexibility linked to temporary contracts undermined this potential 
job security.  Indeed, though the initial video editing jobs were recruited for 
internalized, six month temporary internship contracts, the contracts still had a high 
degree of numerical flexibility given the ease of hiring and firing under this contract.  
Consequently, despite the shorter pathway towards a permanent position for the initial 
video editing jobs, this hiring strategy still has high degrees of numerical flexibility which 
is inversely related to low degrees of job security.  Thus, overall no balance of flexicurity 
is found for prospects and internal progression for the initial video editing job.  
The SPS firm district retail collective agreement provides limited clauses for prospects 
and internal progression, with only one clause addressing accession via seniority within 
certain occupational categories. Therefore, any policies for prospects and internal 
progression would be expected to originate from formal or informal firm policy. 
Within the SPS firm, opportunities for prospects and internal progression were 
relatively informal.  For the current IT support job, opportunities for internal 
progression and prospects consisted of increases in salary and responsibility as well as 
and expansion of the range of tasks undertaken.  This was directly linked to the small 
firm size where the flatter structure meant that consistent and frequent interactions 
between managers resulted in ongoing reviews for promotion. The flatter structure of 
the SPS firm also meant that vertical progression was limited and consequently 
progression was linked to ‘how one worked’ and also training opportunities undertaken.   
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Then you can promote yourself through the level and type of work you do. I 
mean if [the former intern], for example, now he’s starting a course.  Now he's 
doing a communication course. If suddenly tomorrow he starts taking more 
courses, obviously he is considered for promotion. This is promoted professionally 
and economically because this has an impact, but apart from this it is difficult to 
move into a management position because for this to happen the manager 
would have to leave or we would have to let him go. 
 Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016 
 
Overall, the current IT support job was determined to have higher degrees of functional 
flexibility due to increases in training and tasks undertaken, which simultaneously 
enhanced opportunities for job and employment security given the increases provided 
for employability.  Similar to the SPM firm, a possible win-win pay off exists for both the 
IT support job and the SPS firm to balance functional flexibility and employment and job 
security to provide for good quality jobs for prospects ad internal progression. 
Similar to the IRM, SPL, and SPM firms, the initial IT support job was recruited via a 
temporary contract for one year, thus increasing the progression route towards a 
permanent contract.   Indeed, the contract quality mattered for the initial IT support job 
as it provided for increases in external numerical flexibility and consequently decreases 
in job security.  Consequently, overall the initial IT support job is determined to have 
high levels of external numerical flexibility coupled with low levels of job security, which 
results in a lack of a balanced flexicurity outcome for prospects and internal 
progression.   
Table 13:  Summary of Flexible and Secure Jobs in ICT firms in Ireland and 
Spain 
 IRS 
firm 
IRM firm SPS firm SPM firm SPL firm 
Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm  Temp Perm Temp Perm 
Earnings WF  WF, 
ENF 
WF ENF, 
WF 
WF & 
IS 
ENF, 
WF 
WF  & 
IS 
ENF,WF WF 
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Working Time 
Quality 
WTF 
 
WTF WTF - - - WTF 
& CS 
WTF WTF 
Skills and 
Discretion 
FF & 
ES 
- - ENF FF 
&ES 
- FF & 
ES 
ENF FF 
&ES 
Prospects/ 
Internal 
Progression 
FF & 
JS 
- ENF ENF ENF 
&JS 
ENF ENF & 
JS 
ENF  ENF 
& JS 
 
*ENF (external numerical flexibility), IS (income security), ES (employment security), FF 
(functional flexibility), WTF (working time flexibility), CS (combination security) 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, the SPM firm performed better than the other Spanish and Irish ICT firms in 
terms of contributing more to the development of flexicurity balances for current job 
quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  Undoubtedly, this is attributed to the 
beneficial constraints provided through the SPM firm’s collective agreement which 
provided a broad scope for the inclusion and regulation of all of the job quality 
dimensions.  However, the other ICT firms also demonstrated evidence for flexicurity 
balances, in spite of an absence of or weak collective agreements.  Unsurprisingly, 
evidence was not found for flexicurity balances for the ICT firms’ initial jobs recruited 
through ALMPs, largely given the highly flexible forms of working conditions that often 
accompany temporary contracts.  However, the examination of initial contracts is useful 
as it sheds light on how the ICT firms used ALMP internships to recruit labor through the 
adoption of differing hiring trajectories. 
In terms of earnings, the Irish ICT sector was found to have a much higher level of 
average earnings within the sector, and lower wage penalties for individuals below 30 
years old.  In addition, the Irish national minimum wage provided for a much higher 
wage floor than the Spanish national minimum wage.  Spanish legislation also enabled 
firms to pay rates below the minimum wage rates through the IPREM wage and through 
internship contracts.  Thus, overall it was argued that the Spanish national legislation 
did not provide for high wage floors, thus stressing the importance of collective 
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agreements to mitigate downward pressures on wages.  In contrast, Ireland’s earnings 
were argued to be highly exposed to fluctuations in firm production needs and market 
demand.  Indeed, an anomaly was found among the level of earnings between the IRS 
and IRM firms, with relatively little variation despite the clear differences in firm size. 
In terms of flexicurity balances for earnings, only two of the Spanish ICT firms, the SPS 
firm and the SPM firms, were found to couple wage flexibility with income security for 
the current jobs recruited through ALMP internships.  Apparent was the influence of 
both firm’s collective agreements to provide a framework for the structure of earnings, 
as well as the guaranteed income supplements for the jobs recruited through ALMPs.  In 
practice, the SPS firm increased earnings beyond the collective agreement demarcations 
(i.e. beyond the education demarcations) so as to adapt to the firm’s particular 
geographic constraints and increase employee performance.  Within the SPM firm, 
wage flexibility was primarily facilitated through the SPM collective agreement which 
provided for overtime compensation, as well as wage flexibility according to educational 
qualifications.    
For the initial jobs recruited through ALMPs, none of the ICT firms were found to 
provide for balances of wage flexibility and income security. Within Ireland this was 
largely due to the lack of strong institutional constraints beyond the minimum wage on 
income security among the jobs recruited through ALMPs, thus rendering them highly 
dependent on the firm production and market demands.  In contrast, within the Spanish 
ICT firms, Spanish legislation provides for high levels of external numerical flexibility for 
temporary contracts thus mitigating possibilities for income security for the initial job 
earnings recruited through ALMP internships. 
For working time quality, only the SPM firm was found to balance working time 
flexibility with combination security for the current jobs recruited through ALMP 
internships.  This was largely achieved by a combination of both the SPM firm collective 
agreement regulations and firm level policies to redistribute working time according to 
firm and employee discretion. While the SPS firm also provided for balanced outcomes 
for working time flexibility and combination security primarily through its collective 
agreement, in practice this balance was not used in the current job recruited through 
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ALMP internships.  This confirms Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009) assertion that measuring 
flexicurity balances achieved through collective bargaining may not necessarily reflect 
flexicurity outcomes in practice within the firm.  
Within the IRM, IRS and SPL firms, overtime was a frequent feature, but no constraints 
were provided by collective agreements or firm level policies to increase employer 
discretion so as to provide a balance between combination and working time flexibility 
for the current jobs recruited through ALMP internships.  Similar to earnings, none of 
the initial temporary jobs recruited through ALMP internships among the Spanish and 
Irish ICT firms featured flexicurity balances for working time quality, largely related to 
the lack of variation between working time quality in the temporary jobs versus the 
permanent jobs.  
For the current jobs recruited through ALMP internships, evidence of skills and 
discretion that represented a move in the direction of balancing employment security 
with functional flexibility was found within all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, except 
the IRM firm. For the IRM firm, formal training was limited, with learning individualized 
and collaborative learning through teamwork absent and low levels of individual 
discretion in daily tasks.  Within the IRS, SPS, SPM and SPL firms, formal and informal 
firm training policies were the primary contributors to balanced outcomes of functional 
flexibility and employment security.  This was not surprising given the limited clauses in 
the Spanish collective agreements, and the relatively fragmented and weak continuing 
training institutions within both Ireland and Spain.  Therefore, flexicurity balances for 
skills and discretion among the current jobs recruited through ALMP internships were 
increasingly related to firm specific training and the organization of labor within the IRS, 
SPS, SPM and SPL firms.  Within the IRM firm, no variation was found for skills and 
discretion between the current and initial job recruited through ALMP internships.  
Among the SPS, SPM and SPL firms the initial temporary jobs recruited through ALMP 
internships restricted some training for these jobs (in the SPL firm) and all of the initial 
jobs were exposed to high levels of external numerical flexibility thus limiting 
employment security.  
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Finally, a balance of functional flexibility and job quality for prospects and internal 
progression were found for all of the current jobs recruited through ALMP internships, 
with the exception of the IRM firm. Given the close link between skills and discretion 
and prospects and internal progression, this identical outcome is not surprising.  Similar 
to the skills and discretion job quality dimension, balances for prospects and internal 
progression were mainly attributed to formal and informal firm level policies.  Only the 
SPL firm had a detailed and formal promotion process for the job recruited through 
ALMPs, with clear vertical and horizontal pathways for progression, whereas the SPS, 
IRS, and SPM firms had relatively informal progression pathways for the jobs recruited 
through ALMPs.   
Through an examination of initial internal progression and prospects among the jobs 
recruited through ALMPs, distinct hiring patterns began to emerge, providing further 
insight into how the Spanish and Irish ICT firms used ALMPs for recruitment.  Within all 
but the IRS firm, the Spanish and Irish ICT firms chose to add an additional step to the 
progression ladder by initially using a temporary contract.  For the IRM firm, this hiring 
strategy was used to monitor and assess whether the former ALMP intern was capable 
to perform the tasks of the job, whereas in the SPL firm this hiring strategy was used to 
cut costs through externalized and temporary contracts.  Both the SPL and IRM firms 
used lengthy progression ladders through temporary contracts following the ALMP 
internship period, from two years four months (IRM firm) to two years seven months 
(SPL firm). 
Within Chapter 5, it was argued that the IRM and SPL firms only used ALMP internships 
as a recruitment strategy for mid to lower level jobs with other more direct hiring 
strategies used for higher level technical jobs.  The similar lengthy initial internal 
progression pathways adopted by both these firms through highly flexible contracts, 
thus supports the conclusion that the IRM and SPL firms use ALMPs as a readily 
available source of flexible supply of labor among certain occupational segments.  Thus, 
it can be said that the jobs recruited through ALMPs occupy a peripheral position at the 
point of entry in the IRM and SPL firms. 
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In comparison, while temporary contracts (i.e. internship contracts) were also used by 
the SPS and SPM firms to initially  hire individuals through ALMPs,  progression ladders 
on temporary contracts were shorter following the internship period, from one year 
(the SPS firm) to six months (the SPM firm).  As argued in Chapter 5, this recruitment 
pathway was also not used for a particular occupational segment of the firms’ 
workforce, but rather was used for all new workers.  Therefore, while these pathways 
through temporary contracts still have high levels of external numerical flexibility; the 
pathways are less lengthy not segmented by occupation.  This suggests that SPS and 
SPM firms may use ALMPs as a strategy that initially reduces hiring risks, but also 
enables the expansion of these firms’ labor forces.  This same conclusion could be 
applied to the IRS firm, given that the ALMP internship also enabled a reduction in 
hiring risks, and the expansion of the firm. 
These divergent pathways among the two groups of firms draw attention to the 
literature on the flexible firms, where numerical and functional flexibility may lead to 
organizational divisions between organizational insiders and outsiders (Kalleberg 2003).  
It also suggests, particularly in the cases of the SPL firm, that ‘good’ job quality 
outcomes may indeed still be achieved for some dimensions despite rather precarious 
pathways towards these jobs. These organizational features of the ICT firms will be 
examined further in Chapter 7. 
Overall, this chapter has illustrated that broad collective agreements may improve job 
quality outcomes through ALMPs among the ICT firms, particularly in job quality 
dimensions such as earnings and working time quality.  In contrast, ICT firms lacking 
collective agreements or with weak collective agreements, were not as heavily 
constrained by these regulatory mechanisms and consequently any balances of 
flexicurity for ‘good’ job quality outcomes through ALMPs were determined primarily by 
firm production needs and market demands.  Therefore, while collective agreements 
clearly provide beneficial constraints for firm’s to enhance particular job quality 
dimensions, for the majority of the ICT firms, balances of flexicurity did not result from 
collective agreements, but rather from market and firm driven production strategies.  
Indeed, when examining the particular pathways the ICT firms adopted, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that the IRM and SPL firms are using ALMP internships to initially 
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enhance flexibility among some occupational segments of their labor force.  This may 
suggest that ALMP internships are being used as a flexible source of labor as opposed to 
a mechanism of recruitment which aims to upskill.   Chapter 7 aims to extend the 
analysis beyond the ICT firm’s job quality outcome dimensions to more clearly 
understand how these initial ALMP recruitment pathways manifested in practice within 
the ICT firms and why these particular recruitment pathways were adopted in the IRM 
and SPL firms, but not in the IRS, SPS and SPM firms.   
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Chapter 7:  Segmented and Extended 
Entry Tournaments through ALMPs 
 
Chapter 6 argued that while collective agreements do provide some beneficial 
constraints for shaping current job quality outcomes (i.e. particularly for earnings and 
working time quality), the majority of the ICT firms’ job quality outcomes result from 
firm level production strategies and policies.  Through an analysis of initial job quality 
outcomes, as well as the job quality dimension internal progression and prospects, the 
previous chapter argued that the pathways for recruitment were lengthier among the 
IRM and SPL firms, thus providing a readily available supply of flexible labor among 
certain occupational segments within these firms.  Indeed, closely mirroring Chapter 5, 
a distinction was made between the IRM and SPL firms and the IRS, SPS and SPM firms.  
This chapter aims to add an additional layer of analysis to Chapter 5 and 6,  by 
examining these similar recruitment and training strategies among these two groups of 
Spanish and Irish ICT firms, while also considering the dynamics of the internal 
recruitment pathways or ‘entry tournaments.’  Specifically, this chapter aims to explain 
why these entry tournaments were adopted using ALMP internships and the extent to 
which the intersection of institutions and firm level features explains the two groups of 
ICT firms’ distinct pathways.   
First, the segmented and extended entry tournaments among the IRM and SPL firms 
and the unsegmented and shorter entry tournaments among the SPM, SPS and IRS firms 
are examined.  Second, the intersection of Ireland and Spain’s industrial relations 
systems and education and training systems are examined for their impact on the 
specific entry tournaments adopted among the two groups of Irish and Spanish ICT 
firms. Last, three firm level features are argued to occupy increased importance in the 
context of uncoordinated and fragmented national Spanish and Irish institutions, 
particularly for explaining the segmented and extended entry tournaments adopted 
among the SPL and IRM firms and the unsegmented and shorter entry tournaments 
adopted among the SPM, SPS and IRS firms.    
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Internal Entry Tournaments 
In the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, ALMP internships were used as a flexible recruitment 
strategy to prolong the probation period and to develop internal extended ‘entry 
tournaments’ (Marsden 2010) to recruit new labor market entrants.  Specific to the ICT 
sector is the idea that less institutionally structured and more project-based forms of 
employment developed in response to industry’s need to quickly respond to changing 
technology, growing needs of production, and service provision (Ibid).  This argument 
points to the concept of extended ‘entry tournaments’, where individuals particularly in 
the beginning of their careers, are faced with few pre-established structured entry 
channels.  These channels are characterised by competition for occupations among 
many firms over a much longer time period during which these individuals must acquire 
skills and develop their necessary networks to shift upwards in terms of job quality.  As 
argued in Chapter 6, these extended entry tournaments are also evident internally in 
the recruitment behaviour of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms with market and firm-
driven production strategies often contributing to varying degrees and durations of 
flexibility, with evidence of flexible work practices being adopted among particular 
segments of the workforce in some of the ICT firm case studies while not in others.  
Recent research within Ireland suggests that within the ICT sector, a sector generally 
noted for its ‘good’ jobs, there are two types of work experiences emerging: 1) Those of 
experienced participants, and 2) New entrants (Wickham and Boback 2016).  Wickham 
and Boback (ibid) argue that experienced workers have more career progression 
opportunities, higher salaries, and more contract security, given their increased 
bargaining power on the market.  In contrast, new entrants have decreased bargaining 
power, lower career progression opportunities, and less contract security.   In addition, 
new entrants are also increasingly expected to have particular soft skills in addition to 
high level technical abilities (Marks and Scholarios 2008).  Indeed, Chillas et al. (2015) 
found that internships among young graduates increasingly are used by ICT firms to 
assess candidates’ soft skills.   
Thus, for young workers entering the ICT sector with little work experience, a lengthier 
and ever shifting employment trajectory may be expected.  ALMP internships and other 
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demand side ALMPs can enable entrance into a firm, particularly in cases where other 
barriers (i.e. diplomas/degrees, long-term unemployed, etc.) would limit access.  
However, as was found in Chapter 6, a young person’s entrance to employment through 
an ALMP internship automatically extends the employment trajectory and can delay 
increases in earnings, career progression, training and opportunities for work life 
balance.  Therefore, all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms can be said to have extended 
the entry tournaments for ALMP participants, despite the varying durations.  However, 
Chapter 5 and 6 also argued that the trajectories of these entry tournaments vary by 
duration with ALMPs adopted for particular occupational segments in some of the Irish 
and Spanish ICT firms.  Thus, the following section aims to examine the underlying 
dynamics of these entry tournaments, as well as why segmented and lengthy entry 
tournaments were adopted among the IRM and SPL firms, but not the IRS, SPS and SPM 
firms.  
 
‘Slow’ and Unstructured Internal Entry Tournaments 
Within the SPL firm, the ALMP internship program was used as a recruitment strategy to 
extend the entry tournaments for young, new entrants into non-technical occupations, 
primarily within the corporate occupation family of the firm.  In total, the SPL firm 
recruited four ALMP participants through the ALMP internship program for the mid-
level non-technical jobs.  The entry tournaments used through ALMPs involved less 
structured and ‘slow’ career tracks (Mardsen 2010).  For the talent acquisition job a 
‘slow’ career track was used, one that consisted of a university internship, an ALMP 
internship, temporary contracts and internship contracts through a temporary agency 
and finally a permanent contract. This entry tournament lasted approximately three 
years.  Accordingly, ‘slow’ entry tournaments were adopted for the majority of new 
hires within the Human Resource Department. 
The truth is all of my colleagues passed through the same [process], we were 
interns, later we were outsourced [through a temp agency] and then the 
company internalized everyone. 
Former ALMP intern, Talent Acquisition, SPL firm 2016  
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Within the SPL firm this was a consistent recruitment model, one primarily used within 
HR occupations and for other mid-level non-technical jobs. In contrast, this was not 
used for the technical, upper-level occupations, even for individuals with limited work 
experience just entering the labor market.    
What we do mostly, because [the SPL firm] is an IT consulting firm, we contract 
many profiles of individuals who studied IT, medium and higher education 
diplomas and directly contract them from the first moment that the individuals 
finish their degree or courses and we directly offer them a permanent contract. 
There are a few cases in the corporate family, like in Human Resources, 
Marketing or Administration of personnel, finance- in these cases we maybe 
would offer something with SOC [the Public Employment Service]. 
HR Director, SPL firm, 2016 
 
Therefore, within the SPL firm, two strands of entry paths are evident:  1) High-skilled 
technical jobs, characterized by high degrees of security and structured internal career 
tracks and, 2) Mid/low-level non-technical jobs characterized by high degrees of 
flexibility and ‘slow,’ unstructured extended entry tournaments.  This first entry path for 
ICT professionals closely resembles firm based internal labor markets (ILM); 
characterized by a narrow range of entry paths and a clear career ladder (Marsden 
2010).  In contrast, the second extended entry tournament is associated with a diversity 
of career tracks and high levels of competition for occupational entry (Ibid).   Therefore, 
within the SPL firm, ALMP internships are argued to be used as a strategy to develop 
flexible and slow extended entry tournaments among a specific occupational segment 
of the firm’s workforce.  
The SPL firm was found to adopt a production strategy that placed high strategic value 
on particular skill mixes of workers, specifically high-skilled technical workers, a skill mix 
lacking in the Spanish labor market.  This meant that flexibility for workers with less 
importance and with easier access to available skills, such as in the area of Human 
Resources, was attained through utilizing more flexible types of work, such as (ALMP) 
internships, and outsourcing through temporary agencies.   
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In the IT sector, the profiles that finish their degree, prior to finishing their 
degree, the majority are already placed [in firms]. It is a market that moves a lot. 
There is a lot of demand and this is what it does. In our case, we directly contract 
them with a permanent contract because if we offer them a contract or 
agreement through SOC [Public Employment Service] or the university, 5 more 
companies will offer them a permanent contract. 
HR Specialist, SPL firm, 2016 
 
The lack of the supply of high-skilled technical labor and the strategic importance of 
these skills within the SPL firm also meant a great deal of Human Resources was 
devoted to retention strategies, including international recruitment and even poaching 
from other firms.  Thus, using more flexible entry tournaments, including through ALMP 
internships, for this segment of the work force was not an option given the strategic 
importance of these workers to the SPL firm production strategy and the risk of losing 
the workers to other ICT firms offering higher degrees of job security.   
Within the IRM firm, entry tournaments through ALMP internships were not as 
common, but when they used this recruitment strategy, similar to the SPL firm, it was 
used for a low-level non-technical occupation that was of less strategic value to the IRM 
firm’s overall production strategy.   In total, one individual participated and was 
recruited through the Irish ALMP internship.  The job recruited for through ALMPs did 
not require a post-secondary educational qualification and thus the low skill level of the 
job further devalued its importance for the IRM firm in its overall firm skill mix and 
production strategy.  Similar to the SPL firm, the entry tournament used through ALMPs 
was less structured, flexible, and ‘slow.’  It consisted of a six month ALMP internship 
followed by an approximately 2.5 year temporary contract.  As Chapter 6 found, this 
entry tournament represented an anomaly in the firms overall recruitment strategy for 
high-skilled technical jobs, characterized by ‘fast track,’ structured and more secure 
pathways. 
It is hugely difficult to recruit because most people that we were offering on the 
technical side would have two or three offers on the table together so they are all 
sort of looking at the base salary, they are looking at the benefits, and they can 
just train one up against the other and that’s what happens. It’s nuts stuff. 
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HR Director, IRM firm, 2016 
 
Because high level technical skills were less available in the labor market and were of 
strategic importance to the IRM firm’s production strategy, these jobs were also subject 
to high turnover and poaching.  Therefore, similar to the SPL firm, the IRM firm 
struggled to retain these workers and committed a great deal of resources towards 
recruitment, including internationally. 
Overall, the IRM and SPL firms appear to adopt medium road production strategies that 
utilize lengthy entry tournaments through ALMP internships as a way to achieve high 
degrees of flexibility among particular segments of the workforce.  The IRM and SPL 
firm’s reliance on high-skilled technical workers in their wider production strategies and 
the lack of supply of these workers in the labor market means the firms invest more in 
‘faster,’ secure and structured pathways for these jobs, than the more easily accessible, 
mid to low level skilled workers attained through ALMP internships.  Indeed,  Lepak and 
Snell (2002) assert that the ‘uniqueness’ of workers’ specialized skills in the labor 
market and the importance of these skills to the firm’s overall production strategy 
create strong incentives for commitment based HR practices to internalize employment 
and develop high job quality dimensions.  In contrast, workers of limited strategic value 
and uniqueness are more often outsourced or on atypical work contracts, thus fewer 
incentives exist for the firm to improve job quality for these workers.  Therefore, within 
the IRM and SPL firms, ALMP internships are used to facilitate flexible and segmented 
internal entry tournaments which are embedded in the particular production strategies 
of both the IRM and the SPL firms.  Thus, ALMP internships enable these firms to 
continue using medium-road production strategies for particular segments of the 
workforce. This suggests that these extended internal entry tournaments may have 
been adopted anyway in the absence of ALMP internships (i.e. deadweight).   
 
‘Fast’ and Structured Internal Entry Tournaments 
Within the SPS firm, the ALMP internship was used as a recruitment strategy to extend 
the entry tournament for a new entrant for an IT support job.  Different from the other 
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Spanish ICT firm case studies was the employer’s decision to select the ALMP internship 
with the obligation to hire the individual following the internship period.  This 
guaranteed further entitlements to particular employment subsidies to supplement 
training costs and social security reductions and subsidies upon hiring.  As already 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the SPS firm only utilized the ALMP internship once due to the 
difficulties surrounding the administration of the ALMP internship.  While the SPS firm 
used the ALMP internship to extend the entry tournament, the career track it used was 
‘faster’ and more structured given that it selected to use the hiring subsidy following 
the ALMP internship.  For the IT support job, the entry tournament consisted of a 
university internship, an ALMP internship, an internship contract and finally a 
permanent contract, lasting approximately two years. Slight variations of this entry 
tournament were used for all new recruitments, regardless of the skill mix, level or 
occupational area.  Therefore, unlike the IRM and the SPL firms, entry tournaments 
were not developed according to the uniqueness of the knowledge and specialized skills 
of the job.  Instead, all new employees experienced similar entry tournaments. 
Normally they [new employees] are contracted onto a temporary contract if they 
cannot take on an internship contract because they haven’t finished their studies 
or finished too long ago, we are used to having people on temporary contracts, 
maximum one year and then we move them to a permanent contract. 
 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016  
 
Thus, while these entry tournaments are still flexible, they appear more structured than 
those of the IRM and SPL firms. Unlike the SPL firm, the SPS firm also did not rely on 
temporary agency work as a component of its entry tournaments; something that the 
literature argues is more common in larger firms (De Kok, et al. 2011).   Through a mix 
of temporary contracts and employment incentives, the SPS firm was able to both 
mitigate the risk associated with hiring costs and establish a flexible, shorter and 
structured entry tournament.  The SPS firm also did not suffer the high-turnover of the 
SPL and IRM firms and thus the SPS firm’s entry tournaments used through ALMP 
internships were not developed in response to this high turn-over. 
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Ultimately, the SPS firm sought to attract and retain talent through this recruitment 
strategy.  Indeed, the SPS firm’s rural geographical location meant the supply of 
appropriate candidates was limited, as were the jobs limited for candidates living in this 
rural location.  The SPS firm perceived the mutual commitment between the firm and 
employee to invest and develop a career within the firm to be an important aspect of its 
production strategy.  The firm perceived the ‘mutual commitment’ on both sides in 
combination with its geographical location to be an enabling factor to retain human 
capital among its employees. 
In Barcelona I think we would have non-stop turnover, but here in a city of 
sixteen thousand inhabitants there is not a lot of work. So it is on both sides. On 
the one hand firms find it difficult to find workers and workers find it hard to find 
a job, so when you have more or less a job… we are also aware that for firms it is 
difficult to find a profile. So no, there is no rotation. Normally the workforce lasts 
a long time, with new generations [of workers] entering as well. 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016  
 
Another important factor that led to the development of the firm’s similar entry 
tournament among all of its workers and not just a particular segment of workers was 
the type of skill mixes it valued for its jobs.  As argued in Chapter 6, as a small firm, high 
levels of functional flexibility were valued among the jobs in the SPS firm, thus the jobs 
overall were less specialized and required multi-tasking between a wide range of 
projects and tasks.  Thus, functional flexibility was one production strategy the SPS firm 
used to enhance its resource efficiency. 
It is the fruit of the company that we are small and you have to have to adapt to 
do different things. If you do not, you don’t survive either. You cannot have one 
person for everything. 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 2016  
 
The more general skill mix required of the jobs, the flatter managerial structure, rural 
geographical location and low turn-over meant that SPS firm’s resources were not 
skewed towards the preservation of high-skilled technical occupations. Instead, 
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adopting flexible entry tournaments were driven by cost savings derived through 
temporary contracts and employment incentives.  Thus, the SPS firm’s entry 
tournament through ALMP internships was part of a production strategy used to 
mitigate the risk associated with hiring at the point of entry for all occupations.  This 
initial entry tournament then provided the ALMP internship participants access to 
obtaining work experience in a broad range of projects and tasks. 
Compared to the other Irish and Spanish ICT firms, the IRS firm entry tournaments used 
through ALMP internships involved structured and ‘fast’ career tracks.  While 
acknowledging the flexible working conditions provided through the ALMP internships, 
the IRS firm was also the only ICT firm case study that recruited directly onto a 
permanent contract following the ALMP internships.  For the marketing and technical 
support and web designer jobs, the ALMP entry tournaments ranged from six to nine 
months, with duration dependent on the production needs of the firm.  Similar to the 
SPS firm, this entry tournament was also adopted for all new recruitments, regardless of 
the knowledge and specialized skills of the job.  As argued in Chapter 5, the IRS firm 
adopted ALMPs as its primary recruitment strategy, which enabled the IRS firm to 
mitigate costs associated with training and to prolong the period to test individual 
performance.  While the IRS firm’s geographical location did not hinder access to 
qualified candidates, its ability to attract qualified ICT workers was inhibited given the 
lower levels of job security (i.e. earnings and progression) the firm could offer compared 
to other larger ICT firms.   
So a lot of the work that we would do, would be problem solving and it would 
take hours to fix, obviously a person with knowledge and training has the 
experience to do it quicker, whereas an intern might not be able to. And the 
journey of actually figuring that out is a journey that they learn and you know 
whether they go online using google and finding another solution, technical 
solution. It may take them eight hours, whereas the person who was trained 
would be able to do it in one hour but you know not with JobBridge. It is not on 
your time that they are slow, therefore you are not pressuring them to get it 
done and you know can create a learning environment rather than a pressuring 
environment. 
Managing Director, IRS firm, 2016 
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As a small firm with a relatively flat managerial structure, the IRS firm also valued a 
broader skill mix for its jobs.  Indeed, as found in Chapter 6, functional flexibility was 
valued among the SPS firm jobs and enhanced its resource efficiency.  Thus, the IRS 
firm’s production strategy centred less on achieving flexibility through fluctuating 
employment numbers, and more on increasing flexibility through the variety of tasks 
and activities undertaken by its employees.  Outsourcing and other types of atypical 
contracts, outside the ALMP and university internships, were not part of the IRS firm’s 
strategic production strategy.  Similar to the SPS firm, while attaining candidates with 
the right skill mix was valued; equally important was the development of good working 
relationships within the firm that led to commitment and mutual investment.   Indeed, 
this was reflected in the former ALMP intern’s relationship and commitment to the IRS 
firm. 
Basically what we are trying to do is put a company together. We all have a 
vested interested in it so that’s what, that’s our goal. 
Former ALMP Intern, Marketing and Technical Support, IRS firm, 2016 
 
Thus, the flatter managerial structure, low turnover and broader skill mixes required for 
the IRS firm jobs, resulted in an entry tournament that while flexible, was short in 
duration and oriented towards the recruitment of all new workers as opposed to 
segments of workers with less unique skills and strategic value.  The IRS firm did not 
skew flexible work patterns unfavourably towards one segment of the workforce (i.e. 
technical vs. non-technical or high-skilled vs. lower/medium-skilled).  Instead, the firm 
used ALMPs to develop cost-effective entry tournaments which mitigated risks 
associated with hiring and enabled internalizing ALMP participants following the 
internship.  
Within the last firm, the SPM firm, the ALMP internship program was used as a 
recruitment strategy to extend the entry tournament for young, new entrants for 
primarily video editing jobs. The career track was ’slower’ than the IRS firm, but ‘faster’ 
and more structured than the SPL and IRM firms.  The duration of the entry 
tournaments were approximately one year, through one of the two entry tournaments 
towards a permanent job: 1) a five month university internship followed by a six month 
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ALMP internship or, 2) a six month ALMP internship followed by a six month internship 
contract.   
I believe by law someone can do a student internship, then move on to this [the 
ALMP non-labor internship] in SOC, and even then an internship program [an 
internship contract] for up to two years and later you have to give them a 
permanent or temporary contract. I do not know, but in these three processes we 
only use as many as two. If a person enters [the company] as a student intern 
and that scholarship or program ends, later we would move them into one of the 
other two contracts [the ALMP non-labour internship or the internship contract] 
before they progress into a permanent contract.  They will never pass by the 
three types [of successive internships].  It seems to us that the process then is too 
long, we lose talent, and it does not accommodate the individual. 
Finance/HR Director, SPM firm, 2016 
 
Similar to the IRS and SPS firms, while the entry tournaments used a variety of 
‘internship’ agreements and contracts with flexible working conditions, the duration of 
the entry tournaments were still short compared to the SPL and the IRM firms.  These 
two strands of entry tournaments were adopted for all new young labor market 
entrants with little distinction made among different segments and occupational areas 
of the workforce.  Unlike the IRM and SPL firms, the SPM firm relied on more general 
skill mixes for its media occupations, skills more readily available in the Spanish labor 
market.  The ease of access to these skills and candidates meant that the SPM firm did 
not suffer high turn-over among specific segments of its workforce due to poaching 
from other firms.  Overall, flexible entry tournaments through ‘internships’ enabled the 
SPM firm to cut costs, as well as attract appropriate candidates to the firm.  The 
extended entry tournaments through ALMPs also enabled the SPM firm to be more 
confident in the quality of their training, not just technical skills, but also more soft skills 
related to the company culture and methods of working.    
…[when] you have a person who is already trained, who knows how we [the firm] 
workers, knows the firm, knows the culture, knows everything and we know how 
they work since we have trained them, then the next step forward is an indefinite 
contract, to do it well, and we trust this way of incorporating people from below 
and so that they can grow within the company. 
Finance/HR Director, SPM firm, 2016 
 
 
196 
 
 
Similar to the IRS and SPS firms, while attaining candidates with the right skill mix was 
important, the SPM firm valued candidates that understood the firm culture and who 
wanted to establish a career within the firm.   While the rapid expansion of the firm had 
contributed to a hierarchical managerial structure, as found in Chapter 6, high degrees 
of functional flexibility in the SPM firm jobs were important aspects of its strategic 
production strategy.  Thus, external flexibility was primarily limited to the entry 
tournaments, with the SPM firm placing high strategic value on the ability of worker’s to 
multi-task between a variety of projects and tasks.  Outsourcing was also not part of the 
SPM firm’s production strategy.  Therefore, low turnover and the SPM firm’s production 
strategy that placed strategic value on jobs with high degree of functional flexibility and 
broad skill mixes, meant that ALMP entry tournaments were shorter in duration and 
used among all new entrants regardless of their technical specialization or level.  
Overall, the SPS, IRS and SPM firms appear to adopt high road production strategies for 
ALMP internships that utilize shorter entry tournaments through ALMPs to achieve high 
degrees of flexibility among the majority of the workforce at the point of entry.  Unlike 
the SPM and IRM firms, specialized high-skilled technical workers are not as important 
in the overall production strategies of the SPS, IRS and SPM firms.  Instead, these firms 
place more strategic value on workers with a broader skill set and high degrees of 
functional flexibility.  The SPS, IRS and SPM firms ultimately sought to extend entry 
tournaments only in as far as it was still a viable recruitment strategy to attract and 
retain talent.  Indeed, the ‘faster’ entry tournaments meant that a narrower range of 
entry pathways existed and entry tournaments were composed of higher degrees of job 
security.  Therefore, while ALMP internships enabled the SPS, IRS and SPM firms to 
enhance job flexibility at the point of entry, the shorter pathways towards permanent 
jobs favoured a universal high-road production strategy for not just one segment, but 
the entire workforce.  
This section has argued that the two distinct entry tournaments of the two groups of 
ICT firms can be linked to two different types of firm production strategies, segmented 
medium-roads or universal high-roads.  Within the IRM and SPM firms, ALMP 
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internships were used to recruit candidates through ‘slow,’ unstructured and highly 
segmented entry tournaments, for low to mid-level jobs that were of less strategic 
importance to the firms’ overall production strategy.  Two career tracks exist within 
these firms:  1) High-skilled technical jobs, characterized by high degrees of security and 
structured, ‘fast’ internal career tracks and, 2) Mid/low-level non-technical jobs 
characterized by high degrees of flexibility and ‘slow,’ unstructured extended entry 
tournaments.  Importantly, even when former ALMP interns eventually obtain 
permanent contracts, the permanent contract may not necessarily guarantee ‘good’ 
quality job outcomes, as was illustrated in the case of the IRM firm’s system’s 
administrator job.  This suggests that the ALMP internships within the IRM and SPM 
firms are used for a peripheral group of workers so as to achieve cost-effectiveness, 
while providing a buffer for high-skilled technical workers from fluctuations in the 
market demand.   
In comparison the IRS, SPS and IRM firms’ entry tournaments through ALMP internships 
involved structured and ‘fast’ career tracks at the point of entry for all jobs.  The low 
turn-over, the difficulty to attract skilled workers (for the IRS and SPS firms), emphasis 
on more ‘soft skills’ and the interest in retaining worker’s skills recruited through ALMPs 
also meant the firms adopted faster career tracks to avoid any potential losses in talent.  
For the ALMP participants this meant competition into a secure job was over a shorter 
time period and participants were less at risk of being trapped in ‘slow stream’ entry 
tournaments (Marsden 2010). Overall, distinct patterns emerge among the two groups 
of firms with ALMPs providing a mechanism for ‘slow’ and segmented entry 
tournaments in one group of firms and ALMP internships providing a mechanism for 
‘fast’ and unsegmented entry tournaments in the other group of firms.  This raises the 
question as to how the intersection of specific firm level and institutional conditions 
may constrain shorter and unsegmented entry tournaments in the first group of firms, 
and in the second group of firms enable lengthy and segmented entry tournaments.  
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The Intersection of Institutions and Firm Production Strategies  
A consistent argument throughout this thesis has been that Irish and Spanish 
institutional arrangements provide few mechanisms to enable or constrain particular 
strategies of engagement and training.  Indeed, as the VoC literature suggests, Ireland 
and Spain are plagued by uncoordinated and fragmented collective bargaining and 
educational and (vocational) training systems.  As argued in Chapter 4, ALMP 
institutions, particularly the PES, also remain fragmented and weak, which can influence 
the systematic participation of firms in ALMPs.  In this context of rather weak and 
uncoordinated institutional features, firm level features are argued to occupy an 
important role in how firms incorporate ALMPs into their overall production strategies. 
This section aims to examine how the intersection of Irish and Spanish institutions and 
specific firm production strategies may enable and constraint distinct ALMP entry 
tournaments among the SPL and IRM firms and the IRS, SPM and SPS firms. 
Coordinated collective bargaining systems are one institutional arrangement that may 
enable and constrain particular firm production strategies surrounding job quality and 
skill acquisition, including through ALMPs and other types of in-firm training (Edlund 
and Gronlund 2008).  In the Spanish and Irish ICT case studies, the collective bargaining 
systems were found to have a limited impact on firm production strategies to improve 
job quality and skill acquisition. Indeed, the Spanish industrial relations model remains 
fragmented and plagued by coordination failures, with social partners consistently 
reliant on state legislation to regulate working conditions and training.  This contributes 
to stalled and narrow ICT collective agreements that provide limited scope to constrain 
or enable particular production strategies that encourage skill acquisition through ALMP 
internships within the Spanish ICT firms.  Indeed within Spain, employment protection 
legislation played a large role in shaping particular production strategies of the ICT 
firms, particularly the SPL firm’s decisions to extend the duration and allocate entry 
tournaments through ALMP internships among certain parts of its labor force.  
Ireland’s voluntarism industrial relations model characterized by limited state legal 
intervention and the absence of collective bargaining in the majority of the ICT sector 
did not play a large role in shaping the Irish ICT firm production strategies.  Instead, the 
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Irish ICT firm constraints were related to specific production strategies adapted to 
market conditions.  Therefore, the distinctive entry tournaments through ALMPs 
adopted among the SPL and IRM firms and the IRS, SPS and SPM firms are linked to firm 
specific features, not the Irish and Spanish collective bargaining systems.    
Education and vocational training systems also improve overall and specialized skills in 
the workforce, as well as provide strong (initial) vocational training (Soskice 1999; Hall 
and Soskice 2001).  Strong and coordinated industrial relations systems discourage 
poaching and enable educational and vocational training systems to address more firm 
specific training needs (Ibid).  Ireland and Spain were found to have weak vocational 
training systems and   be more dependent on a general education system that relies 
primarily on technical and university institutions.  For the Irish and Spanish ICT firms, 
skills were derived through the university and/or technical school systems with the 
Spanish SPL firm providing high levels of upskilling among its high-tech jobs to suit its 
firm-specific skill needs (Hall and Soskice 2001).  Both the Irish and Spanish SPL and IRM 
firms faced skill shortages for high-tech jobs, thus poaching was a consistent problem 
among these firms.   This supports the existing literature which asserts that while a 
general education system often enables higher levels of individual mobility between 
firms and reduces general skill training costs, it also may create a skill shortage for firms 
that require more specialized or company specific skills (Ibid).  Thus, the fragmented 
industrial relations systems and general education and training systems, enabled 
lengthy and segmented entry tournaments for the jobs recruited through ALMPs among 
the SPL and IRM firms.  This deficit of high-skilled technical workers enabled the SPL and 
IRM firms to organize their workers and ALMPs according to the strategic importance of 
these skills.  However, the shortage of high skilled technical workers did not shape 
ALMP entry tournaments among all ICT firms in the same way, suggesting it is the 
intersection of firm level features and institutions which either enable or restrict 
particular ALMP entry tournaments.  In other words, not all firms have the same 
capabilities to pursue high-road or medium-road production strategies even in the 
context of similar institutional conditions.  Accordingly, firm level features are an 
important dimension within weak institutions.  
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From the examination of internal entry tournament dynamics, three firm level features 
can be argued to enable or constrain how the Irish and Spanish ICT firms construct 
particular entry tournaments through ALMPs:  the degree of internationalization, the 
degree of value firm’s attach to human capital (both general and specific), and the 
scarceness of human capital.  One of the distinctions that emerged among the varying 
entry tournaments used by the two groups of Irish and Spanish ICT firms was the firms’ 
varying degrees of exposure to international competition between the MNC subsidiaries 
(SPL and IRM firms) and the domestic IRM, SPS and IRS firms.  The Irish and Spanish ICT 
firms also faced varying degrees of skills shortages.  However, skills shortages were 
acute in the SPL and IRM firms, and were coupled with high turn-over.  This had a direct 
impact on how the SPL and IRM firm used ALMP internships to construct segmented 
and lengthy entry tournaments.  The reason for these more acute skills shortages 
among  the SPL and IRM firms compared to the IRM, SPS and IRS firms, despite facing 
similar institutional conditions, are argued to be explained by the degree of value the 
firm’s attach to different types of human capital.  The combination of international 
competition, skills shortages, and the value attached to different types of human 
capital, are argued to ultimately enable or constrain employer choices to use ALMP 
internships for ‘slow’ and segmented entry tournaments or ‘fast’ and unsegmented 
entry tournaments. 
The degree of internationalization of the firm often encourages firms to reduce costs 
and improve resource efficiency in areas that contribute less to a firm’s economic 
performance (Strange 1996).  In addition, firms often seek to increase labor flexibility 
through flexible contracts and outsourcing offshore (Pulignano and Keune 2015).   
Devaraj and Vigneswara Llavarasan (2014) argue in their case study of two Indian 
subsidiary firms, that outsourcing off-shore is increasingly apparent within the ICT 
sector, a trend that can have an impact on the high or low road production strategies 
adopted by firms.  While outsourcing and offshore labor decreases firm costs, it 
encourages the firm to circumvent national constraints on low-skilled and lower waged 
labor which further increases the inequalities between high and low skilled workers.  
While the degree of internationalization has not been examined in relation to how firms 
engage with ALMP internships, as illustrated in Chapter 2, Bredgard and Halkjæer (2016) 
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found that the degree of internationalization played a key role in whether Danish firms 
participated in ALMP wage subsidy schemes, with domestic firms participating more 
often than foreign firms.  Through the examination of ALMP entry tournaments in the 
Spanish and Irish ICT firms, this thesis found that when MNC subsidiaries and domestic 
firms do participate in ALMPs, different ALMP trajectories emerge, with clear 
distinctions between the SPS, SPM and IRS domestic firms and the SPL and IRM MNC 
subsidiary firms.  Therefore, the degree of internationalization among the ICT firm case 
studies is a plausible firm feature which either enables or restrains ALMP led entry 
tournaments. 
The degree of value firm’s attach to human capital( both general and specific) and the 
scarceness of that human capital shape the particular production strategies adopted by 
firms (Sherer 2011).  Value refers to how specific types of human capital are perceived 
by the firm in its strategy to gain competitive advantage, whereas scarceness refers to 
the firm’s demand for human capital relative to its supply (Ibid).  These two firm 
features are linked, given that not all firms value human capital in the same way and 
skill shortages have varying degrees of importance according to the particular 
production strategy adopted.  Despite an extensive literature on the distinctions 
between firm-specific and general human capital and its transferability and acquisition, 
most notably Becker (1964) and Doeringer and Piore (1971), the concept of human 
capital here is conceptualized as relative and not absolute (Zucker 1988).  Thus, human 
capital is embedded in dynamic institutional and structural contexts.  Firms may attach 
different value to human capital at different points in time, which in turn may coincide 
or not with particular skill shortages in the labor market.  Indeed, among the two groups 
of ICT firms the degree of value attached to human capital and its scarceness are argued 
to be important factors which shape the duration and segmentation of the ALMP entry 
tournaments.    
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ICT firms:  Internationalization and Human Capital 
 
Segmented and Extended Entry Tournaments: IRM and SPM firms 
Both the IRM and SPM firms are multinational subsidiaries selling their products on the 
international market.  While the IRM firm was recently acquired by an American MNC 
firm, the SPM firm has always been a subsidiary of a German MNC firm.  Therefore, 
both firms can be said to have high degrees of internationalization.   
Within the IRM firm, the majority of the low-skilled jobs (i.e. customer IT support) are 
outsourced off-shore (i.e. Philippines), thus providing a strategy to reduce costs and 
increase resource efficiency.  In contrast, while the SPL mother MNC adopts an on-
shore/nearshore outsourcing model across three continents, the SPL firm is one of the 
three main hubs for nearshore outsourcing.  Indeed, in 2017 the SPL firm was central to 
the mother MNC firm’s expansion plans, given its ‘skilled workers and cheap labor.’   
Therefore, the SPL firm’s position as a subsidiary hub for nearshore outsourcing means 
high pressures exist to cut costs and maintain a skilled workforce to remain competitive 
internationally. Thus, while the IRM firm outsources low-skilled labor off-shore as a 
subsidiary, the SPL firm occupies the position of a near-shore outsourcing post for all 
skilled workers.  However, despite these differing positions in the network of subsidiary 
firms, both the IRM and the SPL firms place high degrees of value on their high-skilled 
technical jobs in terms of the overall strategic importance for the firms to achieve a 
competitive advantage.  
 The IRM firm’s skill mix was concentrated by high-skilled technical jobs specialized in 
software with few medium to low-skilled jobs.  Therefore, the IRM firm had a high 
degree of value for the high-skilled technical jobs in their overall production strategy.   
Consequently, resource efficiency could be achieved either through outsourcing jobs 
off-shore or offering less secure and flexible working conditions for low to medium-
skilled jobs.  In comparison, the SPL firm had a wider mix of skills within its firm, from 
low to mid-level administrative jobs to high-skilled software and IT consulting jobs.  
However, regardless of this mix, the SPL firm still maintained a higher degree of value 
for its high-skilled technical jobs.  Indeed, unlike the IRM firm, the SPL firm’s position as 
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a near-shore outsourcing firm for cheap and skilled labor meant that efforts to improve 
resource efficiency occurred within the firm itself, as opposed to abroad.   
Within both the IRM and the SPL firms, a shortage of a steady supply of human capital 
for high-skilled technical jobs meant that these skills were perceived as scarce by the 
firms.  This further increased the value the IRM and SPL firms placed on acquiring and 
retaining this scarce human capital, with both firms exposed to issues of high-turnover 
and poaching among these high-skilled technical jobs.   
To acquire this scarce and valuable human capital, the SPL firm funnelled significant 
resources towards recruiting internationally, hiring graduates from universities and 
incentivising experienced high-skilled technical professionals to make a career shift to 
its firm, with all jobs linked to permanent contracts.  For those recent graduates 
recruited directly from the university and technical institutes, upskilling was also a focus 
of the firm, with individuals receiving up to three weeks paid certified training (i.e. Java 
technology) during working hours at a training centre.  This was in stark contrast to the 
medium and low skilled non-technical positions of the firm which were recruited using 
temporary contracts associated with less secure and flexible job quality. 
Within the IRM firm, significant resources were also allocated for the acquisition and 
retention of the high level technical skills.  To acquire and retain these skills, resources 
concentrated on international recruitment, HR retention strategies, and recruitment 
through the IRM firm’s collaborative university internship program.  The IRM firm 
asserted it preferred to recruit individuals with work experience for these occupations, 
and thus sought individuals who had already acquired high levels of technical skills 
readily adaptable to the firm’s production needs.  Given that Irish legislation provides 
for similar redundancy costs for temporary and permanent contracts, the majority of 
the IRM firm’s jobs were recruited through permanent contracts, regardless of the skill 
level.  However, the scarcity of the high-skilled technical jobs and the importance of 
these jobs in the IRM firm’s overall production strategy meant that large gaps existed 
between the earnings in these jobs and other less ‘valued’ jobs.  This was one of the 
findings in Chapter 6 when examining the range of earnings within the IRM firm, 
compared to the earnings for the job recruited through ALMP internships. 
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The high degree of internationalization, the high degree of value attached to high-
skilled technical jobs and the scarcity of individuals with these high technical skills in the 
labor market, meant that the IRM and SPL firms system’s administrator job and talent 
acquisition jobs recruited through ALMPs did not initially have a great deal of value for 
the firms’ overall production strategy.  ALMPs were also not considered a viable 
recruitment strategy for high-skilled technical jobs, given the scarcity of these skills in 
the labor market.  Thus, the IRM and SPL firms’ overall production strategy and way of 
organizing workers was conducive to the extension of the segmented entry 
tournaments for the jobs hired through ALMPs, jobs that were less valuable and more 
easily accessible.  In turn, this further enabled resources to be diverted towards the 
recruitment and retention of more valuable and scarce human capital, in this case high-
skilled technical workers.  
SPS, SPM, and IRS firms:  Extended Entry Tournaments 
The SPS, SPM and IRS firms are independent, selling most of their products on the 
domestic market.  Therefore, all of these firms have low degrees of internationalization.  
Off-shore and near-shore outsourcing are not dominant features these firms use to 
reduce costs and increase resource efficiency.  Instead the SPS, SPM and IRS firms rely 
on cost-effective alternatives domestically, including both internal and external 
flexibility.   
Out of the three firms, the SPS firm was the only firm to outsource work through 
contracting, albeit to a small number of contractors (i.e. 20 individuals) based within 
Spain.   Indeed, the SPS firm also utilized other cost reduction strategies, including 
flexible contracts at the point of entry, interfirm collaborative training through various 
travel associations, and high degrees of internal flexibility among its employees.  
Though the SPM and IRS firms did not rely on external contractors, similarly the firms 
also cut costs by enhancing resource efficiency through flexible contracts at the point of 
entry, as well as enhancing internal flexibility among employees.  Unlike the SPL and 
IRM firms, the divide between high-skilled technical jobs and mid to low level non-
technical jobs was not apparent in the IRS, SPS and SPM firms, nor was poaching and 
high job turn-over an issue among these firms.  Indeed, this was linked to the different 
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skill mixes the IRS, SPS and SPM firms valued as strategic importance for their overall 
production strategies. 
Different from the SPL and IRM firms was the higher degree of value the IRS, SPS and 
SPM firms placed on broader skill mixes within the firms.  While tertiary level 
educational qualifications were important for all jobs, equally important was the 
acquisition of ‘soft skills’ including inside knowledge about the firm organization, 
understanding particular ways of working, adapting to the firm culture, and building 
strong interpersonal relationships within the firm.  Within all of the firms, flexible entry 
tournaments provided mechanisms to acquire, train, and evaluate particular skill mixes, 
while also mitigating training and hiring costs.   
Among the SPS and SPM firms, the types and specialization of products and services 
offered also influenced the types of skills valued for the job.  Indeed, the SPM firm 
focused more heavily on using specialized technology for purposes of journalism and 
advertisement, whereas the SPS firm primarily provided IT support services and e-
commerce products for travel agencies.  Thus, neither firm required high-level software 
engineers.  This matters because it creates an environment of decentralized work 
practice where more fluidity exists between training and contract types for technical 
and non-technical skilled labor.  Though the IRS firm did provide some software 
development services and products (i.e. web and graphic design) for the real estate 
industry, it did not limit its flexible entry tournaments to a particular occupational area, 
thus emphasizing as already argued, the degree of value also placed on particular ‘soft 
skills,’ skills that could more easily be assessed in a cost-effective and low-risk manner, 
through the extended entry tournaments through ALMP internships. 
While the IRS and SPS firms did face a scarcity of skill mixes of human capital, the firms 
did not perceive this was due to a lack of supply in the overall labor market, but rather 
attributed it to firm specific features, including geographical constraints and limited firm 
resources (i.e. earnings and progression routes) to attract particular skill mixes.  Given 
the difficulties to attract particular skill mixes as small and/or rural firms, the firms 
relied on other capabilities to retain human capital including, as already mentioned, 
‘mutual commitment’ and providing a good working environment with high degrees of 
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internal flexibility.  Both firms perceived these firm specific conditions as strengths in 
deterring high turn-over and poaching.  In general, the SPS and IRS firms perceived all 
types of human capital as scarce and consequently did not organize working conditions 
around different occupational segments of the workforce.  
The SPM firm did not perceive it had a high degree of skill scarcity or issues in attracting 
the appropriate skilled candidates given its competitive earnings and well-known name 
in the communications industry.  However, as already argued the SPM firm still was 
careful to not extend the duration of entry tournaments to the point of losing training 
investments and talent, thus illustrating the importance the SPM firm attached to 
building particular types of human capital through these flexible entry tournaments as 
well as its overall strategy to remain competitive in the labor market.   
The low degree of internationalization, the high degree of value attached to broader 
skill mixes across all jobs in all segments of the workforce and the perceived degree of 
scarcity linked to these broader skill mixes (in the IRS and SPS firms), meant that all of 
the jobs recruited through ALMPs in the IRS, SPS and SPM firms were perceived as 
potential value-added to the firms’ overall production strategies.  Indeed, these broader 
skill mixes and high levels of internal flexibility were also conducive to enhancing 
resource efficiency in the flatter managerial structures of the smaller IRS and SPS firms.  
The lack of extensive offshore and nearshore outsourcing among the workforce also 
does not increase the divide between working conditions for particular occupation skill 
levels and specializations.  Indeed, the funnelling of resources and particular flexible 
entry tournaments among certain segments of the workforce was also not evident in 
the IRS, IRM and SPM firms.  Therefore, the IRS, IRM and SPM firms overall production 
strategy and way of organizing workers restrained the firms from extending entry 
tournaments for the jobs hired through ALMPs among certain workforce.      
 
Conclusions 
This chapter argued that the dynamics of the IRM and SPL firm’s segmented-medium 
road entry tournaments through ALMP internships and the IRS, SPS, and SPM firms’ 
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universal high-road entry tournaments through ALMPs are explained by the intersection 
of Irish and Spanish ICT sector firm level features and institutions.  Firm level features 
are argued to occupy larger degrees of importance in a context of highly fragmented 
and uncoordinated industrial relations and educational and training institutions within 
Ireland and Spain.  Indeed, it is argued depending on the Irish and Spanish ICT firms’ 
features, the fragmented and uncoordinated industrial relations institutions can have 
varying degrees of impact on firm level decisions surrounding the duration and 
segmentation of ALMP entry tournaments.  Specifically, three firm level features were 
argued to enable or constrain how the Irish and Spanish ICT firms construct particular 
entry tournaments through ALMP internships:  the degree of internationalization, the 
degree of value firm’s attach to human capital (both general and specific,) and the 
scarceness of human capital.   
Among the IRM and SPL firms, the high degree of internationalization increased 
pressure to mitigate costs to remain competitive in the international market.  While the 
IRM firm’s production strategy was one of outsourcing low-skills offshore, the SPL firm 
occupied the position of a nearshore outsourcing hub and thus cost were adjusted in 
the firm itself and among certain segments of the workforce.  However, despite these 
pressures to maintain low costs, the IRM and SPL firms also were under pressures to 
maintain a skilled labor force to have a competitive advantage.  Specifically, both the 
IRM and the SPL firms attached high degrees of value to the high-skilled technical jobs 
in their overall production strategies.  Given the scarcity of this human capital in the 
Spanish and Irish labor market, the SPL and IRM firms diverted a great deal of resources 
(i.e. human and financial) towards acquiring skills, thus further increasing the overall 
value attached to high level technical skills and using less valued skills as a disposable 
periphery.  Indeed, the intersection of these firm level features with weak Spanish and 
Irish industrial relations systems and the general education and weak vocational training 
systems creates an environment that enables the high turn-over and poaching of high-
skilled technical workers among the SPL and IRM firms.  Consequently, ALMP 
internships were not perceived by the SPL and IRM firms as a viable hiring strategy for 
high-skilled technical workers.  Thus, when the SPL and IRM firms used ALMP 
internships, the ALMP internships were used to recruit for ‘less valuable’ and easily 
accessible jobs that played less of central role in the SPL and IRM firms’ overall 
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production strategies. Therefore, these firm level conditions provided an environment 
that was conducive to adopting more lengthy entry tournaments through ALMPs among 
certain segments of each firm’s labor force.    
Among the IRS, SPS and SPM firms, low degrees of internationalization meant that off-
shore and near-shore outsourcing were not dominant features of these firms with labor 
cost reductions and resource efficiency acquired domestically through internal and 
external flexibility.  The stark divide between technical jobs and non-technical jobs was 
also not founded, nor was high job turn-over or poaching an issue within any of these 
firms.  The lack of a divide between the technical and non-technical jobs was argued to 
be related to the value the IRS, SPS and SPM firms attach to broader skill mixes in their 
overall production strategies.  Indeed, the IRS, SPS and SPM firm’s high value for the 
development and acquisition of ‘soft skills,’ meant that ALMP entry tournaments were a 
cost-effective mechanism to evaluate and develop these skills. 
Both the IRS and SPS firms faced a scarcity of human capital.  Unlike the IRM and SPL 
firms, the scarcity was related to firm specific features (i.e. geographical constraints and 
limited resources) which inhibited abilities to attract specific skill mixes.  Despite 
difficulties to attract particular skill mixes, neither firm had low turn-over or suffered 
from poaching, something they attributed to specific firm capabilities such as providing 
a good working environment and high degrees of internal flexibility.  While the SPM 
firm was found to not suffer from a high degree of skill scarcity, the firm perceived 
lengthy entry tournaments through ALMP internships risked losses in valuable training 
investments and talent, particularly ‘soft skills’ acquired through the ALMP entry 
tournaments.  While the IRS, SPS and SPM firms were embedded in similar national 
institutional environments as the SPL and SPM firms, the low degree of 
internationalization, the high degree of value attached to broader skill mixes across all 
segments of the workforce, and the scarcity linked to broader skill mixes (in the IRS and 
SPS firms), provide the conditions to restrain the IRS, SPS and SPM firms from extending 
entry tournaments for the jobs hired through ALMPs among certain segments of the 
workforce.   
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These findings suggest that the Irish and Spanish industrial relations systems and 
education and training systems provide limited constraints to guarantee shorter and 
less segmented entry tournaments when recruiting through ALMPs.  Instead, restraints 
for ALMP entry tournaments are dependent on specific combinations of particular 
structural features of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms to enable shorter and less 
segmented entry tournaments through ALMPs.  In a context, where MNC subsidiary 
firms, such as the SPL and IRM firms, are increasingly exposed to international pressures 
to cut labor costs among some segments of the workforce it appears additional 
institutional constraints would be beneficial.  While large shifts in the regulatory 
features of Ireland and Spain’s industrial relations systems and education and training 
systems in a coordinated manner and at a macro level is difficult (Streeck 1997), smaller 
policies may be designed, even implicitly, to provide beneficial constraints for the ICT 
firms.   
Indeed, the Spanish ALMP internship program design required a detailed nine month 
training plan.  Within the SPS firm, this constraint enabled the managing director to 
standardize and consider more long-term training practices, a quality that is often 
lacking in smaller firms (de Kok et al. 2011).  This example suggests even small 
alterations in the policy design of ALMP internships, as opposed to large national 
institutional changes, may shift manager’s production strategies and also enhance job 
quality. Thus, despite Ireland and Spain’s highly fragmented and weak industrial 
relations systems and education and training systems, opportunities for beneficial 
constraints exist.  In a context where wider Spanish and Irish institutions have limited 
impact within the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, reconsidering the design of ALMPs may be 
a viable strategy to shift employer behaviour.   
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion   
 
This research was interested in understanding how Irish and Spanish ALMP internships 
facilitate particular job quality outcomes within the Spanish and Irish ICT sector.  To 
answer this question the study required a clear understanding of the key macro and 
meso institutions within which these ICT firms are embedded as well as the 
identification of particular mechanisms that enable or constrain firm behaviour 
surrounding job quality outcomes through ALMPs.  An empirical analysis of ICT firms’ 
engagement with ALMP internships, job quality outcomes through ALMP internships, 
and internal entry tournaments through ALMP internships was conducted within five 
Irish and Spanish ICT firms. Within each of these analyses chapters distinct research 
findings moved the thesis towards answering the central research question.  Indeed, 
three key research findings emerge from this thesis.  
First, in a context of weak national level institutions, firm features play an increasingly 
important role in explaining how employers facilitate particular job quality outcomes 
through ALMP internships within the Spanish and Irish ICT sector. Overall, Ireland and 
Spain’s weak industrial relations systems, fragmented training systems and general 
education systems place limited constraints on how firms construct flexible and secure 
job quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  While an examination of current job 
quality outcomes through ALMP internships in the IRM firm found that balances of 
flexible and secure jobs could be attained through broad and detailed collective 
agreements, the other Spanish and Irish ICT firms were found to either lack collective 
agreements or have narrow and weak collective agreements. Therefore, for the 
majority of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, balances of flexicurity for good quality jobs 
were concluded to not result from collective agreements, but rather from firm level 
policies developed according to market and firm driven production needs.   
In terms of earnings, only the SPS and SPM firms were found to couple wage flexibility 
with income security for the current job quality outcomes through ALMPs. This 
flexicurity balance was related to both firms’ collective agreements which provided a 
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framework for the structure of earnings, as well as guaranteed income supplements for 
the jobs recruited through ALMP internships.  
For working time quality, only the SPM firm achieved flexicurity balance for working 
time flexibility and combination security for the current job quality outcomes through 
ALMP internships.  Again, this balance was explained by a combination of the SPM 
firm’s collective agreement and firm level policy which redistributed working time 
according to firm and employee discretion.   
Evidence of skills and discretion that represent a move in the direction of balancing 
employment/job security with functional flexibility for the current job quality outcomes 
through ALMP internships was found within all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, except 
the IRM firm.  However, dissimilar from the other job quality dimensions, these 
balances are attributed to primarily firm specific formal and informal training and the 
organization of labor, as opposed to firm collective agreements or continuing training 
institutions.   
Similarly, a move in the direction of balancing functional flexibility with employment/job 
security for prospects and progression for the current job quality outcomes through 
ALMP internships was also evident in all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms, but the IRM 
firm.  In line with the skills and discretion job quality dimension, this resulted from 
formal and informal firm level policies.  Last, none of the firms moved in the direction of 
balanced outcomes for any of the job quality dimension for the initial jobs recruited 
through ALMP internships. These findings confirm that the Spanish and Irish ICT firms 
were not heavily constrained by macro and meso institutions to construct balances of 
flexicurity for ‘good’ quality job outcomes through ALMPs, but instead these job quality 
outcomes were determined primarily by firm production needs and market demands.  
Indeed, Ireland and Spain’s weak institutional environment was also conducive to 
distinct firm specific patterns emerging among the MNC subsidiary SPL and IRM firms 
and the domestic IRS, SPS and SPM firms in terms of how these two groups used ALMP 
internships.  This observation is directly related to the last two key findings of this 
research, findings that have direct implications for how ALMP internships may be more 
effective, particularly in a context of weak institutional constraints. 
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For the MNC subsidiary SPL and IRM firms, ALMP internships were found to be one of 
many mechanisms the firms used to supply their labor force, with ALMP internships 
primarily used as a flexible supply of labor and having limited scope for upskilling.  In 
comparison, the within the domestic IRS, SPS and SPM firms, ALMP internships helped 
reduce firm hiring risks and provided participants with access to a wide range of skill 
development and work experience, thus providing some upskilling. 
Among the SPL and IRM firms, ALMP internships were used as a strategy to develop 
high degrees of flexibility and ‘slow,’ unstructured extended entry tournaments among 
particular segments of the workforce.  Both firms relied heavily on high-skilled technical 
workers in their wider production strategies. The lack of supply of these high-skilled 
technical workers in the labor market meant the firms invested more resources in 
‘faster,’ secure and structured pathways for these jobs, than the more easily accessible, 
mid to low level skilled workers attained through ALMP internships.  Because of the lack 
of supply of high level technical skills in the Irish and Spanish domestic labor market, 
both firms committed a great deal of resources towards retention, firm led internships 
and training programs, international recruitment and even poaching strategies to attain 
these skills.  Therefore, recruiting these high-skilled technical workers through ALMP 
internships was not an option, given the strategic importance of these skills in the firms’ 
overall production strategies and the risk of losing these workers to other ICT firms 
offering higher degrees of job security.  Accordingly, the ALMP internships were used to 
recruit workers of limited strategic value and of less ‘unique’ and specialized skills for 
the firms’ overall production strategies.   
In short, in the IRM and SPL firms, the ALMP internships are not used to upskill, but 
rather to facilitate a flexible supply of labor which can easily be shed according to shifts 
in production needs and market demands.  Within the IRM firm, the high degree of 
flexibility extended into the current system’s administrator job recruited through the 
ALMP internship.  Accordingly, no flexicurity balances on any job quality dimensions 
were found for the IRM firm’s current system’s administrator job.  While the SPL firm 
achieved flexicurity balances on some job quality dimensions for the current talent 
acquisition job recruited through the ALMP internship, the SPL firm’s entry tournament 
was still highly flexible and lengthy.  Thus, ALMP internships enable the IRM and SPL 
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firms to continue using medium-road production strategies for specific segments of the 
workforce. This suggests that these extended internal entry tournaments may have 
been adopted anyway in the absence of ALMPs.  Thus, ALMP internships may be highly 
susceptible to issues of deadweight, displacement and substitution effects in these 
firms. 
Among the domestic SPS, IRS and IRM firms, ALMP internships were used as a strategy 
to develop structured and ‘fast’ career tracks to achieve high degrees of flexibility 
among the majority of the workforce at the point of entry.  Unlike the SPM and IRM 
firms, specialized high-skilled technical workers were not of central importance in the 
SPS, IRS and SPM firms’ overall production strategies.  Instead, these firms placed 
strategic value on jobs with high degrees of functional flexibility and broad skill mixes.  
ALMPs provided an appropriate mechanism for these firms to train and assess these 
skills, while also providing a cost-effective recruitment strategy.  Ultimately, these firms 
sought to extend the entry tournaments only in as far as it was still a viable recruitment 
strategy to attract and retain talent.  This was evident in the ‘faster’ entry tournaments 
and narrower range of recruitment strategies these firms adopted.   
The IRS firm entry tournaments used through ALMP internships was also the only ICT 
firm case study that recruited directly onto a permanent contract following the ALMP 
internships and consequently the jobs recruited through ALMP internships had faster 
career tracks towards permanent jobs than the other Irish and Spanish ICT firms.  
Similarly, while the SPS firm did not have one of the shortest entry tournaments for the 
job recruited through ALMPs, it selected the ALMP internship with the employment 
incentives which obligated it to hire following the internship period.  Given that both 
firms faced difficulties accessing candidates with the right skill mixes due to resource 
and/or geographical constraints, production strategies centred less on achieving high 
levels of numerical flexibility among its workers, and more on increasing functional 
flexibility among the workers.  ALMP internships enabled the two firms to mitigate 
hiring costs and to prolong the period to test individual performance.  Flatter 
managerial structures, low turnover and broader skill mixes in the IRS and SPS firms 
were conducive to collaborative learning environments and exposure of employees to a 
wide range of tasks.  Both of these firms used the entry tournaments through ALMP 
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internships as an opportunity to expand, as well as train the ALMP interns, albeit 
informally.  Despite the IRS and SPS firms’ small size and consequently limited capacity 
to invest in training, both the IRS and the SPS firms achieved balances of skills and 
discretion that represents a move in the direction of balancing employment/job security 
with functional flexibility for the current job quality outcomes.  Thus, evidence exists 
that ALMP internships provide some upskilling for both firms. 
The IRM firm was slightly different from the IRS and SPS firms given its medium size and 
its orientation towards media occupations.  Given its size and focus on media 
occupations, the IRM firm did not face difficulties accessing candidates with broader 
skill mixes with these skills more readily available in the Spanish labor market.  
However, the SPM firm still placed importance on high degrees of functional flexibility 
in its jobs and limited external flexibility to initial entry tournaments among its workers.  
ALMP internships were a strategy the firm used to mitigate risks associated with hiring, 
as well as a cost-effective strategy to train and assess participants both in a range of 
technical and ‘soft’ skills.  Similar to the IRS and SPS firms, the SPM firm had low 
turnover and broader skill mixes which were conducive to collaborative learning 
environments and exposure to a wide range of tasks for ALMP participants.  Given the 
medium size of the SPM firm, it did not face the same limited capacity to invest in 
training as the IRS and SPS firms and was able to offer more formal training courses.  
However, similar to the IRS and SPS firms it also achieved balances of skills and 
discretion that represents a move in the direction of balancing employment/job security 
with functional flexibility for the current job quality outcomes through ALMPs.   
 
In summary, three key findings emerge from this thesis: 
1) In a context of weak macro and meso institutions, firm features play an increasingly 
important role in explaining how employers facilitate particular job quality outcomes 
through ALMP internships within the Spanish and Irish ICT sector.  
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2) ALMP internships are one of many mechanisms, the Spanish and Irish MNC ICT 
subsidiary firms use to supply their labor force.  ALMP internships are primarily used as 
a flexible supply of labor and have limited scope for upskilling. 
3) ALMP internships are more effective in the domestic small and medium ICT firms 
where they help reduce firm hiring risks and provide participants with access to a broad 
range of skill development and work experience, thus providing for upskilling. 
These findings point to the important role firm level features play in facilitating 
particular job quality outcomes through ALMP internships within the Spanish and Irish 
ICT sector.  It also suggests that ALMP internships may be more suitable for Irish and 
Spanish small and medium domestic ICT firms in terms of promoting stronger 
possibilities for more structured and ‘faster’ pathways towards quality jobs.  However, 
apparent are the problems that stem from this reliance on firm specific features to 
facilitate ‘good’ job quality outcomes through ALMPs.  Employer behaviour could easily 
shift as firms adjust to changing production needs and market demands.  In addition, 
given that small firms have different resource capacities (i.e. human and financial) to 
invest in training, especially formal training, ALMP job quality outcomes in terms of skill 
acquisition and discretion could also potentially be highly variable.  These observations 
pose problems for ALMP internships if one assumes that ALMPs are meant to activate 
the unemployed through a job matching system and raise the productivity and skills of 
participants.  Indeed, the weak institutional constraints for ALMP internship job quality 
outcomes means the risk remains that ALMP participants may become trapped in poor 
quality jobs or enter a churning process between poor quality jobs and unemployment.   
Therefore, for ALMPs to create sustainable and quality jobs, ones accessed through 
structured and ‘faster’ entry tournaments, further constraints must be placed on the 
Irish and Spanish ICT firms that use ALMPs.  According to Streeck (1997) socially 
embedded and effective regulatory constraints among otherwise self-interested, 
rational economic action is necessary to benefit economic performance of society as a 
whole.  In other words, for the Spanish and Irish ALMP internships to facilitate quality 
job outcomes within the ICT sector, further constraints must be placed on how the Irish 
and Spanish firms can incorporate ALMP internships into their overall production 
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strategies.  Nevertheless, the key findings of this research suggest that ALMP 
internships would be more effective in domestic small and medium ICT firms.  
Therefore, while broader institutional constraints should be considered for all firms that 
participate in ALMP internships, this research also suggests a more sectoral level focus 
and one that focuses on domestic small and medium firms.  
 
The Contributions of the Study 
Through a cross-country comparative analysis of job quality outcomes attained through 
ALMP internships in five Spanish and Irish ICT firms, this research has made a number of 
contributions to knowledge.  These include: 
- The key role that the Irish and Spanish ICT firm features play in constructing 
flexible and secure job quality outcomes through ALMP internships, in  Spain and 
Ireland, countries characterized by weak industrial relations systems, 
fragmented training systems and general education systems. 
- The Spanish and Irish MNC ICT firms primarily use ALMP internships as a flexible 
supply of labor, one that has limited scope for upskilling. 
- ALMP internships are more effective in the domestic small and medium ICT 
firms, given the reduced hiring risks and access ALMP interns have to a wider 
range of skill development and work experience, thus providing for upskilling. 
- An extension of the flexicurity analytical framework to examine job quality 
outcomes in practice at both the sectoral and firm level. 
- It enhances the limited academic literature which examines the demand side of 
ALMPs, specifically how particular sectors and firms engage and organize ALMPs 
within their overall production strategies. 
- It examines the processes that lead to job quality, as opposed to how ALMP 
participation impacts the probability of employment.  
- More generally, it adds to the scarce research on ALMPs within countries that 
are less often considered ‘best practice.’ 
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Literature 
While taxonomies such as the Varieties of Capitalism provide important tools to 
understand the relationships between sectors and complementary industrial relations 
and education and training institutions, it often neglects and exaggerates coherence 
within ‘capitals’ (Bechter et al. 2011; Meardi et al. 2013).  Indeed, the literature on 
corporatism argues that industrial relations systems that lack ‘encompassingness’ often 
have strong cross-sector variation affects, particularly among liberal and mixed models 
(Crouch 1993).  While internationalisation has generally been considered an important 
factor in manufacturing for the convergence of work arrangements (Puligano and Keune 
2015), this thesis suggests that these convergences may also be found within the service 
sector, as in the case of the Irish and Spanish ICT subsidiary firms examined.  Similarly, 
Thelen (2014) argues that the increased growth and importance of the service sector 
alongside the decline of the manufacturing sector, has had varying impacts on working 
arrangements, ones that often transcend the coherent capitals suggested by the VoC 
literature.   
Importantly, and in line with the thesis findings, Thelen (ibid) argues that many of the 
countries examined in the VoC literature are experiencing a move towards 
liberalization.  However, the capacity of the state to actively broker with labor and 
capital through key political-economic institutions (i.e. collective bargaining, VET and 
labor market institutions), plays an important role in the extent to which divergent 
trajectories of liberalization are pursued.  This in turn has further implications for how 
risk is collectivized and how employer strength and organization is moved in the 
direction of economic efficiency and equality.   In this thesis, both the Spanish and Irish 
state are identified as weak in their capacity to broker between labor and capital in the 
ICT sector, as well as in their ability to strengthen and reinforce key political-economic 
institutions that would move ICT employers in a clearer and more uniform direction that 
supports economic efficiency and equality.  Therefore, in a context of fragmented and 
uncoordinated industrial relations and education and training institutions, production 
levels features such as the degree of internationalization, the degree of value firm’s 
attach to human capital (both general and specific), and the scarceness of human 
capital were found to hold increased salience.  This suggests that the VoC focus on 
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analytical categories such as employer coordination in relation to industrial relations, 
initial vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relation and employee 
cooperation, may be missing important firm level production features that this thesis 
found important when explaining job quality outcomes and entry tournaments through 
ALMP internships.  This focus on various firm level production features as additional 
analytical categories appears particularly relevant in countries that have adopted more 
‘deregulatory’ trajectories of liberalization, such as in the case of the Irish and Spanish 
ICT sector. 
The thesis also makes important contributions to the ILM literature, supporting and 
adding to Rubery and Grimshaw (1998) and Grimshaw et al. (2001; 2002) arguments 
and findings about the reconfiguration and dismantling of ILMs within a context of 
increased external and internal labor market pressures.  While the thesis found a clear 
lack of strong ILMs in all of the Spanish and Irish ICT firms that recruited through ALMP 
internships, the IRM and SPL firms notably had more lengthy and precarious 
employment trajectories towards permanent contracts.  This was attributed to the high 
degree of exposure to international labor market pressures within both firms to cut 
costs (often through outsourcing), as well as internal pressures to continue to maintain 
a skilled workforce.   
In addition, a lack of a steady supply of high level technical skills for upper level jobs in 
the labor market meant the IRM and SPL firms both faced high turn-over and poaching 
of skills, thus pressuring them to adapt their employer strategies to develop solutions, 
including the funnelling of significant resources to attract and retain workers with these 
high level technical skills.  This strategy resulted in fragmented ILM structures, with 
clear differences in the duration and structure of entry tournaments between the 
individuals recruited for positions through ALMP internships for medium and low skilled 
non-technical positions and those individuals recruited for high level technical positions 
in terms of training provision and skill discretion, internal progression and promotion 
ladders, earnings, and job security (temporary versus permanent contracts).  Specific to 
the IRM firm was the clear lack of training linked to a promotion ladder for the lower 
skilled non-technical position recruited through ALMPs, thus suggesting similar to 
Grimshaw et al. (2002), a ‘delayering’ of job ladders at the lower levels. These findings 
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contrasted with the ILM structures in the domestic SPS, SPM and IRS ICT firms, where 
the divide between those individuals recruited through ALMP internships and high-
skilled technical jobs was not a feature of the firms’ ILM structures.   
The SPS, SPM and IRS ICT firms were less exposed to international labor market 
pressures, valued different types of skill mixes, and had flatter organizational structures.  
Specific to the small SPS and IRS firms, was the perception that all skill mixes were 
scarce (due to geographical and resource constraints) and thus employer strategies and 
working conditions were not organized around particular workforce segments.  Among 
all of the domestic SPS, SPM and IRS firms, similar and limited entry ports into the firms 
existed for all types of occupations with the flatter organizational structures lending to 
various forms of collaborative on-the-job learning and high degrees of functional 
flexibility.  None of these firms faced issues of high job turn over or poaching either, 
with entry tournaments more structured and of less duration for the individuals 
recruited through ALMP internships.   
Similar to Rubery and Grimshaw (1998) and Grimshaw et al. (2001; 2002), this thesis 
found that the polarization between primary and secondary firm ILMs is not readily 
apparent in practice, but instead employers are constantly adapting ILMs at the 
intersection of often multiple internal and external labor market pressures.  This 
research also emphasizes the importance of a focus on the sector, the degree of firm 
internationalization and the size of the firm in shaping how training provision and skill 
discretion, internal progression and promotion ladders, earnings, and job security 
(temporary versus permanent contracts) are allocated among particular groups of 
workers.  The findings suggest that small, domestic firms may be more conducive to 
shorter and more structured entry tournaments, albeit with limited opportunities for 
promotion due to the flat organizational structure.  All of these findings also emerge in 
the context of two countries, Ireland and Spain, which lack strong macro and meso 
institutions to coordinate and regulate labor market exchange in the ICT sectors which 
further inhibits the uncertainty and exposure of the firms to international labor market 
pressures.  Therefore, greater diversity and fragmentation in ILMs, coupled with an 
increased importance of employer-led market solutions would be expected in countries 
lacking these strong macro and meso institutions.  A focus on firm level features in 
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explaining the fragmentation and dismantling of firms would be particularly important 
in these types of countries. 
The comparative analysis at the sectoral and firm level also further unpacks the 
flexicurity concept, one that has consistently been used to examine national (Auer 2007; 
Bonoli and Emmenegger 2010) and sectoral regulatory features (Pulignano and Keune 
2015; Ibsen and Mailand 2009, 2010; Paolucci 2017), thus neglecting how combinations 
of flexicurity and security outcomes manifest in practice at the workplace.  Indeed, 
through an analysis of flexicurity outcomes within five Irish and Spanish ICT firms across 
two countries, this study fills this research gap by enabling an analysis of flexicurity 
outcomes in practice and shedding light on how firms may behave in different 
regulatory settings.  The decision to examine job quality outcomes through ALMPs 
further adds another layer to the flexicurity literature, given that ALMPs are one 
strategy argued to be a key component of flexicurity to enhance labor market 
transitions and employability (Heyes 2013; European Commission 2007).  Indeed, this 
research would suggest that while ALMP internships may provide an entrance into jobs 
within the Irish and Spanish ICT sector, internal labor market transitions to flexible and 
secure jobs may still be highly flexible and lengthy depending on how ALMPs are 
incorporated into particular firm production strategies.   
Last, this study contributes to the small but growing literature on the role of employers 
or the firm in ALMPs (Bredgaard and Halkjær 2016; Bredgaard 2017; Inglod and Vilzade 
2016), as well as the firm level dynamics that underpin job quality outcomes.  An 
extensive literature exists on ALMPs, with empirical studies primarily evaluating 
whether the participation of an individual in ALMPs increases the probability of 
employment (see Kluve 2006 for a review).  One of the conclusions is that ALMP 
programs that are closer to the workplace have greater possibilities for employment 
outcomes (Kluve 2006, 2010; Card et al. 2009).  However, the role of employers in 
facilitating employment outcomes is less understood.  The existing supply side research 
also tends to focus mainly on employment outcomes to the detriment of job quality 
outcomes.   
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The study of the Irish and Spanish ICT firms suggests that even when firms participate 
and recruit through ALMP internships, flexible and secure job quality outcomes may not 
be guaranteed.  Indeed, job quality outcomes through ALMP internships may be more 
dependent on firm level features in a context of a weak institutional environment.  In 
addition, ALMP internships appear to have variable effects according to whether ICT 
firms are MNC or domestic, with particularly strong effects for small domestic ICT firms 
which have difficulties accessing labor and provide ‘faster’ and more structured career 
tracks towards quality jobs.  Indeed, given the recruitment difficulties these small 
domestic ICT firms face, this is where ALMP internships may have the highest scope for 
building firm capacity.  Indeed, within Chapter 7 it was argued that the design of the 
Spanish ALMP internship program supported the development of a more detailed 
training plan for future employees within the small Spanish firm, thus enabling the firm 
to upgrade training and improve job quality.  These findings suggest that ALMP 
internships do have scope for providing structured pathways towards quality jobs, 
particularly among domestic small firms within the ICT sector.  However, further 
research is needed to understand what institutional constraints may be necessary to 
facilitate flexible and secure job quality outcomes when firms hire through ALMPs.  In 
addition, a sectoral focus seems particularly important given differences in overall job 
quality between high-skilled sectors such as ICT sector and low-skilled sectors such as 
retail (Eurofound 2014).   
 
Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis provides a number of contributions. First it adopts a 
cross-country comparative case study design that analyses job quality outcomes at the 
sectoral and firm level.  This research design provides a framework for future research 
that is interested in exploring how employment dynamics unfold in practice at the firm 
level within the context of national and sectoral regulatory features.  Secondly, the 
adaptation of Ibsen and Mailand’s (2009) flexicurity analytical framework to the firm 
level provides a comprehensive frame to analyse how actual flexible and secure job 
quality outcomes manifest in practice at the firm level. Indeed, this framework also 
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enables a more comprehensive understanding of variation between national and 
sectoral flexicurity regulation and actual implementation within firms.  More generally, 
this research illustrates the value of comparative case study research as well as 
emphasizes the difficulties that can arise to access firms, particularly firms in low-skilled 
sectors that may be more exposed to lower quality job outcomes through ALMP 
internships.  Indeed, this research initially intended to analyse job quality outcomes 
through ALMPs through a comparison of the ICT sector (i.e. a high-skilled sector) and 
the retail sector (i.e. a low-skilled sector), but was unable to gain access to firms in the 
latter sector.  Last, the triangulation of data through a semi-structured topic guide, the 
analysis of firm websites and policy reports, and the extensive analysis of labor market 
legislation and collective agreements provided for a more holistic understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms and processes that may shape job quality outcomes through 
ALMP internships.  
 
Policy Recommendations  
While the supply side continues to remain the dominant approach to ALMPs within the 
EU, this research argues that employers have a large role to play in facilitating particular 
job quality outcomes through ALMPs.  The findings of this research suggest that in a 
context of weak macro and meso institutions, firm features play an increasingly 
important role in explaining how employers facilitate particular job quality outcomes 
through ALMP internships within the Spanish and Irish ICT sector.  In addition, the 
findings suggest that ALMP internships may be more effective in the domestic small and 
medium ICT firms where ALMPs aid to reduce firm hiring risks and provide participants 
with access to a broad range of skill development and work experience.  Accordingly, 
these firms were found to offer shorter and more structured entry tournaments 
towards quality jobs through ALMP internships.  While considering the recruitment 
difficulties of the small domestic ICT firms, as well as the difficulties small firms face to 
upgrade training, this led to the conclusion that ALMP internships may have the highest 
scope for building firm capacity within these firms.  Therefore, the findings of this 
research argue that ALMP internships should be focused at the sectoral level, among 
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domestic firms, with a particular focus on small firms.  While ALMP internships may also 
be effective in large and medium MNC ICT firms, they should be aimed at areas of high-
skill need within these firms.  One such example would be to combine ALMP high-skilled 
formal IT training programs with ALMP internships within the large and medium MNC 
ICT firms.  This would redirect ALMP internships to address actual skill need within these 
firms, as well as continue to encourage upskilling.  Adapting this same example to 
smaller ICT firms would also be effective, given the limited resources these firms have 
to access formal external training.   
More generally, further institutional constraints on Irish and Spanish ICT firms are 
needed to ensure ALMP internships lead to sustainable and quality jobs, ones accessed 
through structured and ‘faster’ entry tournaments.  Clearly these institutional 
constraints would look different within Ireland and Spain given the different 
institutional environments.  Within the context of Spain, collective agreements appear 
to be one such institutional mechanism that may constrain firm behaviour and 
encourage better quality of job outcomes.  However, as seen in this research, this is 
only possible if collective agreements include a broad range of job quality issues, such 
as in the case of the SPM firm’s non-daily press collective agreement.  Within Ireland, 
the absence of collective bargaining in the ICT sector means that institutional 
constraints are left primarily to the state and thus the state represents the main 
institution to constrain job quality issues.  However, this research found the Irish state 
offers few constraints for job quality issues.  Therefore, while changes could be made to 
the Spanish industrial relations system to encourage social partners to negotiate on 
more job quality issues and the Irish state could be lobbied to develop statutes that 
encompass broader job quality issues, these institutions are path dependent and as 
such embedded in a system of rules.  Consequently, smaller, incremental changes are 
more realistic.  Examples may include strengthening the Public Employment Service and 
its engagement with employers, as well as designing ALMP internship programs that are 
more structured and targeted at specific sectors.    
Further cross country comparative research at the sectoral level that specifically 
examines job quality outcomes through ALMP internships is a rich area of research that 
is needed.  Further comparisons of countries lacking the coordinated and strong 
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institutions of the classical northern European ALMP countries is also needed to further 
uncover not just poor cases of job quality outcomes, but also good job quality 
outcomes. This type of research may further uncover mechanisms that encourage 
employers to facilitate good quality job outcomes through ALMPs, in an otherwise weak 
institutional environment.  This would also present areas of policy learning for 
improving ALMPs that could be more easily adapted to countries such as Ireland and 
Spain.   
 
Conclusions 
This thesis is important because it addresses an area of research that was previously 
neglected and an area that could potentially have policy implications to improve job 
quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  It draws attention to the need to 
understand how sectoral and firm specific dynamics influence employer behaviour 
related to job quality outcomes through ALMP internships.  This is particularly 
important in weak institutional environments such as Ireland and Spain that provide 
few constraints to encourage ‘good’ quality jobs within firms.  This thesis has explained 
how ALMP internships can have varying effects on job quality with shorter and more 
structured entry tournaments towards quality jobs found in small and medium domestic 
ICT firms and lengthier and less structured entry tournaments towards quality jobs in 
large MNC ICT firms. By attaining an understanding of the firm dynamics that contribute 
to these varying job quality outcomes through ALMP internships, this thesis provides 
valuable insights for innovating future ALMP internship policymaking , as well as for 
potential improvements in job quality outcomes for future ALMP intern participants. 
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Appendix A:  Interviewee Information  
 
Organization/Firm Type Ireland Spain 
Government & State 
Officials/Academic Experts 
Government Official 1, 
DEASP (PES), 2017 
Government Official1, 
Catalan Ministry of 
Education and Training, 2015 
Government Official 2, DSP 
(PES), 2017 
Government Official 2, 
Catalan Ministry of 
Education and Training, 2015 
Government Official 3, DSP 
(PES), 2016 
Government Official 1, SOC 
(PES), 2015  
Politician 1, Irish activation 
policy, 2017 
Expert 1, Economist labor 
market policy, 2015 
Former Government Official, 
PES, 2016 
Expert 2, Youth labor market 
policy, 2015 
Politician 2, Irish labor 
market policy, 2017 
Expert 3, Employment  
Research,2015 
 Expert 4, Training and 
employment, 2015 
Trade Unions Trade Union Representative, 
ICTU, 2015 
Trade Union Representative 
1, Comisiones Obreros 
(CCOO), 2015 
Trade Union Representative, 
SIPTU, 2017 
Trade Union Representative 
2, Comisiones Obreros 
(CCOO), 2015 
Trade Union Representative 
1, Mandate, 2017 
Trade Union Representative 
1 , Youth Division, 
Comisiones Obreros (CCOO), 
2015 
Trade Union Representative 
2, Mandate, 2017 
Trade Union Representative 
2, Youth Division, Comisones 
Obreros (CCOO),2016 
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 Trade Union Representative 
1, Service Federation, 
Comisiones Obreros (CCOO), 
2016 
Employer Federation Employer Federation 
Representative, Irish 
Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC), 2015 
Employer Federation 
Representative 1, Catalan 
micro, small and medium 
employers federation 
(PIMEC), 2015 
 Employer Federation 
Representative 1, Catalan 
Employer’s Federation 
(Foment del Treball-Patronal 
Catalana),2015 
 Employer Federation 
Representative 2, Catalan 
Employer’s Federation 
(Foment del Treball-Patronal 
Catalana), 2015 
ICT firms Managing Director, IRS firm, 
2016 
Managing Director, SPS firm, 
2016 
Former ALMP Intern, Sales, 
marketing and Technical 
support, IRS firm, 2016 
Former ALMP Intern, IT 
support, SPS firm, 2016 
Former ALMP Intern, Web 
Designer, IRS firm, 2016 
HR specialist, SPL firm,2016 
Human Resource Director, 
IRM firm, 2016 
Former ALMP Intern, Talent 
Acquisition, SPL firm, 2016 
Former ALMP Intern, IT 
Support and System’s 
Administrator, IRM firm, 
2016 
Finance/HR Director, SPM 
Firm, 2016 
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Appendix B:  ALMP Programs by Type- Ireland and Spain 2017 
 
ALMP Programs by ALMP type- Ireland and Spain 2017 
 
  Job 
Search 
Assistan
ce and 
Monitor
ing 
Labour 
Market 
Training 
(Qualificati
ons and 
Work 
Experience
) 
Employment 
Incentives/Wa
ge 
Subsidies(indiv
idual or 
employer) 
Direction 
Job 
Creation 
through 
Public 
Sector 
Work 
Program
mes 
Start-
Up 
Incenti
ves 
Ireland Back to Work 
Enterprise 
Allowance 
Scheme 
    X 
Counselling 
and Guidance 
(LES, Intreo, 
etc.) 
X     
Short-term 
Enterprise 
Allowance 
    X 
Part-time 
Employment 
Incentive 
  X   
TUS-
Community 
Work 
Placement 
   X  
JobBridge  X    
Gateway    X  
Community 
Employment 
Scheme 
   X  
Apprenticeshi
ps 
 X    
SkillsNet  X    
Specific Skills 
Training 
 X    
(Career)Traine
eship 
Programme 
 X    
Back to 
Education 
Allowance 
(BETA) 
 X    
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Bridging/Foun
dation 
Courses 
 X    
ICT Skills 
Conversion 
Course 
 X    
JobPath 
(Seetec and 
Turas Nua) 
X X    
JobsPlus 
(Youth) 
  X   
YouthReach  X    
Social 
Inclusion and 
Community 
Activation 
Program 
(SICAP) 
   X  
Momentum  X    
Spain-
Catalonia 
Program for 
orientation 
and guidance 
for Labor 
Market 
Insertion with 
PES and other 
public and 
private 
entities (i.e. 
personal and 
online 
services for 
job search 
assistance) 
X     
Job Search 
Spaces 
Program 
X     
Recruitment 
of Young 
people for 
Internships 
 X    
Grant 
Program for 
Private 
Employment 
Placement 
Agencies 
X X    
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Subsidies to 
Favor the 
Incorporation 
of young 
people in the 
Youth 
Guarantee 
Program 
  X   
Training of 
Supply in 
Priority Areas 
(FOAP) 
 X    
‘Training’ 
Programs with 
Commitment 
to Hire 
 X X   
Employment 
and Training 
Program 
(public 
entities) 
 X    
Hiring a young 
person onto 
an internship 
contract 
(public 
subsidies and 
entities) 
 X    
New 
Opportunities 
for Young 
People 
 X    
Employment 
for Young 
People 
 X X   
Foreign 
Language 
Training 
Programs 
 X    
ICT Training 
Programs 
 X    
Non-labor 
internships 
 X    
Dual 
Professional 
Training 
 X    
Training and 
Insertion 
 X X   
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Mixed 
Employment 
and Training 
Programs 
 X    
Entrepreneurs
hip Scheme 
    X 
Open-ended 
contract 
conversion 
incentive 
  X   
Temporary 
Contract 
Recruitment 
Incentive 
  X   
30+ Program 
(lower 
qualification 
levels, long-
term 
unemployed) 
X X    
Youth 
Guarantee 
X X    
Integrated 
Actions- 
Second 
Chance (16-24 
years old) 
X X X   
Supporting 
the 
Incorporation 
into the 
Labour 
Market >45 
years old 
  X   
Work and 
Training 
Program >45 
years old 
X X X   
On the job 
training 
through 
internship 
contracts 
 X X   
‘Making 
Employment 
for Youth’ 
Programme, 
18-29 years 
old 
X X X X  
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Youth 
Employment 
Programme, 
16-24 years 
old 
X X X X  
Mobility 
Programs for 
professional 
experience 
(TNL-Mobil 
Cat Program 
for young 
people, 
Catalunya / 
Baden-
Württemberg) 
X X    
Source: Catalonia Public Employment Service 2016; CSO 2016 
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Appendix C:  Consent Forms and Research Guidelines 
 
 
Informed Consent 
 
You have been invited to participate in a research study.  The research focuses on 
internships in companies, or work experience, and the quality of jobs among young workers in 
Ireland and Spain.  Within Ireland, the study focuses on the National Internship Scheme 
JobBridge.  You have been asked to take part in this study due to your knowledge and/or 
experience working within this area. Please read this form carefully before agreeing to take 
part.  If you have any additional questions or concerns I would be happy to answer them. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to examine the link between internships in companies and jobs 
among young workers in Ireland and Spain.  The study examines two internship programs, 
one in Ireland (i.e. the National Internship Scheme JobBridge) and one in Spain (i.e. Non 
labour Internships in Companies).  
 
What and who will the research involve? 
If you agree to participate in this research, an interview will be conducted with you about your 
experience as a host or participant with the National Internship Scheme JobBridge and/or 
your successive job within the company.  The interviews will include, though not limited to, 
questions about the structure and content of JobBridge internships, participants in JobBridge 
internships, the regulation of the program, quality of jobs, and more generally, employer 
participation in training programs.  The interviews will last approximately one hour and be 
relatively informal. This research will involve a range of participants (i.e. Human resource 
management, company directors/CEOs, participants/alumni of the JobBridge internship 
program, trade union representatives, and employer organizations and representatives) who 
are knowledgeable and have experience working and/or participating with training or 
internship programs. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
This research is voluntary and it is your choice whether to participate or not.  You can stop the 
interview process at any point and withdraw any information prior to the publication of the 
research.  You may also reschedule the interview if desired.  If you do not wish to participate 
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at this time you are invited to fill out the withdrawal sheet at the end of this form and return it 
to the researcher for record purposes. All of your data will promptly be destroyed and the 
confidentiality of your decision will be ensured.  
 
Will your participation in the study be kept confidential and anonymous? 
All information, including audio recordings, will be stored on a password protected and 
encrypted computer and any physical documents will be locked within a secure cabinet.  
Aside from the identification of specific internship programs and labour market sectors, every 
effort will be made to alter any information that may make participants and companies 
identifiable.  All identifiable information will be removed from the data and participants will be 
anonymized from the point of the interview by being assigned an identifier code.  The key to 
this identifier code will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked cabinet in the 
researcher’s office.  Any extracts quoted from the interview will also be anonymized.  All 
electronic and paper data will be destroyed following a maximum of five years or at the point 
of publication when the data is no longer needed.   
 
How will the information be used? 
The results will be seen by the researcher, supervisors and examiners and be presented in 
the published thesis and academic journals, as well as at relevant conferences.   
 
What are the possible advantages and disadvantages? 
The researcher does not see any disadvantages for participants taking part in this study.  
Non-participation is also not envisioned to have any repercussions.  Benefits include the 
opportunity to voice your opinion and professional experiences, potentially improve the 
effectiveness of training programs for young workers, and contribute to existing knowledge 
about training programs with internships within Ireland.  
 
Further queries? 
If you need any further information, please feel free to contact me. 
 
Researcher Amelia Dulee-Kinsolving, B.A. Global Studies and Spanish, M.A. Public  
   Administration & Public Policy and M.A. International Relations 
  Department of Law & Department of Sociology,  
  Maynooth University- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare 
  Mobile: 083 1581696 
 
Supervisors Prof. Michael Doherty, Department of Law  
  Maynooth University- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare 
  Michael.B.Doherty@nuim.ie 
  Tel:  (01) 7086638 
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  Prof. Seán O’Riain, Department of Sociology  
  Maynooth University- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare 
  Sean.ORiain@nuim.ie 
  Tel:  (01) 7083688 
 
If during your participation in this study you feel the information and guidelines that you were 
given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if you are unhappy about the 
process, please contact the Secretary of the National University of Ireland Maynooth Ethics 
Committee at research.ethics@nuim.ie or +353 (0)1 708 6019. Please be assured that your 
concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner. 
 
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and 
records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation 
by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within 
law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest possible extent 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to 
any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.  
Signature ___________________________________ Date ________________________ 
Name (printed) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview recorded by audio.  
 
Signature ___________________________________ Date _________________________ 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ 
If you would like to withdraw from this research at any point, please sign below and return this 
form to me at:  
Amelia Dulee-Kinsolving 
Department of Sociology 
Maynooth University- NUIM 
Maynooth, Co. Kildare 
 
Signature ________________________________ Date _____________________________ 
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Formulario de Consentimiento Informado 
 
 
 
Ha sido invitado para participar en una investigación.  La investigación doctoral trata sobre 
las prácticas en empresas, o experiencia laboral, y la calidad de los puestos de trabajo, entre 
los jóvenes trabajadores en España e Irlanda.  En el caso de España, me estoy centrando en 
prácticas no laborales en empresas para jóvenes, en la CCAA de Cataluña.  Ha sido invitado 
para participar en este estudio desde que tiene conocimiento y/o experiencia trabajando en 
este tema. Por favor lea este documento antes de aceptar a participar. Si tiene alguna 
pregunta o duda estaría encantada a responderlos.  
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio?  
El propósito de este estudio es examinar el vínculo entre las prácticas en empresas y los 
puestos de trabajo, entre los jóvenes trabajadores en España e Irlanda.  El estudio 
examinará dos programas de prácticas en empresas, uno en Irlanda (es decir JobBridge) y 
uno en España (es decir Practicas no Laborales en Empresas).   
 
¿Qué y quien va a implicar la investigación?  
Si acepta participar en este estudio una entrevista se llevará a cabo contigo a cerca de su 
experiencia en prácticas no laborales y/o su puesto de trabajo en su empresa en general.  
Las entrevistas incluirán, sin limitarse, las preguntas sobre la calidad de los puestos de 
trabajo, la estructura y/o contenido de prácticas no laborales, los usuarios del programa, la 
financiación del programa, los reglamentos del programa, y la participación del empleador en 
programas de formación.  La entrevista tendrá una duración aproximada de una hora en 
completarse y serán relativamente informal.  Esta investigación incluirá una gama de 
participantes (es decir responsables de recursos humanos y/o jefe de la empresa, 
participantes/alumnos de prácticas no laborales en empresas, representantes de los 
sindicatos, representantes de los patronales, personal del Servicio Público de Empleo 
Estatal, personal del Servicio de Ocupación de Cataluña, organizaciones de jóvenes) que 
tienen conocimientos y experiencia trabajando o participando en los programas de formación.   
 
¿Hay que participar?  
Esta investigación es voluntaria y es su decisión si desea participar o no.  Puedes detener la 
entrevista en cualquier momento y retirar cualquier información antes de la publicación de la 
investigación.  También se puede reprogramar la entrevista si se desea. Si no desea 
participar, en este momento se le invita a llenar la hoja al final de este formulario y devolverlo 
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a la investigadora para propósitos de registro.  Todos sus datos serán destruidos y se 
garantizara la confidencialidad de su decisión.  
 
¿Su participación en este estudio será confidencial y anónima?  
Toda la información, incluidas la grabación de audio, se almacenará en un ordenador 
protegido por contraseña y cifrado.  Los documentos físicos serán encerrados en un 
gabinete.  Aparte de la identificación de las programas de formación y los sectores del 
mercado de trabajo, se hará todo lo posible para alterar que pueda ser que los participantes 
identificable.  Toda la información identificable será eliminada de los datos y los participantes 
serán anónimos desde el principio de la entrevista atrás de un código identificador asignado. 
La clave de este código de identificación será almacenada en un disco duro externo en un 
gabinete cerrado con llave en la oficina de la investigadora. Cualquier extracto citado de la 
entrevista también será anónimo.  Todos los datos electrónicos y en papel serán destruidos 
después de un máximo de cinco años o en el punto de publicación cuando ya no se 
necesitan los datos. 
 
¿Cómo se utilizará la información?  
Los resultados serán vistos por la investigadora, sus supervisores y examinadores y serán 
presentadas la tesis publicada y en las conferencias pertinentes.   
 
¿Cuáles son las posibles ventajas y desventajas?  
La investigadora no ve ninguna desventaja para los participantes que tomaron parte de este 
estudio.  La no participación tampoco está previsto que tenga repercusiones.  Las ventajas 
incluyen la oportunidad de expresar su opinión e experiencias profesionales, potencialmente 
mejorar la eficacia de los programas de formación para los trabajadores jóvenes, y contribuir 
al conocimiento existente acerca de los programas de formación con prácticas en empresas 
dentro de España.  
 
¿Más preguntas? 
Si necesita más información, no dude en ponerse en contacto conmigo. 
 
Investigadora Amelia Dulee-Kinsolving, M.A. Administración Política y Políticas Publicas & 
M.A. Relaciones Internacionales, B.A. Estudios Internacionales y Español, 
Departamento de Derecho & Departamento de Sociología, La Universidad de 
Maynooth- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Irlanda 
  Mobile: +34 684092458 (España), +353 83 1581696 (Irlanda),  
 
Supervisores Prof. Michael Doherty, Departmento de Derecho  
  La Universidad de Maynooth- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Irlanda 
  Michael.B.Doherty@nuim.ie 
  +353 (0)1 7086638 
 
  Prof. Seán O’Riain, Departmento de Sociologia 
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  La Universidad de Maynooth- NUIM, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Irlanda 
  Sean.ORiain@nuim.ie 
+353 (0)1 7083688 
 
Si durante tu participación en este estudio, se siente que la información y directrices que se 
le he facilitado han sido descuidados o ignorado en cualquier forma, o si no estás satisfecho 
con el proceso, por favor póngase en contacto con El Secretario de la Comité de Ética de la 
Universidad Nacional de Irlanda Maynooth en research.ethics@nuim.ie o +353 (0)1 708 
6019. Se puede asegurar que sus inquietudes serán tratadas de manera confidencial.  
 
Hay reconocer que en algunas circunstancias, la confidencialidad de los datos de la 
investigación y los registros puede ser anulados por los tribunales en caso de litigo o en el 
curso de la investigación por parte de la autoridad legítima.  En tales circunstancias, la 
Universidad tomara todas las medidas razonables dentro de la ley para asegurar que se 
mantengan la confidencialidad en la mayor medida posible.   
 
Declaración de Consentimiento: He leído la información anterior, y han recibido respuestas 
a todas las preguntas que le pedí.  Doy mi consentimiento para participar en el estudio.  
Firma ___________________________________ Fecha  ________________________ 
Nombre (letra imprenta) 
____________________________________________________________ 
Además de acceder a participar, también me consentimiento para que la entrevista está 
grabada por audio.   
Firma ___________________________________ Fecha _________________________ 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------
------ 
Si deseas retirarse de esta investigación en cualquier momento, por favor firme abajo y 
devuelva este formulario a mí en: 
Amelia Dulee-Kinsolving 
Departamento de Sociología y Departamento de Derecho 
La Universidad de Maynooth- NUIM 
Maynooth, Co. Kildare 
Irlanda 
Firma  ________________________________ Fecha _____________________________ 
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Appendix D: Research Guides 
 
Irish ICT Firm Interview-  ALMP Internships 
Introduction 
 Can you tell me a little about the company and your role in the company?  
 How many workers are there? 
 What are the key occupations?  
 What is the average age range of workers within your company? Gender 
distribution? 
 What have been some of the biggest challenges for the company most 
recently?  
 
Part 1: JobBridge Intern 
 
 What has been your company’s overall experience as a host within the 
JobBridge Internship Scheme? 
 How many JobBridge interns has your company hosted? 
 What was/is the duration of your company’s JobBridge Internship program? 
 What are/ have been the ages of the interns your company has hosted?  
 What have been their educational qualification levels and areas of study? 
 Did/do you offer any additional subsidy to the JobBridge intern in addition to 
their social welfare payment and top up? 
 What type of training does/did your organization offer to JobBridge interns? 
 Why did your company decide to participate in the JobBridge internship 
program? 
 Have you participated in other government sponsored training/internship 
schemes in the past?  
 
Recruitment 
 How many JobBridge interns have you hired? What occupation(s) were they 
recruited for? Why did you decide to hire these JobBridge interns? 
 What individual characteristics were important determinants in your 
company’s decision to hire (or not) JobBridge interns? 
 Of those JobBridge interns who were recruited, what type of labor market 
contract were they recruited onto? 
 Were there other larger sectoral and institutional constraints which impacted 
the contract type interns were recruited onto? 
 
Work Experience  
 What does work experience represent to your company? How does work 
experience influence your company’s hiring decisions? Why?  
 What type of work experience is valued by your company when making hiring 
decisions? 
 Of those young JobBridge interns that were hired, how many had previous 
work experience?   
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Part 2: Job Quality 
 
Earnings 
 What is the average monthly salary within your company? 
 How does your company set wages? What impacts these decisions? 
 To what extent is high job turnover an issue within your company? 
 How do you increase worker output or effort in your company? 
 
Prospects 
 What opportunities for career advancement are offered within your company? 
 What types of employment contracts are the majority of your workers on? 
 
Training and Work Organization: 
 Does your company formulate yearly training and development plans? What 
types of training are offered? 
 What is the skill level (i.e. educational qualification) of the majority of your 
workers?  
 Is there any preference for internal applicants when filling vacancies? 
 How frequently is information disseminated to employees?  
 How frequently do employees work in teams/groups within your company?   
 
Work Intensity/Working Time Quality 
 How many hours per week on average do your employees usually work? 
 How are working time arrangements set (hours worked each day and days 
worked each week)? 
 What type of employee representation is available within your company? 
 How influential are collective agreements (i.e. national, regional/sectoral) 
within the ICT sector and your company’s decisions to establish specific 
standards for training, salaries, contract types offered and flexible working 
hours?  
 What employees are included in these collective agreements? 
 What regional and local business associations is your company a member of? 
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Irish Former ALMP Intern/Current Employee   
 
 
Part 1:  JobBridge Intern 
 
 Can you tell me a little about your experience as a JobBridge Intern? 
 When did you begin your JobBridge internship? 
 What was the duration of your JobBridge internship? 
 What was your educational qualification and area of study when you began the 
JobBridge Internship in the company? 
 What were your day-to-day tasks as a JobBridge intern? 
 What type of training did you receive through JobBridge? 
 How were you evaluated during the JobBridge internship? 
  
Reasons for Participation 
 Why did you decide to participate in the JobBridge internship program? 
 
Work Experience 
 Did you have any previous work experience prior to JobBridge? What type?  
 What did you gain through the JobBridge work experience? 
 
Recruitment  
 How do you think the work experience obtained through the internship 
directly impacted your chances of being hired after?  
 What type of contract were you hired onto? 
 
Part 2: Job Quality  
 
 Can you tell me a little about your position within the company? 
 How long have you been employed in this position? 
 How did your job within the company change prior to the economic crisis and 
after the economic crisis? Or how did it change throughout the economic 
recession? 
 
Earnings 
 What is your net annual salary? Your gross annual salary? 
 What impacts increases/decreases in your salary? 
 
Employment Prospects 
 Have you received any type of employment promotion with your company? 
 Do you feel that your employment is secure? Why? 
 
Training and Work Organization 
 In the last 12 months what type of training have you received or undertaken to 
improve the skills in your current position? 
 How closely does your job match your educational qualification and area? 
How closely does it match your existing work experience? 
 How does the company disseminate information among its workers? 
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 How much autonomy do you have in your job to: 
a. Establish your own work objectives? 
b. Establish your own methods of work? 
 How often do you participate in key decision making within the company? 
How are key decisions communicated to employees? 
 How are you evaluated in your job? 
 What procedures must you follow when a problem arises with a client? 
 How frequently do you work in a team? 
 
Work Intensity/Working Time Quality 
 How many hours on average per week do you work? 
 How frequently do your weekly working hours change? 
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Spanish ICT Firm Interview-  ALMP Internships 
 
 
 
 ¿Me puede decir el nombre de su puesto de trabajo actual y las tareas que 
desempeña en la empresa?  
 ¿Cuántos trabajadores hay?  
 ¿Cuáles son las ocupaciones de los empleados de la empresa? 
 ¿Cuál es el rango de edad promedio? 
 ¿Cuál es el porcentaje de trabajadores hombres y mujeres? 
 ¿Cuáles han sido algunos de los mayores desafíos para la empresa 
recientemente?  
 
 
Parte 1: Prácticas no laborales en empresas 
 
 ¿Cuál ha sido la experiencia de la empresa como anfitriona en prácticas no 
laborales en empresas?  
 ¿Cuántos participantes de prácticas no laborales ha recibido la empresa? 
 ¿Cuál fue / es la duración del programa de prácticas no laborales en la 
empresa?  
 ¿Cuáles han sido los niveles de educación de los participantes de prácticas no 
laborales en la empresa?   
 ¿Cuál fue el área de estudio de los participantes de prácticas no laborales en la 
empresa? 
 ¿Cuánto era el salario mensual promedio ofrecido a los trabajadores jóvenes 
que participaban en prácticas no laborales? ¿Por qué la empresa decidió 
ofrecer este salario? 
 ¿Qué tipo de formación recibieron los participantes de prácticas no laborales?  
 
Razones para participar 
 ¿Por qué la empresa decidió participar en el programa de prácticas no 
laborales? 
 ¿La empresa ha participado en otro tipo de programas de formación o  
prácticas del SOC en el pasado? ¿Por qué? 
 
Contratación 
 ¿El programa de prácticas no laborales está integrado en el plan de 
reclutamiento de la empresa? ¿Cómo está incorporado adentro del plan de 
reclutamiento de la empresa? 
 ¿Cuántos participantes de prácticas no laborales la empresa ha contratado? 
¿Para qué ocupaciones fueron contratados? ¿Por qué fueron contratados? 
 ¿Qué características fueron claves en la decisión de la empresa para contratar 
participantes de prácticas no laborales? 
 ¿Qué tipo de contrato se les hizo a los participantes en prácticas no laborales al 
ser posteriormente contratados al término del periodo de prácticas? ¿Por qué? 
 ¿Cuáles fueron las otras limitaciones u oportunidades sectoriales e 
institucionales que influyeron en la decisión del tipo de contrato que se les 
hizo a los participantes en prácticas no laborales? 
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Experiencia laboral 
 ¿Qué aporta la previa experiencia laboral del practicante a la empresa? 
 ¿Cómo influye la experiencia laboral en las decisiones de contratación? ¿Por 
qué? 
 ¿Qué tipo de experiencia laboral es valorada al tomar la decisión de 
contratación? ¿Por qué? 
 De los participantes en prácticas no laborales que fueron contratados ¿Cuántos 
tenían experiencia laboral anterior? 
 
Parte 2: Calidad del Trabajo 
 
Salario 
 ¿Cuál es el salario mensual promedio de los trabajadores? 
 ¿Cómo es que la empresa fija los salarios? ¿Qué impacta estas decisiones? 
 ¿Hasta qué punto es la rotación de empleados en la empresa, llega a ser un 
problema? ¿Por qué? 
 ¿Qué actividades o acciones se realizan la empresa para motivar a los 
trabajadores? 
 
Perspectivas de crecimiento 
 ¿Qué tipos de oportunidades hay en la empresa para el crecimiento 
profesional?  
 ¿Cómo se toman las decisiones  para las promociones? 
 ¿Cómo se adaptan los contratos de trabajo a las necesidades de flexibilidad 
horaria de la empresa 
 ¿Cómo varía la distribución de los tipos de contratos según la edad entre los 
trabajadores de la empresa? 
 
Formación y organización del trabajo 
 ¿Tiene planes anuales de formación y desarrollo? ¿Qué tipo de formaciones se 
ofrecen (informal en el puesto de trabajo, formal sobre el puesto de trabajo, 
formal con certificación)? 
 ¿Qué influyó en la decisión de ofrecer formación? 
 ¿Qué papel juegan los sindicatos en la formación?  
 ¿Qué tipos de trabajadores reciben capacitación?  
 ¿Cuáles son las cualificaciones profesionales de la mayoría de los trabajadores 
en la empresa? 
 ¿Cómo difunde la información entre sus trabajadores? 
 ¿Con qué frecuencia los empleados trabajan en equipos o grupos? 
 
Horarios laborales 
 
 ¿Cuánto horas semanales en promedio trabajan los empleados?  
 ¿Con que frecuencia cambian los horarios de trabajo de los trabajadores? ¿Por 
qué cambia o no cambia? 
 ¿Los trabajadores pueden ajustar su horario de trabajo para atender situaciones 
personales o familiares? 
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Representación de los empleados 
  ¿Qué tipo de representación de comités de empresa o delegados se encuentra 
disponible dentro de la empresa? ¿Qué tipo de problemas se discutieron en los 
últimos 12 meses? 
 
 ¿Cómo influyen el convenio colectivo del sector en las decisiones de la 
empresa para establecer normas específicas para  la formación, salarios, tipos 
de contratos ofrecidos, y horas flexibles? 
 
Red de asociaciones  
 ¿A qué asociaciones empresariales regionales y/o locales pertenece la 
empresa?  
 ¿Cuántas empresas más dentro de estas asociaciones empresariales también 
están participando en el programa de prácticas no laborales?  
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Spanish Former ALMP Intern/Current Employee  
 
 
Parte 1: Prácticas no laborales en empresas 
 
• ¿Me podrías comentar un poco sobre tu experiencia como participante en prácticas 
no laborales en empresas? 
• ¿Cuándo empezaste los practicas no laborales? 
• ¿Cuál ha sido tu nivel de educación cuando empezaste tus practicas no laborales? 
• ¿Cuánto fue tu salario mensual como participante en las prácticas no laborales?  
• ¿Por cuánto tiempo estuviste en una estancia de prácticas no laborales?  
• ¿Cuáles han sido sus responsabilidades participando en el programa de prácticas no 
laborales?  
• ¿Qué contenido estuvo incluido en el convenio de prácticas no laborales?  
 
Razones para la participación  
• ¿Por qué usted decidió participar en el programa de prácticas no laborales 
• ¿Por qué usted ha seleccionado para participar en las practicas no laborales?  
 
Experiencia del trabajo 
• ¿Qué tipo de experiencia de trabajo tenías antes de hacer prácticas no laborales en la 
empresa?  
• ¿Qué ganaste con la experiencia de trabajo de prácticas no laborales en la empresa? 
 
Contratación después de prácticas no laborales en empresas 
• ¿Cómo crees que la experiencia laboral obtenida a través de tu experiencia de 
prácticas no laborales en la empresa impactó directamente sus posibilidades de ser 
contratado después? 
• ¿Qué tipo de contrato recibiste después de tu estancia de prácticas no laborales en la 
empresa? 
 
Parte 2: Puesto de trabajo actual en la empresa 
 
• ¿Me puede decir el nombre de su puesto actual y las tareas que desempeña? 
• ¿De cuánto tiempo es su contrato de trabajo actual? 
• ¿Cómo cambió su puesto actual de trabajo antes de la crisis económica y después de 
la crisis económica?  
• ¿Qué tipo de contrato de trabajo tienes? 
 
Ganancias 
• ¿Cuánto es su sueldo neto mensual? ¿Su sueldo bruto anual? 
• ¿De qué depende su salario en la empresa? 
 
Prospectos de empleo 
• ¿Qué tipos de oportunidades ve en su puesto de trabajo para la promoción 
profesional? ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de promoción? 
• ¿Crees usted que su puesto de trabajo actual es seguro? ¿Por qué? 
 
Formación e Organización del trabajo: 
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•   ¿En los últimos doce meses que tipo de formación has recibido para mejorar sus 
habilidades para el puesto de trabajo? ¿La formación fue pagada por la empresa? 
• ¿Hasta qué punto crees que su título se ajusta (job-skill match) a las funciones del 
trabajo actual? ¿A su experiencia laboral? 
•¿Cómo es que la empresa difunde la información de la empresa entre sus 
trabajadores? 
• ¿Cuánta responsabilidad tiene en su puesto de trabajo actual para?: 
a) ¿Establece sus propios objetivos?  
b) ¿Establece su método de trabajo?  
• ¿Participa en las decisiones claves y la planificación dentro de la empresa? ¿Qué 
tipo de canales de comunicación se utiliza normalmente? 
• ¿Qué tipo de evaluación ha recibido en los últimos doce meses sobre su puesto de 
trabajo? 
• ¿Qué procedimientos debe seguir cuando surge un problema con un cliente o 
proveedor?  
• ¿Qué procedimientos debe seguir cuándo surge un problema con un supervisor o 
compañero de trabajo? 
• ¿Con qué frecuencia trabaja en equipo 
 
Intensidad del Trabajo y el Tiempo de Trabajo  
• ¿Cuántos horas semanales en promedio trabajas?  
• ¿Con que frecuencia cambia el horario de trabajo? 
• ¿Con qué frecuencia se espera que trabaje horas extra durante la semana? ¿Y durante 
el fin de semana? ¿Por qué? 
• ¿Puede ajustar su horario de trabajo para atender situaciones personales o 
familiares? 
 
Representación de los Trabajadores  
• ¿Qué influencia tiene el convenio colectivo sobre su salario, horario de trabajo y 
otras condiciones que influyan en la calidad de su puesto? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
